Iran has been making quarterly statements to the IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) for nine long years. That’s longer than most current IAEA member state permanent mission representatives in Vienna can recall because virtually none of these individuals were here in Vienna back then. But there are a few exceptions. And today one of them showed me that institutional memory matters.
Agenda item 7(d) of this week’s routine quarterly BOG meeting wrapped up today was “Implementation of IAEA Safeguards and Relevant UNSC Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran.”
True to form, during the discussion of that agenda item, Iran made a statement to the BOG this morning. Iran’s report represented the last scheduled occasion for Iran to make a comprehensive statement about its nuclear program before meeting with the six powers in Moscow on June 18. For that reason, the audience inside the boardroom in the M Building at the VIC today were particularly attentive.
Delegates were treated to a broadside by Ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh suggesting that Iran isn’t about to come to Moscow in a mood to cooperate. Among other points, Soltanieh told us today:
- The IAEA is an “international technical organization” only and is acting beyond its mandate in pursuing bogus “intelligence information” about alleged nuclear activities in member states.
- The IAEA is not really a United Nations agency at all, and therefore cannot be instructed by the Security Council to expand its mandate.
- “Involvement of the UNSC in [IAEA] matters has created a political and security dimension and prevented the [IAEA] to continue [sic] its smooth technical verification activities.”
- “The only reason that the [Iranian nuclear] file is still open is due to politically motivated allegations by a couple of Western countries.”
- The UNSC nuclear resolutions on Iran “lack… legal and technical basis.”
- Iran will never suspend its uranium enrichment program as called for by the UNSC resolutions.
Most of this we have heard before; in fact, since 2005, we’ve heard it many times. But with a little less than two weeks to go before Moscow, a lot of people in the boardroom interpreted this outburst as a signal that Iran on June 18 will not compromise. Is that really true? If the six powers during the next two weeks offer something more to Iran than spare parts for Boeing aircraft and additional Russian nuclear power cooperation, maybe there will be movement. But since we don’t really know what Iran is being offered by the six powers, we can’t say.
In any event, Iran on a couple of points today departed somewhat from its usual narrative. For instance, this:
In order to prove to the international community that all such allegations [of military or clandestine activity] are forged and baseless and our nuclear activities are exclusively for peaceful purposes, we have on many occasions worked intensively with the Safeguards Department, and in many cases we had to take steps beyond our obligations under the NPT. The full implementation of the Work Plan (INFCIRC/711) of 2007, which was negotiated and agreeed upon by Iran and the Agency and later endorsed by the Board of Governors, proved the political determination and good will of my Government.
That’s interesting because in the background of the BOG meeting–in a development far more significant than the meeting itself–Iran and the IAEA are negotiating the final text of a proposed agreement for a new Work Plan (these days the IAEA doesn’t use the somewhat tarnished term “Work Plan” but instead calls it a “structured approach document.”)
On the eve of the BOG meeting this week, I and two Carnegie colleagues, Eli Levite and Pierre Goldschmidt, put that ongoing bilateral negotiation into context here.
On Monday this week, IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano told the BOG that the IAEA and Iran will hold a meeting here on Friday, June 8 in Vienna to negotiate further over this new text.
If Soltanieh’s statement that the BOG endorsed the original 2007 Work Plan were true, it would imply that the BOG–the same policy-making organ that has been on Iran’s case for the last nine years–approved the original Work Plan which Iran since 2008 has claimed it has fulfilled. The Soltanieh narrative might also imply that the BOG should now look with favor upon the new version of the agreement that Iran is putting forth now.
But there was no endorsement of the Work Plan by the BOG meeting in September 2007.
The 2007 Work Plan was made available to the BOG as an “information circular,” described by the IAEA Department of Publications as intended to “bring matters of public interest to the attention of its member states.”
Infcirc/711 was accordingly distributed to the BOG on August 27, 2007 in this form.
There’s nothing in the Rules of Procedures of the Board of Governors, in the IAEA publications guidelines, or to my knowledge anywhere else that says that the BOG must approve or endorse any Infcirc document.
In fact, summary records from the September 2007 BOG suggest instead that Russia, China and NAM states welcomed the Work Plan but that other member states on the BOG received Infcirc/711 without enthusiasm and, on the basis of interventions that were recorded by the president of the BOG for that meeting, by expressing skepticism. The U.S. and European states went on record at the time by warning that adoption of the Work Plan might result in Iran’s unduly prolonging the IAEA’s investigation of Iran’s nuclear program and by preventing the IAEA from addressing critical issues on the basis of evidence presented after Iran “closes the file.” These issues are still with us in the discussion between the IAEA and Iran over the new agreement draft put forth by Iran. According to some versions of events, the lack of acceptance of the 2007 Work Plan by Western states and Japan in the boardroom prompted then-DG Mohammed ElBaradei to walk out of the meeting.
When the BOG convened in September 2007, Japan’s resident representative and Ambassador to the IAEA was Yukiya Amano. (He served from September 2005 through his election as IAEA Director General in late 2009). Amano joined his U.S. and European colleagues in registering criticism of the Work Plan, on behalf of the government of Japan.
On Tuesday this week, before Iran addressed the BOG on safeguards in Iran, the 35 governors had taken up agenda item 7(b), “The Safeguards Implementation Report for 2011.” During that discussion, the Russian Federation raised objections to the IAEA’s State-Level Safeguards Approach as arbitrary and subjective. It wasn’t clear to most people why Russia made this intervention; after all, IAEA safeguards in Russia follow from a Russian voluntary safeguards offer to the IAEA (Infcirc/369) and are extremely limited in any case. Come what may, in his statement the next day inside the boardroom, Soltanieh appeared to use Russia’s statement on the SIR as a springboard, attacking the IAEA again and again for exceeding its technical mandate by indulging in arbitrary “allegations not involving nuclear materials.”
The points raised about the limitations of the IAEA’s authority are also found in Daniel Joyner’s book, and the Non Aligned Movement has strongly criticized the IAEA reports on Iran: http://www.campaigniran.org/casmii/index.php?q=node/11868. And before then, http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india-with-nam-in-slamming-iaea-report-on-iran/682728/
“NAM notes with concern the possible implications of the continued departure from standard verification language in the summary of the report of the Director General,” said the statement which was read during the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on behalf of over 100 NAM member states, including India. ”
The IAEA is in fact not a investigative agency, and its function in the NPT context is quite limited to measuring declared fissile material. The text of Iran’s standard safeguards agreement with the IAEA specifically states — twice — that that’s the ‘exclusive’ purpose.
Thanks Mark. Very informative.
Two questions immediately spring to my mind.
If we accept that a circulated Infcirc document doesn’t amount to an endorsement by the Board of Governors then:
Q1: what DOES the BoG actually have to do to endorse a Working Plan?
If we accept that the BoG DIDN’T endorse that 2007 Working Plan then
Q2: What – exactly – are the questions that the IAEA is expecting Iran to provide answers to?
Because it seems to me that absent a Working Plan then the list of questions are entirely open-ended, and so there is no way that Iran can ever get “the Iran book” closed.
Obviously so, precisely because a politicized IAEA can simply keep piling up new questions now matter how often Iran answers old queries.
If that were the case then I can thoroughly understand why Soltanieh is So Very Pissed Off.
Excellent points, Johnboy. I actually think that even with the 2007 working plan as the basis of cooperation, there is still sufficient ambiguity in the document and in the BoG decisions to essentially keep Iran on the hook forever. And I think that is in fact the most likely scenario, particularly now with Amano at the helm. I think it all goes back to the IAEA operating outside its mandate in the possible military dimensions area. This means that the level of cooperation required by Iran, and the level of effort and standards of evidence required to reach that level of cooperation are not specified in any governing documents, because the IAEA is acting outside its documentary framework. This is indeed part of what Iran has been complaining about – a lack of standards for the IAEA’s inquiries, which makes BoG decisions on Iran’s case inherently subjective and highly susceptible to politicization.
The point I believe is to be deliberately vague such that goalposts can forever be moved and even new ones put in place to make sure Iran never gets off the hook. The goal is to have a method whereby sanctions can be made permanent until such time as the regime collapses.
Wishful thinking of course: may need some Iraq-like prodding to change the regime.
Amy, there might well be a problem with applying some Iraqi-style “prodding” to Iran.
It is this: sanctions had the highly-desirable effect of weakening the Iraqi military, whose foreign-made weaponry simply wasted away from a decades-long lack of spare parts and ammo. Pushing THEM over was easy.
But the Iranian military is “sanction-proof”, precisely because they make it all in-house i.e. everything from the boots on on up to the missiles mounted on the fighter jets are stamped “Made in Iran”.
Those Iranian weapons are lo-tech, no question.
But the Iranians know that once they press the trigger those weapons will fire, and they know that it doesn’t matter how long they keep their finger on that firing button the bullets will keep spewing out.
That’s a daunting prospect even for the US Armed Forces, since it’s been at least 40 years since they have fought such an enemy.
The “Structured Approach Document” aka SAD about sums up the state of affairs.
How many cooks are at this broth? Who is IRI supposed to please? US? EU? P5+1? IAEA? UNSC?
This mess would not have happened if Iran’s CSA was followed and arbitration initiated instead of an extrajudicial referral to the UNSC.
Chapter 7 sanctions are extra-judicial since there can be no “threat to the peace” from a nuclear program that the IAEA said ended any weapons-related work rather abruptly in 2003 and that our DNI backs up.
How is it a threat to the peace?
Soltanieh’s bullets seem to be correct.
You may be interested in this recent oped:
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/05/a_queen_for_a_queen?page=full
As the author suggests: if we’re really worried about the 20% work….well strike a f-ing deal and be done! It seems we are not and the sanction are here to stay, like on Iraq.
Oh… and how US torpedoed an earlier deal:
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=108043
If I was an investigative reporter I would see which lobbyists wrote the text of the sanctions on Iran.
“Iran isn’t about to come to Moscow in a mood to cooperate.”
Well, maybe its Iran’s turn not to cooperate after the P5+1 have not been cooperating for like ever.
S.A.D. indeed.
Anon makes an excellent point: the Safeguards agreement has a clause of how to handle disputes not concerning diversion: arbitration NOT referral to a POLITICAL UNSC.
The best way forward would be to kick of arbitration now. I recall Mark supported arbitration about a year or two back.
Is Germany supplying nuclear-capable submarines to Israel — apparently in full knowledge of how they will be used — a possible violation of the NPT?
http://www.richardsilverstein.com/tikun_olam/2012/06/04/germany-sells-israel-nuclear-weapons-capable-submarines/
How does the +1 of the P5+1 explain this behaviour?
I also wanted to bring that up, it seems strange that the west doesn’t put pressure on Germany regarding these nuclear capable submarine sales where as in the case where Russia equipped Iran’s navy with the Kilo class submarines the Americans put considerable pressure on the deal.
Considering the dolphin class submarines are nuclear capable and the Kilo class are not… it seems strange and in some cases hypocritical in terms of their attitude towards proliferation.
This is fundamentally no different than the Chinese selling TELs to North Korea. I suppose the Chinese can get an additional fig leaf’s worth of coverage by claiming that Wanshan Special Vehicle Compay was just selling ICBM TELs as a private venture without government approval while the Dolphin sale definitely required Berlin’s approval.
