In December, I noted a story by Michael Isikoff in Newsweek that Condoleeza Rice would name Paul Wolfowitz to chair the State Department’s International Security Advisory Board.
Well, it is official. (Bloomberg News has a nice exposition with a money quote from Joe Cirincione.)
Although much of the attention is understandably focused on the chair, I am most concerned at how one-sided the overall composition of the board has become, especially since Amy Sands departed in the wake of that awful report they issued on space.
A little housekeeping. The ISAB removed the link to the terms of reference for their forthcoming China study. I have posted the TOR here.
A basic flaw in the TOR is the presumption that “China’s perceived military/strategic needs are translated into force structure”.
There is not one perception, but many such perceptions of threat and military/strategic needs in China, they are different across top leaders, Ministries, Services, and within each Military Region / Provincial entity and the respective Services and departments under them.
The top leadership (Hu/Wen) are nominally and formally in control of this disparate group, but with the exception of certain policy areas (like control over nuclear warheads) and the purchase of big ticket items from abroad that are highly visible (and hence, subject to control), Beijing’s grip on this vast system range from limited to questionable.
Each of the Military Regions have their own resources over and above the budget allocated from Beijing, including PLA/N owned enterprises, their own factories, stockpiles, mines, and other capabilities that Beijing do not directly control.
The MRs are in turn, highly autonomous and able to implement programs on their own with Beijing having a say only when it becomes an ‘international issue’ or a major domestic issue. (e.g. denying permission for the Kitty Hawk to enter Hong Kong for a pre-arranged and pre-approved (by Beijing) port call.
Chinese military tradition from Sun Tzu holds that once a Military Commander is appointed by the Emperor, specific judgments and commands cannot be questioned or reversed even by the Emperor. He can only be removed.
In that sense of the term, the PLA/N is more “states within a state” than probably any other military in the world.
Beyond this, there may be little or no sensible military / strategic needs behind their military programs beyond bureaucratic rationale like building an apparently impressive system (e.g. Type 094 SSBN) earns a few Admirals promotions. Never mind that such a system neither fits with Beijing’s ‘minimal means of reprisal’ strategy nor China’s available infrastructure to support such an operational capability. It is a fair bet that Hu/Wen have never been told the truth (nor do they understand) the limitations and weaknesses of the Type 094 platform and the negative consequences of deploying it vs. the positives.
Perhaps the TOR need to be rethought to account for these issues and its ramifications as to how to engage China in a meaningful dialog on arms control.
Man, and here I was hoping for the return of one Fred Dalton Thompson…
This is the same board who a majority of members signed on to a paper supporting low-yield bunker busting nuclear weapons and other battlefield uses for nukes around 2001.
So at least with the replacement of our man Fred with Wolfowitz, the board’s advice will remain consistently bad.
I am just annoyed that no reporter has called Amy Sands to ask why she left.