But, while such a transfer is highly questionable w/re the spirit of the NPT, I do not believe that sale of nuclear-capable delivery systems violates the letter of the treaty. Even ICBMs sans warhead could probably be sold freely under the NPT (though not the MTCR).
The fact that this is a front-page Der Spiegel story, and that Israel allowed a foreign journalist for the first time on a Dolphin submarine, makes this an interesting development. What was the Israeli PR motivation in allowing a Der Spiegal reporter aboard? I imagine the Israeli PR people now think this is a bit of a disaster given the line Der Spiegel has taken:
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/israel-deploys-nuclear-weapons-on-german-built-submarines-a-836784.html
Pondering what the rationale Israeli PR might have for assisting in this story:
a) Send a more public and clear message to Iran that Israel already has a second strike capability, so Iran having a first-strike ambition weapon would have limited merit?
b) Indirectly reassuring the Israeli public that Israel has already countered any Iranian virtual nuclear power capability, so they need not worry unduly even if Iran contiues enrichment etc?
c) Simply acting as an open governement? (unlikely)
d) Trying to gain German public support for supplying more Dolphin subs to Isreal – without conditions such as stopping settlements? (Looks like a big fail on this one)
Option b seems the most likely to me.
John, remember that the Chinese sold only a TEL chassis to North Korea, without the means to launch or even safely support a missile in transport.
I do think that is fundamentally different to a super-silent submarine specially adapted with large and unusual 650 mm diameter launch tubes, with a hydraulic launch mechanism. A system pre-built with the mechanism to carry and launch large cruise missiles.
I think there is little equivalence between a fancy lorry chassis, and one of the most advanced and quiet conventionally powered submarines in the world.
Although it has to be conceded that the MTCR does ban land based missile launch vehicles, but the rules do not apply to equivalent launch vehicles if they operate from water or the air.
This “nuclear capable” thing doesn’t mean much. The Dolphin submarines can, like most modern submarines, launch cruise missiles from its torpedo tubes. And cruise missiles, as everyone knows, can potentially carry nuclear as well as conventional warheads.
The fighter aircraft the US sells Israel are also “nuclear capable” – they can, after all, carry nuclear bombs and cruise missiles. So can ships and missiles can even be fired from ground launchers. Almost any platform is “nuclear capable” by that definition.
Yes, I agree.
Also, in Iran’s CSA it says the exclusive purpose is to make sure no diversion of nuclear materials takes place: so even if the Parchin conventional explosives studies were weapons related it is not a breach of the CSA.
Funny how law is malleable if one is looking at Germany vs. Iran.
Andy, you make good points that cruise missiles are easy to launch from lots of general purpose platforms.
Yet it is interesting to note that MTCR 12.A.2 makes (land) vehicles capable of launching large cruise missiles a MTCR Cat II item, but not equally functional sea or air vehicles. Perhaps MTCR 12.A.2 should have had a reduced scope to ballistic missiles, and perhaps then included sea and air vehicles.
NB Der Spiegel reports named former German officials saying things like they “assumed from the very beginning that the submarines were supposed to be nuclear-capable”. Also:
“German officials speaking under the protection of anonymity were even more forthcoming. “From the beginning, the boats were primarily used for the purposes of nuclear capability,” says one ministry official with knowledge of the matter.”
Their major new point is that the German military establishment understood at the time the submarine would become a nuclear platform, so were acting against the spirit of non-proliferatiion from the outset.
I have a question, once a country signs NPT, is it possible for it to come out it. as I understand it’s a two way treaty. could iran come out of it and then it becomes legal for it to aquire nuclear bomb.
Yes. North Korea did exactly that.
The problem for Iran is that any such announcement would also mark the exact instant that Benyamin Netanyahu orders the IAF to launch its bombers against Iran **and** cry that Israel is the victim in all this.
Better to simply stay in the NPT, and thereby deprive Israel of even the slightest excuse to claim victimhood.
I am convinced that the point of these negotiations is not solving the problem (for either sides). It seems it is a way to spend time till November. Only after an election a solution might emerge either diplomatic or militaristic.
Amir, you are dead right.
Obama in his multiple national security debates with Romney this fall has to say we kept all the sanctions, and perhaps added some more, per latest comments by David Cohen, czar of Iran sanctions in the Treasury Department.
The game for these P5+1 meetings is to throw a bone at IRI, such as civilian aircraft parts, so that Obama can say we stopped 20% as well, but all the draconian sanctions are still in place.
IRI should not have the illusion that USG will accept enrichment on the Iranian soil, so long as Bibi and company are against it.
“IRI should not have the illusion that USG will accept enrichment on the Iranian soil, so long as Bibi and company are against it.”
There is an end-run that the USA can take around that Bibi-Bluster(tm). If it wants to, of course…..
The USA can come to an accomodation with Tehran whereby the Iranians provide some answers on past nuclear projects, and then the USA can tell Amano (nobody here believes that Amano is independent, do they?) to declare that the IAEA is now satisfied; case closed.
At which point, of course, the UNSC would also close the book on Iran.
That probably takes us past November, and a re-elected Obama could then point out the futility of the USA continuing to sanction Iran over something that both the IAEA and the UNSC says is a non-issue.
Again, that is all predicated upon Obama **wanting** to put this baby to bed, but if he does then that’s how he can do it.
It’s not difficult to see why the BOG would never endorse the original Work Plan, it was never going to get them the answers they wanted on the Alleged Studies, now morphed into PMDs, and they could not endorse a route to recognising the right to enrich by default.
Which means to say the PMDs are not the main issue for either side.
There’s a fascinating read in Middle East Report (online) at the moment – an interview with Hossein Mousavian, very closely involved on the Iranian side in the EU3 negotiations. He believes the PMD questions are basically the easiest part of the problem – with the right agreement they would be resolved in 48 hours.
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero051612
Mark, would you mind explaining what the Board of Governors **do** have to do before it can be said that they have endorsed a Work Plan?
Indeed, it is unclear from your article whether the BoG even does deign to endorse such Work Plans, Iran-wise or otherwise.
“The IAEA is not really a United Nations agency at all, and therefore cannot be instructed by the Security Council to expand its mandate”
That is a rather important legal point, is it not?
If I have read INFCIRC/11 correctly then that claim is correct i.e. the IAEA is merely an external agency that has a special working relationship with the UN, but its mandate does not derive from the UN.
And if that is the case then, sure, any UNSC Resolution that claims to grant the IAEA additional authority or an expanded mandate must be ultra vires.
Johnboy, you are correct here, and importantly so, that the IAEA is not a part of the UN. It was established independently by treaty, and only has a working relationship with the UN. This is often misunderstood. The agency is constantly being referred to in the media as the UN’s nuclear watchdog. That description is completely inaccurate.
There is an interesting legal question that you mention, and that I’ve heard before, which is the extent to which the UNSC can use it’s Chapter VII powers to expand the mandate of the IAEA. I am quite skeptical about such claims of authority in the UNSC. I’ve written quite a bit on the legal limits of the UNSC’s powers, using arms control cases as case studies. I think the UNSC has exceeded its authority in a number of cases in the past 11 years, including Resolution 1540, and some of its resolutions on NK and Iran. I lay all this out in detail in my recent article in the Georgetown Journal of International Law. The idea that the UNSC could unilaterally alter the bilateral treaty relationship between a state and the IAEA, and give the IAEA as an international organization more authority than it was given by its founding states, seems to me to run counter to some fundamental principles of international law, including the consensual nature of sources and the limited legal personality of international organizations. I think it is a bridge too far for the UNSC to claim to have such sweeping, legal hegemonic powers.
The full text of Soltanieh’s statement appears here:
http://iraniandiplomacy.ir/en/news/52/bodyView/1902448/Iran:.Halting.Nuclear.Enrichment.Impossible.html
Why is it that all 22 comments on ACW want to give Iran a free pass on both Parchin and 20% enrichment (particularly in excess of the requirement to fuel the TRR)?
Is not the overall risk higher to the region if a country is allowed to without checks 1) produce all the nuclear material and 2) test designs for weapons?
Maybe this is all strictly peaceful, but it seems to me to be at least potential dual use and the risk exists without active monitoring by the IAEA. IAEA lowers the risk of a nuclear confrontation, so why not encourage it in the 22 comments?
I don’t think any one wants to give a free pass to anyone: most of these 22 comments are outlining what the LAW says so that there can be some perspective, rational discussion and some legal basis for action.
Absent that it is just feelings: I feel threatened by Iran so I feel we must do XYZ. That is not how law works.
There was the CSA: any dispute that does not involve diversion of nuclear materials can be settled by arbitration. Instead extra-judicially Iran case was sent to UNSC.
Then, extra-judicially the UNSC found Ch 7 sanctions to fit the bill whereas those can only be enacted when a threat to the peace exists.
Our DNI and IAEA say weapons work (such as it was: research level) ended in 2003.
Right now, Iran is in full compliance with its CSA. The 10-y.o. Parchin business is not relevant. Not now. Not then. It was conventional explosives whatever the purpose. Nothing to do with the CSA.
That is why people (NAM) are pissed: Iran’s case has been GROSSLY mishandled by the IAEA, UNSC, P5+1 etc. whereas we see Germany giving nuclear capable subs to Israel.
That is why you have the 22 comments defending international law — not defending Iran.
BTW, Mark, do you still support arbitration?
anon2:
the best way to familiarize yourself with the relevant law is to read the CSA — linked in the F.P. article near the start of the comments, and with Prof. Joyner’s article:
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/2011/11/dan-joyner-iaea-report.php
Basically, I think everyone would like no nukes anywhere: but there are laws and prescribed methods and legal scope — this is not what one wishes or not wishes to be the case. It is law.
It’s not so much that anyone wants to give Iran a “free pass” as it is not wanting to hand to the IAEA a “carte blanche”.
The IAEA does appear to act as it is free to redefine its own mandate on a whim and a prayer, thereby granting to itself an authority that it does not possess.
It should be pretty obvious why that is an exceptionally dangerous proposition i.e. it gives an enormous incentive for a country like the USA to parachute their own man *cough* Amano *cough* into the IAEA, there to make life miserable for Whatever Country The USA Decides To Pick On This Week.
Ask yourself this: if that were the end result of all these shenanigans then why would any country (except the USA and its allies, of course) want to remain in the IAEA?
Or, long story short: this is an issue that goes way beyond the immediate objective of Let’s Bring Iran Down A Peg Or Two.
Anon, Amy and Johnboy,
Your points are all logical consequences of the law that exists. Without being a lawyer myself, lets assume that you are correct and Iran is not violating any law with both 95% enrichment and a conventional explosives test of a nuclear warhead compression/detonation system.
But
1) Does not continued work at Parchin contradict the (politically inspired) DNI statement that Iran ceased its weapons development program in 2003?
2) If there is no law against 95% enrichment by a country with stated hostile intent, should not the IAEA use every method within its power to attempt to prevent 95% enrichment of sufficient material for one or multiple weapons?
With regard to Amano, I think we can all agree that he is not an agent of the United States, but instead an elected choice that the United States supported (among other countries).
@anon2
” continued work at Parchin”
What continued work at Parchin? Anything nuclear you know of? Please do share! The IAEA knows of no nuclear materials work now — or ever — at Parchin.
If it is military and conventional materials are involved it is not an issue for the IAEA.
“If there is no law against 95% enrichment by a country with stated hostile intent, should not the IAEA use every method within its power to attempt to prevent 95% enrichment of sufficient material for one or multiple weapons?”
No. We should stick to international law. If we (IAEA) need to change the CSA agreement with Iran to prevent 95% enrichment we should do so THROUGH the law.
If we need to make a new NPT treaty we should work on that.
We should not spin wild and grossly incorrect versions of written LAW.
BTW, The only real (non-rhetorical) stated hostile intent I’ve seen is from the US and Israel.
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“With regard to Amano, I think we can all agree that he is not an agent of the United States, but instead an elected choice that the United States supported (among other countries).”
No, Amano is likely an agent of the US — he went to the US IC before publishing the Nov 2011 report in a hushed up trip.
See also the links to Amano’s name in the FP piece I mentioned:
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/05/a_queen_for_a_queen?page=full
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So, no, in short international law is not what you feel like it should be today. However strongly you feel.
The IAEA is not free to expand its mandate.
anon2,
Iran’s basic argument is that that non-proliferation can best be ensured when there’s a perception of fairness. So while it’s good that IAEA cares so much about nuclear proliferation in Iran, it would be much more successful in its efforts if it worked on the basis of mutual trust and presented itself as proportionately concerned about nuclear proliferation in different countries based on their real conduct. Remember that Iran was implementing the Additional Protocol and fully cooperating in resolving concerns about unreported past work involving nuclear material (all of which were eventually resolved), when it’s case was sent to the UNSC in early 2006 since it had restarted 3.5% uranium enrichment under the full surveillance of the IAEA.
If the letter of the law does not matter in the case of Iran, it should also not matter in the case of Israel, US-India cooperation, Brazil’s nuclear record, disarmament of existing nuclear weapons states, etc. Otherwise, Iran perceives the investigation as not being really based on a genuine concern about nuclear proliferation, but on political motivations.
See the merip.org link by Andy above for a clear explanation of Iran’s position. If you find it unjustified, let us know.
anon2: “If there is no law against 95% enrichment by a country with stated hostile intent, should not the IAEA use every method within its power”….
Let me stop you right there and ask you what the phrase “within its power” actually means.
After all, if I don’t want you to do something then it is perfectly “within my power” to pick up a piece of lead pipe and whack you about the head until you agree to stop what you are doing.
That is, of course, dependent upon the definition of “within my power”, which can mean:
“what I can do” versus
“what I am allowed to do” versus
“what I am entitled to do”.
So what do you mean when you so blythly toss about a phrase like “within its power”?
See this also:
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-heroux/the-iranian-nuclear-program_b_1559545.html
@anon2
“Why is it that all 22 comments on ACW want to give Iran a free pass on both Parchin and 20% enrichment (particularly in excess of the requirement to fuel the TRR)?”
Well, Parchin — assuming it was nuke-related, which Bob Kelley says it likely was not — would still be conventional explosives. So it is not the “22 comments” who give Iran a free pass, it is the CSA. The law gives Iran a free pass on Parchin, ok? [Also, it like WAS 15-10 YEARS AGO. Get over it. The DNI says he has “high confidence” that there is no nuke work in IRI. IAEA confirms all that stuff ended in 2003]
Re. 20% enrichment: the LAW SAYS IRI can enrich to whatever level it pleases and whatever amount it pleases so long as no diversion occurs. Even 95%, as long as it is under safeguards. ok?
So when the IRI is willing to curtail it, take that as a sign of goodwill on their part that they are volunteering to give up their rights.
That is why knowledge of law is helpful: it helps you see when the other party is actually being cooperative and showing good will.
What is really stopping a deal is p5+1 unwillingness to take yes for an answer. Also congress.
I think the dry question of law, while important, answers a few things but delivers little. Both sides have lost faith in the ability of the law as it stands to provide a solution. Both sides need to coax the other into voluntary arrangements that create new law that does give them the confidence they seek in the other.
Both sides have played their own legal, political and tactical games since 2003 – but ultimately both sides need to come up with something that serves their interests and they can sell to their populations.
The US have the bigger obstacles in that regard – Israel and Congress, the latter being where the two conflate. Support for Israel is an order of magnitude greater in Congress than in US public opinion in general. Obama et al need to get their game right. They have probably done more for Israel’s QME than any previous administration. They have done their bit.
Iran needs to get their game right too. If they really want to curb Israeli power in the region, if they really want to do something concrete for the Palestinians rather than blandly invoke their cause for their own benefit, they have to give the US something to work with.
Simple innit?
The law in this case is quite clear: Iran does have a right to enrichment, and it has not violated the NPT, and past safeguards breaches — which according to the IAEA did not involve a diversion of fissile material for non-peaceful uses and were unrelated to any weapons program — have been remedied. There is no valid legal basis of the demand that Iran allow inspections of non-nuclear sites, and furthermore if the IAEA has a valid basis that there are undeclared sites in Iran, it should go to the Board and ask for Special Inspections. The law is squarely on Iran’s side.
Yes, Iran volunteered to give up 20% enrichment and got the finger from the p5+1 BECAUSE THIS IS NOT ABOUT ANYTHING TO DO WITH IRAN’s NUCLEAR PROGRAM.
It is about wanting to get rid of the regime. See:
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=108043
If I was an investigative reporter I would see which lobbyists wrote the text of the US sanctions on Iran.
From that URL:
“For the U.S. the enrichment in Iran is a red line which the EU cannot cross,” Mousavian quotes Nicoullaud as saying.
=====
Well, too bad….looks like the US will have to suck it up.
Hass – I don’t disagree, but Iran has also contributed to undermining the confidence in the legal question. There’s the modified subsidiary arrangements dispute, there’s the unveiling of the IR-2 centrifuge shortly after closing off the Work Plan (an item of which was proving the non-existence of the P2 centrifuge), there’s Ahmadinejad claiming Iran has laser enrichment technology after the issue had been closed off by the IAEA. There are many things that all serve to convey the impression that the IAEA is pushing water uphill with a rake.
I understand that this is largely self-inflicted, a response to the nonsense approach adopted as a result of the bleak Bush/Sharon meeting of minds, but we are where we are.
Anon – that quote applied to the EU3 talks in Bush’s time. The US is much more likely to countenance enrichment now. It’s a red line for Israel, not the US, and the real issue is how the US gets round that.
In all likelihood, every party to the talks including the US knows and wants the same deal, and every party knows the US cannot deliver it because of Congress/Israel.
The US has got to get its house in order. Iran can throw them a bit if a bone to help, and probably should, but they won’t do it for airplane spares.
Exactly — they offered to suspend 20% enrichment.
If the West really worries about that, then they should shelve some real sanctions and make a deal.
But they are not worried about anything nu-cu-ler in Iran.
Congress (i.e. Israel) wants to keep sanctions in place no matter. Like Iraq.
Fake nuclear issues are a tactic to achieve this.
At the moment, Iran is in full compliance with its CSA.
They didn’t offer to suspend it. They merely suggested they could be open to offers, and the initial P5+1 bid was a tad shy of the mark.
Cute.
Yes, I meant they offered to suspend it, IF THEY GOT SOMETHING SUBSTANTIAL IN RETURN.
The last part is a no-brainer, really.
Yes, it is. But it’s in the P5+1’s interest to try to set the floor as low as possible. No doubt they wanted to test just how much leverage the soon-to-be-introduced sanctions have given them.
And if they got something cheap it would ease the process at home.
Interesting though that they haven’t attempted to demand a full suspension. That in itself is counter to all the UNSCRs.
Mark, thanks for an interesting post & discussion.
anon2 asks ” If there is no law against 95% enrichment by a country with stated hostile intent, should not the IAEA use every method within its power to attempt to prevent 95% enrichment of sufficient material for one or multiple weapons”
Firstly, enrichment in Iran goes up to 19.75% LEU — modulo the occasional start up reflux.
Secondly, yes, the IAEA should use all methods within its powers — so long as they are consistent with the law, and with agreements signed with Iran. As Dan and Johnboy point out the IAEA is out on a limb.
Thirdly, no, the IAEA should pay no heed to political statements [“hostile intent”] and should conduct their business in a purely technical and impartial fashion. Recently, ex-IAEA inspector and LANL nuclear engineer Bob Kelley said that, under Amano, the IAEA is being unprofessional. I tend to agree.
The IAEA should not become a political instrument of any states.
Regarding that point, I found Mark’s 2003 article in Nuclear Fuel re. US intervening to stop the IAEA cooperating with Iran in 1983 very interesting:
“U.S. in 1983 stopped IAEA from helping Iran make UF6 by Mark Hibbs, Bonn Nuclear Fuel August 4, 2003 Vol. 28, No. 16; Pg. 12”
http://www.iranaffairs.com/iran_affairs/2007/12/irans-not-so-hi.html
Mark, if you have more thoughts to share on that it would be great to hear. Do such political maneuvers still occur at the IAEA?
There is (again) an overly legalistic spin here.
Diplomacy isn’t just about international law, it’s about power and facts on the ground. Diplomats and scholars who focus on law to the exclusion of power or facts on the ground are doing the world and themselves a disservice.
The NPT and IAEA legally have a bunch of particular clauses, and a less formal power agreement (“You won’t build nukes, and we won’t stomp you arbitrarily”).
The legalism was intended in part to enable enough confidence building that the knowledge required to verify “You won’t build nukes” was part of the program. The IAEA basic treaty and particular additional protocols are rather heavily weighted towards that, if you know what you’re looking for.
Facts on the ground are that there’s a whole lot of circumstantial and more alleged evidence that Iran had a 1980s – 2003 active nuclear weapon design and technology program, that allegedly went cool (some ongoing tests but not organized program) after 2003. The IAEA and NPT are failing to provide confidence building or inspections (so far) to disprove or prove that.
The entire point of NPT and IAEA is to prevent people from cheating in ways that then lead to joint US-Israeli bombing campaigns and outright warfare. Iran’s not playing ball, and is playing the legalism card. It’s obviously in their best interest in both scenarios of “there’s a program (cool or covertly active) and we’re hiding it” and “we’re bluffing up a program as a geopolitical tool” (what Saddam’s Iraq did, to its ultimate demise).
The legalists are NOT HELPING.
There’s a point; the treaty should be more explicit, sure. It’s not like they’re wrong there. And IAEA is being politicized in the process. But they’re missing the bigger point, which is that a failure of confidence-building and Iranian cooperation here leads to war, not greater international cooperation and peace.
If you are providing Iran cover here, it’s not helpful. A number of commentators are. If your intention is to help provoke the situation to war, ok, that’s at least consistent behavior then. If you aren’t trying to provoke a war, approaching it purely legalistically from a bash-the-US-and-Israel point of view just encourages the upcoming war.
I would like to submit that it’s immoral to be in the latter camp. Your position doesn’t help Iran, the IAEA, or anyone else. Fixing the legal and treaty situation needs to be a separate thread from crisis management.
Well war is not good but if they want Iranian to ignore their dignity we welcome it. A war has equal consequences for everyone involved (or even not involved)
Thanks George for your common sense in the name of those (like myself) who yawn at another repetitive legalistic discussion. Points made here by various commentators have been made over and over. (And, incidentally, most if not all of them have thoroughly debunked over the past fiver years or so by Andreas, Jeff, Josh, Mark, etc.)
George,
I would like to know your opinion about my prior comment directed to anon2, and also Iran’s concerns as expressed clearly by Mousavian in his April interview with MERIP.
George,
I find your comments here to mesh very well with what the USG tends to do whenever they sense international law is not on their side in a dispute – argue its irrelevance. How many times did this happen during the Bush administration, regarding Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay, the list goes on. However, when the USG senses the law to be on their side, e.g. In WTO disputes, piracy and law of the sea disputes, diplomatic law disputes, they will wax eloquent with their righteous legal indignation and criticize the other party for their violations of vital principles of international law. This hypocrisy never ceases to tick me off. I am a law professor, and so I do tend to see things in a legalistic light. Though no more than you technical types tend to see things through a technical lens. But I do genuinely think that international law is important, among other reasons because it is a test of consistency and sincerity of policies, and creates a predictable playing field for states, which does tend to reduce distrust and miscommunications of intent. That is of course if international law is honored. In the case of Iran, I think international law plays an important role in exposing the politicized and ideological nature of the criticism of Iran and of the drumbeat to war. The primary reason for both is Israel’s perception of Iran as a threat to their security and regional power, and the wildly disproportionate influence that Pro-Israeli interests have in US politics. International law, in requiring objectivity and consistency, can expose such politicized, ideologically based aggression. In doing so, I sincerely hope that international law helps to avoid war in this case. Legal analysis certainly hasn’t caused the current crisis. All the players share blame for it, though in my opinion the US bears the most blame.
Shaheen, I can’t help disagreeing strenuously with your assertion that legal arguments supporting the Iranian position have been debunked. I have actually been impressed by how little solid legal analysis has been presented anywhere in defense of the US/Israeli/EU legal positions on the Iran issue. I conclude that no one has come forward because there really is no solid legal case supporting their positions, and they know that, and they are simply counting on their economic and military power to overcome the deficiencies in their principled/legal positions.
GWH: “The legalists are NOT HELPING.”
I have no time for such self-servicing handwaving, which I find is always waved around when the proponent understands – however dimmly – that the law is standing between them and The Thing They Want.
I find that the best retort is to quote this paragraph from Anthony D’Amato:
“The best that international law can do is to articulate to states that are involved in a dispute a choice between the legal route and the expedient route. To choose legality is to bring a tiny bit more order into the world; to choose power politics will bring a measure of disorder into the world.”
George wants to go the expedient route, because that’s the only route that is open to him.
And, who knows, it might even get George what he wants.
But that requires that you think only about what expediency gets you, and not at all about where it takes you.
I happen to think that both are important.
George doesn’t, because George is wearing blinkers.
GHW: “The entire point of NPT and IAEA is to prevent people from cheating in ways that then lead to joint US-Israeli bombing campaigns and outright warfare.”
George, the entire point of NPT and IAEA is to dangle a carrot under the nose of member states i.e. if you sign this treaty and you abide by its rules then you get lots and lots of goodies for your nuclear program. If you don’t sign it or you refuse to abide by it then you get the cold shoulder.
That is the entire point of NPT and IAEA, and George is simply spouting nonsense when he claims that the role of both is to straight-jacket a.n.y.b.o.d.y so that there is no excuse for the USA/Israel to go aaround hitting that poor unfortunate soul with A Big Stick.
George, baby, there *is* no excuse for the USA/Israel to go hitting anybody with A Big Stick, and that is true regardless of whether (or not) that somebody has (or has not) signed this dinky little treaty.
Might does not make right.
Sorry if that offends you, but, there you are….
Dan and Johnboy –
Johnboy seems to feel (I think) that the correct answer is to balance all three of legalism / international law, not going to war, and not having an Iranian nuclear weapon (please correct me if I’m wrong). Do you honestly think we can have all three?
What I want, personally, is to avoid both an Iranian nuclear weapon and a US/Israeli war against Iran. Any damage we can avoid doing to international law in the process is to be pursued, but those two goals are more important to me than legalities.
I would like both. If I cannot have both, I have a reluctant preference for avoiding the Iranian nuclear weapon. I put the law on a second tier at the moment.
I would like to know if you disagree that these are both strongly desirable, and if so, which you would individually reluctantly prefer if in fact a choice has to be made between them.
Dan, you are pretty openly suggesting that you feel that the whole case here is invalid somehow, that we don’t actually face this situation and hard choice. I understand that assertion, but I strenuously disagree that it’s reality. Even if you disagree that that’s the situation we’re in right now, I would like you to (for the sake of argument) answer my question as if that is the choice we face.
If you would put international law on the top tier, above avoiding a war, then that’s what I submit is legalism and at least arguably immoral. In the long run, we need international law and not rule by force, yes. But the long run is not today; power and diplomacy are still intertwined. If you refuse to understand or acknowledge it you’re setting up a falsely simplified model of the situation. It’s essentially a form of utopian diplomacy, which is unrealistic to the point of counterproductivity. That we should be going towards better behavior doesn’t mean that we can ignore power realities now.
Mohammed –
Iran’s pre-negotiations rhetoric has evolved some nuance that may indicate that they understand and are willing to cooperate with confidence-building measures regarding their former program.
That is somewhat contraindicated by recently apparently having attempted to destroy evidence at Parchin, and continuing to deny any validity to the now fairly massive pile of evidence on the pre-2003 weaponization program (and slight evident post-2003 ongoing effort).
The western flexibility on mutual deescalation seems good. But Iran has previously tended to play like confidence building was unnecessary. Iraq tried that; Saddam got ultimately buried because of it. If they really get it, and are willing to put it on the table and stop fucking around with covering stuff up, come clean for real, then they are bringing enough to the table for the west to step up, turn crisis off, and reduce sanctions.
I see two possible actual endstates here:
One, Iran refuses to play ball. Some time in the not too distant future, either Israel or the US+Israel stop playing ball too, and all or most identified Iranian nuclear facilities are destroyed. Iran uses this for internal political purposes, plays the innocent martyrdom card internationally, retaliates widely but in a manner which avoids outright full war with the US.
Two, Iran accedes to coming clean and confidence building, and things normalize. I believe that this includes coming clean about a mostly pre-2003 weapons program, a real R265, Parchin, numerous other details, but whatever reality turns out to be, they open the books and let people talk to the IAEA, and allow the IAEA to verify the program really is shut down and keep verifying that they don’t restart it. I suspect that once the west (and Israel) have confidence the program really is over, and not coming back, an actual peaceful nuclear program (including safeguarded enrichment and confidence-building access to the Iranian centrifuge R&D and production programs, to ensure no diversion to a topping enrichment plant still hdden somewhere) is tolerable to the west (and Israel), though they would muchly prefer that it just go away. I suspect that the recent rounds of financial sanctions are removed in response or temporarily as a pre-incentive, and permanently after confidence building is going for real.
Once confidence building is established and the situation normalizes, it ceases to be a crisis in any sense, and other than ongoing IAEA monitoring to ensure nondiversion and no new secret topping enrichment plants it’s just a question of how isolated and antagonistic does Iran want to stay.
Johnboy:
No. The entire point of NPT (and IAEA) was to discourage nuclear weapons proliferation.
Article II
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
George,
First, I’m glad to have this stimulating conversation with you. It’s only through such collegial exchanges that those with different viewpoints can at least try to understand each other, if not agree. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank Mark for providing us this forum. He is rare among ACW bloggers in allowing this kind of in depth discussion of non-technical matters.
To your points. I think I understand that you see the current situation as a choice between war and an Iranian nuclear weapon. And that you think demanding compliance by all sides with international law might lead to the Iranian nuclear weapon happening instead of the war. And that you think in fact the war would be preferable to the Iranian nuclear weapon happening. Thus, you think people like myself should stop giving Iran the aid and comfort of substantiating legal arguments. Do I have this about right?
Assuming that I do have this about right, I have to say that I do disagree with you in your basic assessment of the current situation and the assumptions you make about the future. I think that the situation we currently face is that Iran is likely developing, inclusive of past efforts and current efforts, a technical and industrial capacity to make a nuclear weapon. I think they are trying to get to the point at which they could make a nuclear weapon if they wanted to. When I consider that reality, I am simply not as shocked and full of fear as so many people in this country, including most of the arms control policy and technical community, appear to be. I see Iran reaching this capacity as an inevitable, and reasonably foreseeable occurrence, and I really don’t see why people are so afraid of it. I know all too well the arguments for why we should be afraid of it. But in the end I think all of that is either consciously or unconsciously us reflecting the concerns of the only country that has a legitimate claim to being threatened by an Iranian NW capacity – Israel. Somehow we have collectively internalized Israel’s fear and concern about Iran, and have begun to parrot it as our own. So much so that we have convinced ourselves of the objective truthfulness of that narrative and our own identification with it. I am personally just not that afraid of Iran having a NW capability. I do not believe that, were Iran to develop NW capability, they would instantly build a bomb and as quickly as possible lob it toward Tel Aviv. I know that most Israeli’s do actually believe this – I know this from long talks with a very good Israeli friend – but I think there is simply no convincing basis for this belief. I think that Iran’s government is too rational to do something so clearly failing a cost/benefit analysis for them. I think that when Iran does achieve NW capability, it will use that capability exactly as Israel uses its NW capability – to deter aggression against it, and to project its regional influence without using NW. To me, there is nothing any more evil about Iran doing this than there is about the U.S., France, India, Pakistan or Israel doing this. Do I understand why Israel is concerned about their regional power being diluted and their security situation being less stable? Yes. But is that a reason why the US and the EU should be freaking out about Iran achieving NW capability, so much so that we think war is our only option for dealing with it? No.
So, to summarize, I do not see the current situation as either war or an Iranian NW. I see the current situation as Iran inevitably moving toward having a NW capability, and that we in the West should stop freaking out about it and giving such ridiculous aid and enablement to Israel’s subjective concerns about its own security and loss of regional power. So to put it simply I see the current situation as neither war nor an Iranian NW, but rather as a progression toward an Iranian NW capability, in response to which there should not be a war.
We cannot stop Israel from going to war if that’s what they choose to do. But I think we should take ourselves out of the equation and let Israel make its choices on its own. If it chooses war, then it will bear the consequences of that war itself. If it chooses not to go to war, I think the sun will rise the day after Iran achieves NW capability and the world will go on much as it did before, if we allow it to.
So what about international law? I really don’t see it as an obstacle to a peaceful outcome of this situation, as I understand that you do. As I said before, I think the law helps all the parties to the dispute to see, if they will see, how valid from both a principled and moral perspective their positions are. If they would internalize those lessons, and not allow irrational ideology and politics and ego to govern their conduct, then I genuinely believe that peace is a more likely outcome than war.
But as I think Johnboy was saying earlier, the law doesn’t control what people do. It only tries to guide them to do what is most likely to result in peace. People are always free to disregard the law. But if they do, they are more likely to be convicted in the court of world opinion of having done wrong and having acted in a manner likely to result in war.
Dan writes:
No, it’s more nuanced.
In order, I value all of:
1. No iranian nuclear weapons
2. No war (or serious violent conflict)
3. International law and norms
I value international law and norms in part because they build stable international relations and avoid long term conflicts. I value avoiding wars as killing people is wrong, it breeds more violence too often, and is often subverted by agendas other than the particular causus belli. I value avoiding an Iranian bomb as I fear that they are less amenable to stable deterrence WRT Israel, making a regional nuclear war likely, and it is highly likely that nearby non-nuclear nations such as Saudi Arabia would find the threat to them unacceptable, forming an even more escalating regional nuclear arms race and further exponentiating risks of nuclear regional war and nukes eventually leaking out to non-state actirs such as islamicist terrorists.
I believe both 1 and 2 are simultaneously achievable. That has already entailed scope creep for the IAEA and NPT. To some degree we are compromising on 3 already and may need somewhat more to get 1 and 2. As a separate long term issue the NPT and IAEA need strengthening to work effectively, and bending things now may harm this effort, and I am not blind nor unconcerned about that result.
My concern is that legalistic focus on 3, pushing the NPT and IAEA back “into line”, plays directly against solving both 1 and 2 for real. This happens in two significant ways:
One, it undermines using IAEA as a multinational negotiator and inspector which can both build western confidence that Iran has shelved the earlier apparent / asserted weapons program. There is no other evident path to a mutually agreeable confidence building intermediary.
Two, it promotes Iran’s legalistic intransigence and pushes them away from accepting confidence building paths forwards. You and Iran have points that international laws and organizations have been politicized and bent, but they have to move past that and come clean about the historical program and confidence build to convince us and Israel that there is no longer an ongoing weapons program. Without confidence building, it is blindingly obvious now that risk of war is very high. Israel has clearly telegraphed that absent convincing confidence building that the weapons program is shut down, they will go it alone if the other western powers do not; The US has clearly telegraphed that we’re more patient but willing to go to an attack eventually.
If this round of talks outright fails on confidence building there’s high risk Israel goes before November; if they don’t and Obama loses the election there is high risk he goes before January so he doesn’t leave it to Romney un-resolved. If obama wins and Israel stays stayed the situation could drag on a year.
In my opinion and estimation, therefore, if you place 3 ahead of 1 and 2 you only get a war and possibly, if it’s not a decisive war, Iranian nukes in 3 to 4 years anyways, and general nuclear proliferation breaks out in the gulf. I find this at least offensive and borderline horrific. Too many of the nightmare scenarios in which the NPT breaks down generally start like this.
I don’t see promoting international law first and only here in any practical manner doesn’t hamstring the necessary focus on confidence building, needed to offer a non-war non-nuclear-Iran path forwards. The alternatives seem implausible.
I would rather accept bending international law in a way that gives us that potential intermediary through which a non-nuclear non-war scenario can work.
I disagree that Iran weaponizing is no big deal; even if it was, Israel disagrees and is willing to go to war over that. Your “well, that’s their problem” seems immorally to just be chosing war, that we both admit will thence happen, to give the US a more morally neutral sidelines view of the carnage. It’s extremely going to happen even if we say no. We can fight against that outcome with negotiations and diplomacy and sanctions and concessions, and find the confidence building peace path. You seem to explicitly not want that, for a temporary and tenuous moral high ground.
As long as the peace path is possible, imho, we owe everyone all the effort we can expend to make it work.
I don’t think your characterisation of the informal power agreement behind the NPT is accurate. It was more like an agreement between the only two powers that mattered at the time along the lines of “Neither of us want to see nukes sprouting in every little tin-pot backwater kingdom, so we’ll stop our guys building nukes if you stop your guys.” (even if this is something of a crude simplification).
George,
You make some good points worth considering. But I think you, and the USG, are still making some assumtions that are not necessary and that are themselves contributing to both a war and a NW-Iran outcome. If we should, as you suggest, step back from a focus on international law and look primarily at what would pragmatically help to achieve a non-war, non-NW-Iran outcome, shouldnt we stop giving Israel a free pass with regard to its nuclear weapons program and its bellicose behavior? That tends to be a taboo topic in this country, but its an ongoing assumption underlying US policy that I think should be reconsidered if we are really genuinely serious about trying to be pragmatic in achieving a good result in the ME.
Why have we for decades given Israel a free pass to have a nuclear weapons program, and to say and do basically anything they think they should in the name of their security? As you know, we have not only turned a blind eye to this behavior and these facts, but we have positively facilitated and aided Israel in every way we possibly could. And we approach any issue involving Israel by taking for granted the validity and acceptability of Israel’s concerns and actions, and simply say to the other parties involved that they must do whatever it is that Israel wants them to do. And when Israel makes military threats, we dont try to reign them in, as we would any other country in the ME, rather we take it for granted that they will make good on those threats, and we warn the potential targets to stop doing whatever it is that is making Israel make those threats, no matter what the underlying facts and principles would objectively dictate.
Its alot like having a paranoid friend that constantly makes threats to his neighbors over anything he thinks is threatening to him, whether it reasonably looks that way from the outside or not, and he has a gun himself. And our approach is to warn the neighbors that they had better do whatever our friend says, no matter what it is and no matter how unreasonable his demands, or he will attack them with his gun (and BTW we might join him in that atatck with our guns), including the neighbors not getting their own guns, because that would really set him off.
Wouldnt anyone say that the more objectively reasonable approach in that situation would be to try and help your friend overcome his paranoia, convince him to stop threatening his neighbors, and give up his own gun before he hurts someone with it? Wouldnt that in turn predictably go a long way toward convincing the neighbors not to get their own guns in order to defend themselves and deter your friend from his aggressive behavior?
This metaphor is directly relevant to the Iran crisis. Why does Iran want NW capability? Surely a huge part of the answer is Israel’s NW capability. And why has the situation reached the current crisis level? As I outlined earlier, its primarily due to Israel’s concerns about its security and regional power, and its threats of aggression against Iran if the West doesnt do more to stop Iran’s nuclear program.
If we are really serious about wanting a non-war, non-Iran-NW outcome, then why dont we start turning the screws into Israel to come clean about its NW program, and to dismantle it, just like we are doing with Iran? And why dont we also get tough with Israel about its threats of aggression against Iran? We all know that if we really did this, it would have a hugely positive potential effect on all aspects of ME peace efforts. And it would very likely slow or stop Iran’s push for NW capability.
But we will not do this very practical thing because of the history and ideology and politics that we all know about.
But again, the point is that this is an unnecessary continuing assumption underlying US policy that is contributing to a war, NW-Iran outcome. This fact makes US rhetoric about practicality and doing whatever it takes to get a good outcome, including bending international law, come off as disingenuous and unbelievable.
George,
i agree with your points. Thank you for taking the time to write them.
Anon2
George,
Thanks for the detailed reply. But I think you didn’t address my (and Mousavian’s) points. The requirement for confidence-building measures is not and should not be asymmetric, otherwise they simply won’t happen. Let me ask this: Does implementation of the Additional Protocol by Iran constitute a huge confidence-building measure? What would you think about the other side’s intentions if you were Iran and were referred to the UNSC after cooperating in a transparent way for 3 years, resolving past issues one by one, voluntarily suspending fuel cycle work for 2.5 years and implementing the AP? If transparency was really an issue, why not accept it from Iran?
I don’t believe that there’s an imminent danger of either a war by US/Israel or producing nukes by Iran; both are too dangerous and costly for the deciding parties. I see the nuclear controversy as part of a broader campaign to weaken Iran by sanctions and other types of pressures, so it becomes amenable to an invasion in one or two decades. Iran is trying to repel the pressure and maintain its sovereignty at the same time (allowing inspectors into conventional military facilities too many times (which may never end) may pave the way for compromising Iran’s military secrets, as happened in Iraq). It’s no secret that US/Israel seriously hope to effect a regime change in Iran, regardless of the nuclear program.
So I believe that it’s actually immoral to help pressure Iran, as it increases the long-term prospects of “Iraqization” and thus a devastating war. Moreover, this pressure is already taking its toll from ordinary Iranian citizens in the form of draconian economic sanctions. This is why I believe trying to undermine the US/Israeli narrative against Iran is the best way to reduce the prospects of war/sanctions/sabotage/assassination and thus the most ethical choice.
Mohammed –
Confudence building would have to be symmetrical enough.
As a point, however, the US basically took no serious global threat actions against Iran from the time the hostages returned in 80 until 2003. There were some sea clashes but nothing Iran should have seen as active confrontational regime change.
The veil came off the alleged nuclear weapons program around then.
There are two credible explanations for subsequent US policy – one, we committed to long term regime change after 9/11, or Two, we’re reacting to the nuclear program.
Some hawks, and possibly (likely?) Israel want regime change, but in my opinion the bulk of the US political opinion, and all or essentially all the other western governments, merely want a credible end to the nuclear weapon threat.
Iran is not wrong that regime change has been proposed, but it needs to judge which is the dominant current motivation. If it is regime change then they need nuclear deterrence to survive. If it is the nuclear program, they need to credibly abandon it. Not credibly abandoning it means almost certain moderate war soon.
Their current actions are certainly driven by fear of regime change. The west needs to assuage those fears enough now for confudence building. But we are in a crisis where
Military options are openly discussed. Crisis stability inversion (see Jervis et al, Psychology and Deterrence) is in play. Iran’s denial strategy is now destabilizing and confidence destroying. Iran’s public stance leans on moralism and equivalence. Pride. I can understand those, but they are self destructive in the crisis.
Both sides should take some confidence building steps, yes, but Iran demanding a precondition of such a total de-escalation will not work. This path is what Saddam walked near his end. No, it’s not fair, equal, honorable, or symmetrical. But responding in a manner which leads to honorable prideful martyrdom is not a good or wise choice.
Dan writes in part:
The Israeli nuclear weapons are not a credible cause of the Iranian nuclear weapons program. In historical order, the Iraqi weapons program and Iran/Iraq war, and US antagonism, then fear of US regime change efforts after 9/11.
Iran sees Israel as an enemy, but the distance makes it a non-existential threat to Iran. They oppose Israel and arm its enemies, and can use holding Israel at risk with ballistic missiles and eventually possibly nukes as a deterrent threat to US interventions and regime change efforts. Of course, US regime change efforts spiked in response to their nukes…
Israel, on the other hand, faced multiple genocidal existential threats, and went nuclear to forestall them. They were paranoid (and still are) but really did have people out to exterminate them. Again.
Until Iran’s nuclear behavior, one could have argued that Israeli nukes were now unnecessary, as the genocidal threat had passed. But Iran brought it back. It will be generations before that is viable again.
Israeli / Iranian conflict was low key and not aimed at Iran regime change until credible evidence of Iran’s nuclear program surfaced.
You are implicitly and somewhat explicitly asking for and asserting there should be more symmetry here. Perhaps morally yes, but from a historical and real point of view that’s not credible and doesn’t reflect history. Geopolitics doesn’t work by morality. It should be instructed by it – war and genocide bad – but playing geopolitics through an overly moralistic lens fails. Iran is not playing by international law here either. We’ve let them tiptoe up to a big red line in the sand. The symmetry and legalism the situation can tolerate is decreased by proximity to that line.
George, from your 3 listed priorities,
1) No Iran nukes (or becoming a virtual nuclear power)
2) No preventive war by the USG/Israel
3) International law being upheld
there is no way to achieve 1) without 2). Iran will accept war if necessary to avoid giving up a nuclear program that leads it to achieving a nuclear weapons capability on the order of Brazil or Japan. That is the bottom line.
I find your preference for a war that will kill hundreds of thousands of Iranians, thousands of Israelis, and thousands of Americans to an outcome that is peaceful and lawful to be strange at the very least. I say this because it may be that you do not fully appreciate what a full war with Iran actually looks like.
There are, in fact, 2 very different war scenarios. An Israeli strike produces a very limited war. Iran will take this as an opportunity to withdraw from the NPT and to pummel Israel for a few days with missiles, maybe even crack open Dimona with a lucky shot. You can then assume Iran will have usable nukes within a year.
The other scenario is a USG strike. That is the total war with massive casualties and global economic destruction as Iran chokes off 30% of the world’s oil. It is a war that is Vietnam sized. And like Vietnam, it is also a war that the USG has no guarantee of winning. Those who have the power to go to war understand this.
As Dan Joyner has stated in depth, the ONLY way to a peaceful non-nuclear Iran is as part of a nuke-free Middle East. That is the only scenario where Iran may relinquish a nuclear weapons capability. I say “may” because as Iran’s program progresses, their power position in any negotiated settlement increases. The deal the USG can get today is better than what they can get 6 months from now. And will be far less this time next year.
Mr Herbert takes a turn to the darkside here.
The point is to strengthen international law and its institutions. In encouraging people to cast aside law in favor of not getting bombed by the USA or Israel, Mr Herbert is encouraging a “might makes right” kind of framework.
The inevitable consequence of this thinking is that everyone rushes towards as much might as possible, defeating non-proliferation and leaving us within a far more dangerous world. Far better to point out the limits of law and work to improve it, rather than to rely on force and threats of force.
George,
You seem to have done a bit of a rhetorical 180 here. You were the one to start making accusations of immorality at the legalists in your first comment on this subject. You actually made that charge a couple of times, at which I admit I bristled a bit. Now you say that morality doesnt really matter when you come right down to it, only power and the facts on the ground and what the US wants to have happen. You see, this is what I was talking about from the beginning. When the USG thinks the law is on their side, theyll argue law. If they cant argue law, theyll argue morality. When the moral arguments are challenged, theyll just fall back on power, and realism, and “do it because we say so or we’ll bomb you.” So perhaps we have now finally stripped away the pretenses. The US will take Israel’s side in any dispute, up to and including using military force, not because of law, or principle, or morality, but because of ideology and politics and a one-sided view of history that sees only the narrative of Israel’s troubled past, but not the narrative of the troubled past and security interests of other states. In addition to the Israeli nuclear program, another core reason for the Iranian NW program was the Iran-Iraq war and the realized fear of genocidal acts by Saddam Hussein. Again I put it to you, is Iran’s NW program any more evil and deserving of eradication than Israel’s, or Pakistan’s, or America’s? But that doesnt matter, as you conclude. We will take Israel’s side. We will do everything in our power to safeguard Israel’s security and regional power. We will not make Israel change its policies one iota, and we will not compromise ourslves in the process. We will give commandments to Iran and we will back up those commandments with all the implements of leverage we have to make them capitulate and comply. Full stop. This reminds me once again of Stephen Walt’s excellent post at FP about how arms control has changed, in just this way:
http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/29/whatever_happened_to_arms_control
“(please correct me if I’m wrong)”
Indeed, let me correct you.
My point is this: you think you are being “pragmatic”, whereas you are wrong. You are being “unprincipled”.
You are so obsessed at getting the result that you want that you will give no consideration to the effect of your own actions.
It is a tunnel-visioned view, and that is why I think it is foolish and naiave, since it leads to a world in which “the west” gets its way by bullying and threatening.
Whoop-de-do. Now, George, what happens then everyone decides that this is the way to get what they want?
GWH: “No. The entire point of NPT (and IAEA) was to discourage nuclear weapons proliferation.”
*sigh*
I’m arguing with a motherhood statement.
The POINT of the NPT and the IAEA is to achieve that goal.
Q: How does it achieve that goal?
A: In exactly the manner that I have already described i.e. to dangle the carrot of nuclear co-operation and int’l assistance for any state that signs onto that treaty and agrees to play by those rules.
Q: Soooo, not so much by threatening and sanctioning?
A: No. Not. One. Little. Bit.
George writes that:
The legalists are NOT HELPING.
They (at least the arguments in this thread) are also WRONG. Mostly. They have a few respectable points, but the legal cards are mostly stacked against Iran, with a few frustrating ambiguities.
The ambiguities have to do with the fact that neither the NPT nor the IAEA Statute nor the safeguards agreements pursuant to both specify how to remedy cheating.
There’s no doubt that Iran cheated. Systematically, seriously, and for a long time (1985-2003). Having an enrichment program and not telling the IAEA is a major violation of the NPT. Enrichment can produce highly enriched uranium and take you to the threshold of having nuclear weapons. Specifically, Iran violated its legal obligation to declare all its nuclear activities (at least those involving nuclear material) to the IAEA.
Iran shattered international confidence in its intentions. As former IAEA Director General ElBaradei said, Iran created a confidence deficit, and the burden was on Iran to overcome this deficit. By continuing to deny wrongdoing while behaving evasively (openly destroying evidence the IAEA seeks), Iran does nothing build confidence.
So how should the international community respond?
On the legal track, the IAEA Board of Governors took the step required by the IAEA Statute: It reported Iran’s non-compliance to the UN Security Council. The Security Council demanded that Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and suspend its suspect nuclear activities. And when Iran refused, the Council imposed sanctions. The Council acted under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, imposing new legal obligations on Iran. In invoking Chapter 7, the Council found a threat to international peace and security, even though it did not say so explicitly. There is no contradiction between these resolutions and any provision of the NPT. There is nothing extralegal going on.
It’s all an improvisation, as the legal structures of the nonproliferation regime do not specify what steps are needed to remedy cheating. Even if Iran were scrupulously adhering to its current safeguards obligations (which I do not believe is the case), is that really all it takes? Is it good enough for Iran to place its formerly secret enrichment program under safeguards and continue to expand that program in the open? This “no fault” safeguards approach would seriously undercut the core purpose of IAEA safeguards as a deterrent to cheating.
This is where legal arguments are simply insufficient. They do not say what to do next.
All sides claim to want a diplomatic resolution, one that allows Iran to pursue a peaceful nuclear program and provides confidence that Iran will not seek to develop weapons. If these claims are genuine, and if all sides can build confidence in one another’s good faith, this should be doable.
Those are big ifs.
Im just going to let anon’s comments here go, because he/she is clearly not an arms control legal expert.
“The point is to strengthen international law and its institutions”
If international law is not an effective tool for preventing nuclear arms races and ultimately nuclear wars, why do we want to strengthen it? From the discussion here would seem to have a choice between a legal regime that places weak obstacles in the path of would-be proliferators, and one which sets a strong barriers against anyone who would try to stop proliferation with anything more than harsh language. It is not clear to me that the latter, being stronger, is necessarily better.
@anon
“Iran created a confidence deficit, and the burden was on Iran to overcome this deficit.”
Was 2.5 years of suspension, resolving all past issues with regard to undeclared activities regarding nuclear material (the same research-scale enrichment program you pointed to), and implementing the Additional Protocol, sufficient to overcome this deficit? If the Additional Protocol is intended to resolve the “legalistic” claims of lack of IAEA authority and to reach total transparency, why not accept it from Iran by referring its file to the UNSC?
IMHO, you are ignoring the 2003-2006 years.
Dan Joyner writes:
“Im just going to let anon’s comments here go, because he/she is clearly not an arms control legal expert.”
This is a cheap cop-out, dismissing contrary opinions with an off-hand ad hominem attack. I am not a lawyer, but I have worked enough in legal/policy issues related to nuclear non-proliferation to know how far off-base he is.
Mohammed writes, responding to anon and the credibility deficit:
As the Brits would put it, Iran is still playing Silly Buggers with the degree of testing of the weaponization program, and the centrifuge plants and accounting.
These are needed to unambiguously know how far away – design/engineering wise, and possible secret third production facility wise – from actual bombs they are.
Confidence building requires those be openly disclosed. One cannot unlearn knowledge or designs, but declaring it and letting IAEA know enough about centrifuge production to see if another site gets built are material issues. They are material core NPT breaches. In case it’s not clear, material enough that they will in my estimation lead to war if they are not resolved.
I hope you all had the chance to read Helga Scmed’s letter to Bagheri today. It is now clear that E3+3 as she calls it (cute!)–this is another algebraic factorization–has set a new precondition regarding 20% enrichment. Namely, stop 20% enrichment for [meager] airplane parts or we don’t have anything new to talk about in Moscow.
It is clear now that the game is to stop Iran’s 20% without relaxing EU sanctions planned for July 1, and use that carrot, if Iran halts all enrichment for a period of time, to be defined during the talks. If WH pulls this off, very unlikely, it will be a major coup in dealing with Romney. Congrats to Mr. Samore and the team, but I think again USG is trying a heavy handed approach that did not work in the past.
A couple of comments to Mr. Joyner. My late father, a (banking) lawyer, used to say ” that law is not how it is written, but how it is read”. A bit cryptic, but I highly recommend you to go and chat with the people, who were involved in the NPT negotiations in 1960’s. Some of them are still around albeit in diminishing numbers. You will then extract from the negotiation history the “spirit” of the NPT, which is aimed to “prevent diversion of nuclear energy” to nuclear weapons. Just an advice from a simple chemist to a lawyer. Having said that, I do not associate with the views of Anon and even less with my friend Stephen Walt, who has got all this wrong quite some time. But these are other stories.
Perhaps an even more relevant recommendation would be for Mr. Heinonen to read the open history of the Iranian nuclear program pre and post revolution. One will then see how the “spirit” of the NPT was implemented with regards to Iran for the last 33 years. I find the wikipedia entry to be a fair opening treatment.
Just a couple of points:
1) Mark, thanks.
2) The legal limitations on the IAEA have been points of contention since safeguards were first applied in the 60’s. With respect to Mr. Joyner’s legal scholarship, Iran has been doing just fine in the arena without it, thank you, since the NCRI’s first public revelation of clandestine work, albeit with some memorable stumbles out the gate. One important current throughout the history of safeguards, with decidedly varying vigor depending on the DG’s predilections, is an ongoing attempt to make them more credible from the Agency’s technical standpoint in order BOTH to fulfill its mission and do what Member States expect it to do to the best of its abilities. But the limitations are always there, be they legal or political, and they are formidable.
Everyone here knows the Agency’s legal limitations, placed in stark, recent relief by Mr. Joyner’s work and other comments here. Serious people interested in the success of an independent IAEA inspectorate should better use their lawyerly talents to find ways to improve Agency effectiveness.
The sun is shining here on the Atlantic, for the first time in several days, so I will not again dunk my head into the roiling political analysis of what to do about Iran, or what Iran should do about Iran, or whose court the ball is in (please shed a tear for the old men of the Celtics).
But in keeping with the legal aspects of the issue, I found this Wikipedia quote a useful summary of what I have always considered the muddled state of laws made by men:
“The jocular saying is that, in England, ‘everything which is not forbidden is allowed’, while, in Germany, the opposite applies, so ‘everything which is not allowed is forbidden’. This may be extended to France — ‘everything is allowed even if it is forbidden’… — and Russia where ‘everything is forbidden, even that which is expressly allowed. … While in North Korea it is said that “everything that is not forbidden is compulsory.'”
Look folks, the bottom line is that Iran is simply not in breach of the NPT. That’s simply an objective fact.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jun/09/iran-nuclear-power-un-threat-peace
Now we can argue about what the NPT drafters SHOULD have written, or what the role of lawyers COULD be, but that changes nothing. The claim that Iran has “forfeited” its nuclear rights is simply hogwash. The demand that it “suspend” enrichment is utter nonsense, and a violation of the NPT itself (as was bribing India with promises of nuclear cooperation in exchange for voting against Iran at the BOG.)
Hi folks.
Mark Hibbs checking in.
I have been paying close attention to the discourse in response to my post. I am grateful to all who have taken the time and effort to comment.
For anyone who wants to know, my policy is this:
1.) If the submitted interventions are relevant to my post, I approve them. I want a free and open discussion of these issues. That’s an essential mission of Arms Control Wonk.
2.) If I conclude that submitted comments express racism, religious intolerance, cultural bigotry, or political heckling, I will exercise the right of an editor of this site and I will edit the submitted comments or–more likely given my limited free time simply not permit a submitted comment to appear. On the basis of this policy I have not permitted some submitted comments regarding this post to appear.
BTW, contrary to some views expressed on this post and attributed to me I have never proposed that Iran’s objections to findings of the Board of Governors or the UNSC be submitted to “arbitration” by any third parties, nor have I expressed the view that arbitration should be encouraged or undertaken.
It is my ambition to encourage transparency in the decision making of the BOG, an IAEA policy making organ which is closed to the outside world.
You can all be sure that I will return to this important topic in the very near future.
Thank you again, Mark, for this and all your extremely informative and thought provoking posts, and for your emphasis on free and full exchange of ideas through comments. I appreciate this forum for serious discussion of issues. I think the discussion following this post has been particularly rich, and I appreciate your hosting it.
Iran still believes it can bluff it’s way out of impending sanctions.
The bluster is evidence.
As for International Law, when the USA starts obeying it except when it wants to, the concept of International LAW is specious.
We need to keep Iran in the NPT AND get it to fully comply with ALL IAEA requests.
Those in the US and Israel who want regime change or causus belli will continue to ignore International Law concerning Iran.
Those who think that Iran will back down on enrichment are fantasizing.
Wow! 85 responses and counting! I feel sorry that Jeff got only 4 comments on the NW costing issue…
Regarding BOG and Iran and Israel…everybody seems to be p…..g in the wind.
First, Israel has a nightmare with Fordow because it cannot destroy it beyond repair with conventional munitions…need a nuke or two, and so do we, if we ever get dragged into it…
Second, it seems that both Iran and Israel have “irreconcilable” differences having to do with their respective freedom to act with impunity as they please in the greater Middle East, irrespective of “world opinion”. This is a political problem, not nuclear…and solving it might be beyond the current slate of politicians (in US, approval rating below 20%)
Third, a new war in the Middle East will be a catastrophe for everybody, not just in Iran but the world at large, and to boot, will just accelerate the Iranian program a la Pakistan (eat grass syndrome!). If we have delusions that Iran is a “slam-dunk”, we have another thing coming…
Fourth, yes, Iran dabbled with nuclear weapons design(s) and implosion experiments; so what? The IAEA (US and Israel) insistence on visiting Parchin is laughable…because we know the answer! More than a dozen countries at one time or another toyed with NW development, from Argentina to Switzerland…and if my memory serves right, even Saudi Arabia (Prof. Sumer Sahin, a nuclear engineering professor from Turkey’s Ege University did some fission and ERW weapons studies for them in 1980’s…)
At the end of the day, when the rhetoric clears up, we will not have war just because of the impracticality without using nukes…while the “leaky” sanctions regime will continue…
And the world goes on…
Don’t feel sorry. Mark and I have different comment moderation philosophies.
Dan – I wonder if you could clarify something. You write:
I think that when Iran does achieve NW capability, it will use that capability exactly as Israel uses its NW capability – to deter aggression against it, and to project its regional influence without using NW. To me, there is nothing any more evil about Iran doing this than there is about the U.S., France, India, Pakistan or Israel doing this.
This suggests it is your belief that Iran will soon be a nuclear weapon state, as opposed to a nuclear weapon threshold state.
Is that so? And if it is, does that mean the imperative of upholding international law always wins even when faced with an undisputed attempt to undermine it?
Just to be clear, the existence of the Iranian NW program is of course disputed, however your posts suggest you personally do *not* dispute it.
Hi Alan,
You’re right that that passage of mine can be read as you suggest. But I actually think that Iran will only achieve nuclear weapons capability within the foreseeable future. I do not think that they will build a NW. But even at that point of NW capability (nuclear hedging), if everyone basically knows they are at that point, they could use that communal knowledge to deter aggression and project influence. Thats what I was trying to say.
On your second question, this is a technical question outside of my area of expertise, so I have nothing but my own personal layman’s view on the matter. But since you asked, I am personally persuaded that, on the totality, Iran has been gradually accruing the knowledge and technical ability related to all the necessary elements of building a NW. This includes design information, trigger testing and other warhead related research and experiments, and of course the uranium enrichment element. Now, whether this has all been part of a grand design at all, in part, at only certain times, or continuing today, I have no idea and cant even posit an informed guess. But I am persuaded that Iran will likely achieve a NW capability within a relatively few years time. Again, however, I am not persuaded that they will at any time in the foreseeable future build a NW. I suspect they will maintain a nuclear hedging strategy until circumstances change and they feel it necessary to move forward with manufacture/testing.
Thanks Dan.
George – you write:
Israel, on the other hand, faced multiple genocidal existential threats, and went nuclear to forestall them. They were paranoid (and still are) but really did have people out to exterminate them. Again.
Until Iran’s nuclear behavior, one could have argued that Israeli nukes were now unnecessary, as the genocidal threat had passed. But Iran brought it back. It will be generations before that is viable again.
Israeli / Iranian conflict was low key and not aimed at Iran regime change until credible evidence of Iran’s nuclear program surfaced.
Certainly Moshe Dayan held the view that “the Arabs would not always be weak”, but Israel did not develop nuclear weapons on the basis of any imminent threat. In fact it could easily be argued that Israel has *never* faced a moderate, let alone genocidal threat. Yet the “hegemony” of their security has dominated US Middle East policy since, and only since, they acquired them.
It is also worth pointing out that one of the reasons the French agreed to assist the development of the Israeli NW program in the 1960s was that they believed the Israelis would use the capability to give the US problems.
If that was indeed their intention, it was a resounding success. I would argue that your contention that power talks is equally true of Israel, in that their power and their potential to upset the applecart for the US in the region is the greatest influence on US policy than history or ideology.
The bottom line is Iran is now in full compliance with its CSA: every year the IAEA has confirmed the non-diversion of nuclear materials. This despite the fact that in 1983, as Mark reported, the US blokced the IAEA from helping Iran.
Also from 2003-6 Iran volunteered to abide by the Additional Protocol until the EU negotiated in bad faith which led to Iran’s pullout and the consequent political sanctions.
The referral to the UNSC was extra-legal since the CSA prescribes arbitration unless diversion is involved.
Also, as Anon says, Ch 7 sanctions are extra-legal since no threat to peace exists from a non-weapons program (as IAEA and DNI confirm).
Also, the pArchin affair is irrelevant since no nuclear materials were diverted. Red herring.
Also, as has been pointed out if the US+5 wanted a solution they could suspend Iranian 20% enrichment. It appears they want sanctions on Iran more than they want to suspend enrichment:
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/05/a_queen_for_a_queen
GWH etc. are wrong from a plain reading of the law.
Of course they can choose to pooh-pooh the law all they want: it doesn’t change the fact that Iran is in full compliance with its CSA.
If it is not: please state which part of the CSA is being violated now?
Amy writes:
It’s not the CSA.
NPT:
Article II
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
You appear to be arguing the equivalent of “not guilty of murder because I wasn’t speeding driving to where I shot him.”
The scope and legal limits of what the IAEA can and cannot do in Iran w/r/t the NPT enforcement is limited by the CSA. I suggest you read it, especially Article II where it states the exclusive purpose of the CSA is non diversion of nuclear materials — conventional explosives are not covered, very sadly.
Also, in any dispute not involving nuclear diversion arbitration is the proper course, not referral to the political UNSC.
IAEA-Iran CSA:
“Article 2
The Agency shall have the right and the obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied, in
accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all
peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of Iran, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its
control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”
Pretty clear.
Further,
Article 22 of the specific Iranian safeguards agreement from 1974 (see below for URL) explicitly establishes the proper procedure for handling any disagreements between the IAEA BoG and Iranian govt.
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc214.pdf
viz.:
Article 22
“Any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement, except a dispute with regard to a finding by the Board under Article 19 or an action taken by the Board pursuant to such a finding, which is not settled by negotiation or another procedure agreed to by the Government of Iran and the Agency shall, at the request of either, be submitted to an arbitral tribunal composed as follows:
the Government of Iran and the Agency shall each designate one arbitrator, and the two arbitrators so designated shall elect a third, who shall be the Chairman. If, within thirty days of the request for arbitration, either the Government of Iran or the Agency has not designated an arbitrator, either the Government of Iran or the Agency may request the President of the International Court of Justice to appoint an arbitrator. The same procedure shall apply if, within thirty days of the designation or appointment of the second arbitrator, the third arbitrator has not been elected. A majority of the members of the arbitral tribunal shall constitute a quorum, and all decisions shall require the concurrence of two arbitrators. The arbitral procedure shall be fixed by the tribunal. The decisions of the tribunal shall be binding on the Government of Iran and the Agency.”
According to Article 19 of Iran’s safeguards agreement, the IAEA may refer Iran to the UN Security Council ONLY if the IAEA is “not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under this Agreement, to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” AND Art. 2 which states that the purpose of the safeguards agreement is for the “EXCLUISIVE purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” This is standard language in the all basic safeguards. Note further that even then, the IAEA’s model safeguards agreement (INFCIRC-153) imposes various limits on inspections, and requires that IAEA inspections avoid hampering or causing “undue inteference” with civilian nuclear programs, whilst also requiring that the IAEA collects the “minimum amount of information and data consistent with carrying out its responsibilities” and “reduce to a minimum the possible inconvenience and disturbance to the State.”
Finally, note paragraph 52 of the Feb 2006 IAEA report on Iran:
“[A]bsent some nexus to nuclear material the Agency’s legal authority to pursue the verification of possible nuclear weapons related activity is limited.”
So Parchin is not covered and an irrelevant insertion into the conversation.
GWH is right that it would be a very bad thing if Iran tested conventional explosives with an intent to make nuclear weapons — it may even be as bad as Germany knowingly supplying Israel nuclear weapons capable submarines.
Both of these would be against the spirit of the NPT. Both Germany and Iran would be considered bad actors if these things were true. (In Iran’s case, however, Robert Kelley has raised serious questions about the Parchin affair, as presented by ISIS).
Amy also is right that the CSA limits the legal authority of the IAEA in Iran.
This is very similar to the situation with the Police: they may have a _mandate_ to stop crime. But their legal _authority_ in going into your home at 3am is limited.
Society does this on purpose.
Similarly, in negotiations between Iran and the IAEA in hammering out a CSA, the legal authority of the IAEA was deliberately limited. It’s wings were clipped and on purpose — no country wants its sovereignty completely taken over by the IAEA/UN/UNSC etc.
And you do not need to take my word for it: Pierre Goldschmidt says the same thing — the IAEA “doesn’t have the legal authority it needs to fulfill its mandate.”
see:
http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/11/03/looking-beyond-iran-and-north-korea-for-safeguarding-foundations-of-nuclear-nonproliferation/6nz6
Pierre ought to have noted that this is a deliberate construct.
So, if the IAEA wants to expand its authority then it needs to renegotiate the Iran CSA.
On this note: it would be much better if the DG reports came as a True/False: did Iran abide by its CSA: True or False, instead of the loaded and opinionated and arbitrary and ad hoc and unprofessional reports under Amano.
If this were true, Iran would get a “True”.
Anon, echoing Amy’s comments:
Again, not guilty of murder because didn’t speed on the way to the shooting.
Nobody is asserting Iran has diverted, violating the CSA. It keeps getting brought up here.
Nobody is asserting a diversion.
Iran can at any time assert “you know what, we’re done with this, we’re not in violation of the CSA and we didn’t sign the additional protocol, we’re done talking about anything other than material inventory. Bye.”
That is their legal right. It will be followed immediately by tougher sanctions and within short order by bombs. It would at this stage be – in reality – considered an equivalent to exiting the NPT by withdrawl.
This entire exercise is about attempting to avoid bombs. Presumably on both sides. If not the IAEA, then who? Iran is working with them, slowly and painfully but working. An all new alternate ageny could not stand up soon enough to avoid bombs.
It appears that the legalists want to force a situation that leads – in the real practical non-utopia world – to war. Seriously, WTF? Fix the treaties after the crisis. Causing a war to make a point is about the most immoral unethical position I have ever seen. How do you people sleep at night? Actions have consequences. Reality is what it is. Deal with that.
GWH: “Again, not guilty of murder because didn’t speed on the way to the shooting.”
No, George, it means that they Are Not Guilty Of Anything.
GWH: “Nobody is asserting Iran has diverted, violating the CSA.”
As opposed to your “assertions” regarding things you have no evidence for, at which point you are being about as “assertive” as Colin Powell standing before the UN and showing dinky diagrams(tm) of modile anthrax labs.
GWH: “That is their legal right. It will be followed immediately by tougher sanctions and within short order by bombs.”
Then the dudes who start flinging those bombs would be guilty of a war of aggression, which is all very well if you win but quite the bummer if you lose.
George, you appear to be advocating the threat of wars of aggression as “sensible” foreign policy, to the extend that merely threating to start such a war is – in and of itself – a good and sensible reason for pandering to the whims of that wannabe aggressor.
A sort of Chamberlain-in-reverse, which is always such a good look.
Why, exactly, do you think that is a good thing?
Why, exactly, do you think that such a doctrine would forever remain the exclusive plaything of “the good guys”?
Why, indeed, would “the good guys” remain “the good guys” if they seek to achieve their aims by way of Big Bad Bombs?
GWH: “It would at this stage be – in reality – considered an equivalent to exiting the NPT by withdrawl.”
You have a strange grasp of “reality”, George.
GWH: “This entire exercise is about attempting to avoid bombs.”
Nooooooo, I don’t think it is, nor has it ever been.
GWH: “It appears that the legalists want to force a situation that leads – in the real practical non-utopia world – to war.”
Nooooo, I for one want to remind everyone that “the west” appears to be abandoning the route that it is *supposed* to have championed in the post-WW2 world, and abandoning it to a might-makes-right doctrine that would be perfectly at home in the late 1930s.
It is bizarre – utterly and completely bizarre – that people like George can not see that he is advocating a path that turns “the west” into what it proports to detest.
He appears to be cool with it, but I suspect that this is mainly because he can’t even see it.
George,
it is evident you do not have a clue about the legal aspects of the IAEA’s work.
GWH: “Iran can at any time assert “you know what, we’re done with this, we’re not in violation of the CSA and we didn’t sign the additional protocol, we’re done talking about anything other than material inventory. Bye.”
That is their legal right. It will be followed immediately by tougher sanctions and within short order by bombs.”
Well, no — that would be against the UN Charter and some UNSC resolutions so would be illegal. Which is what the threats of force are — illegal. The current course of action by the West is against the law.
Also, the proper course for the IAEA to take when there is no diversion of declared nuclear materials is:
a) to kick off arbitration, and
b) if needed, special inspections can be initiated. [go look up what those are]
So, you are wrong and you are unaware of some of the very basic and fundamental ways in which the IAEA works (should work) and are, apparently, ignorant of international law and you support and wallow in your ignorance by saying might is right: Iran best do what West says or they will be bombed. Terrorism, right?
So you may wish to apply to the State Dept. — you may fit right in. You might even get on the negotiating team.
GWH – Iran was a victim of actual usage of WMD and people are still being treated for that, now as we speak and dying from it aswell. The whole world was silent when this happened – Saddam’s usage of chemical weapons against Iran – and when Iran’s representative at the UN tried to raise this for discussion at UNSC, all the powers there stopped it from happening.
In their silence they killed the CWC and now, with their constant harassing of Iran, they are killing the NPT whilst remaining silent about Isreal’s nuclear weapons.
You talk about war – well war is already taking place with the murdering of academics and scientist in Iran, attacking Iran’s IT software with viruses – remember stuxtnet? diqu? and now FLAME?. And on top of that constantly making open threats of attacking Iran and imposing sanctions to make ordinary people lives difficult in Iran. The Iranians were ready for war this Feb/March and Mr Obama had to back peddle to stop it kicking off. Iran called the US bluff and has now made their threats hallow. If the US/Isreal start a war, know this, it will lead to WW3 and shatter the world economy.
And look at Isreal, a people who were victims of European racism and mass murder are in occupatation of Palestinian land in violation of international law. They say they want peace but they are busy with settlement building, killing and land grabs. Whilst crying about Iran! No Arab/Iranian/Muslim carried out the shoah – this is something that Europe can claim its own. And every time a Isreali spokesmen says what you say – about genocide – I have to chuckle and look at the 25,000+ Iranian Jews who live peacefully, safely and proudly in their home country – Iran.
What you and others are failing to see is that we now have the rise of another independent Asian power in the region alongside, China and India and nothing – not even war – can stop that.
Well put, Johnboy. A very insightful reminder.
I have a naive question: in principle, should the IAEA be allowed to visit places like Parchin? If not, why not, and how does this comport with the IAEA’s efforts to make the inspectorate more effective? Not too long ago, environmental sampling was in its infancy, satellite photos were not available, open source was a gleam in the eye of those of us who did this stuff for a living (and value this site). Times change, and the Agency was a lagging indicator, to say the least.
But the Agency pulled off the AP. Nobody would claim it is perfect, but it’s the result of a lot of painful lessons learned, and a decided improvement in the safeguards concept. The inspectorate has done pretty well with technology development. Please note the AP was approved by the BOG in 1997, well before the Board dissolved into a fractious gaggle of North-South bloviation, and back in the good old days when decisions were taken by consensus. For those of you who haven’t, go read the latest safeguards statement: http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/documents/es2010.pdf.
The people who do this work are hardly stooges of the US, bent on undermining Iran. (Believe me, I know, as an American CFE from 2002-2005, when John Bolton was listening to ElBaradei’s phone calls and doing other irritating, stupid things.) The inspectors are the good guys. The excellent legal analysis of Mr. Joyner, et. al., while dedicated to underpinniing Iran’s legal position (something Iran had already done very well), does much to highlight the insufficiency of the basic CSA/153 agreement as an arms control verification model, of which the good guys need no reminder.
Please also note the AP is in force or in process for pretty much every country that possesses the latent nuclear weapons capability – Japan and Germany, for instance – the defenders of Iran hold out as an excuse for Iran’s position. Maybe we should just give up on expanding safeguards coverage in Iran, since the legal ground the Agency stands on is so porous.
At risk of sucking up to the moderator, please, those of you who haven’t, go read this, too: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2012/06/01/iaea-critical-for-making-diplomacy-with-iran-work/b15g.
Another naive question: can the IAEA be effective in an adversarial situation? If not, there’s no point working with Iran – let the bombs fly, with all attendant consequences, or acquiesce in the emergence of another state with nuclear weapons and the consequent risks of knock-on proliferation and possible leaks of technology and materials to terrorist groups. The answer is of course “yes” to my own question, within, of course, the limits of politics and technology. Naekaerts – and Amano – deserve our thanks for pushing the envelope, as do most of their predecessors back to the beginning of the Agency.
By the way, I think we should all avoid ad hominem attacks on people who post their views here: this should rarely be the moderator’s job.
Sorry, that would be “Nackaerts.” Not to take away anything from their predecessors, but the current DDG-SG and DG ones with their hands full of politics, intrigue, and – oh, yeah! – trying to make the safeguards regime more dependable and useful for all member states. The mere suggestion that these guys are dupes or stooges for the US is pretty silly: they signed on for jobs that few can do; I’m pretty sure they are serious about what they are doing; and I am convinced after watching the Agency for over 30 years that they are quite possibly doing the best job they can under the circumstances.
archjr: “I have a naive question: in principle, should the IAEA be allowed to visit places like Parchin?”
In principle, if Iran signs an agreement that says that the IAEA can visit places like Parchin then, yeah, the IAEA should be allowed to visit places like Parchin.
If Iran doesn’t agree to sign any such document then, in principle, the answer is “no”.
After all, whose country is it, Khamenei’s, or Amano’s?
archjr: “Please also note the AP is in force or in process for pretty much every country that possesses the latent nuclear weapons capability”
Ahem. Brazil. I don’t see anyone threatening Brazil.
How odd.
How very odd indeed…..
archjr: “Another naive question: can the IAEA be effective in an adversarial situation?”
No.
But then again, you have to ask yourself this: who is being adversarial, and who is being conciliatory?
archjr: “If not, there’s no point working with Iran – let the bombs fly, with all attendant consequences,”
Okey-dokey, I think you have just answered my previous question.
Look, Iran signed the NPT, and that brings with it some promises of goodies for Iran *as* *well* *as* the promise from Iran that it won’t manufacture nukes.
Iran is rather miffed that since 1979 it has been picked on. Mainly because it has been picked on.
But to add insult to injury is to then blythly declare that the “solution” to this is to Drop Bunker Busters On Iran.
Why – exactly – do you think that is in any way a remedy?
Iran signed the NPT, and if it is constantly in violation of that NPT then the “remedy” is to remove the benefits that come from being a signatory.
Oh, yeah, that’s right: Iran has consistenyly had those benefits withheld from it….
But I reject the notion that if Iran willfully violates the NPT then that willful violation allows “the west” to cry “Bombs Away!!”.
It doesn’t: if Iran won’t play by the rules of the NPT then it should be told to leave the NPT, at which point it is in the same boat as North Korea, Pakistan, India and Israel.
I don’t see anyone threatening to yell “Bombs Away!!!” on any of those countries.
How odd.
How very odd indeed….
Argentina also enriches without an AP — and Brazil and Argentina both had secret nuclear weapons programs in the past. And we are not talking low level research programs that are only against the spirit of the NPT, like Iran perhaps had. [see FP article linked in comments] They were making bombs — almost.
When the IAEA hounds Argentina and Brazil like they hound Iran to ratify the AP, maybe I will wake up and pay attention to their patently politicized statements.
You ask: “I have a naive question: in principle, should the IAEA be allowed to visit places like Parchin? If not, why not, and how does this comport with the IAEA’s efforts to make the inspectorate more effective? ”
Well Iran did not ratify the AP — it is voluntary. So, no, the IAEA has no right to go into Parchin. Even the IAEA said in 2005 that absent a nexus to nuclear materials the IAEA’s right to inspect in Iran is limited.
You can certainly wish that the IAEA become stronger and its mandate expanded, but you must negotiate that expanded mandate with each nation per its CSA.
Is this really difficult to understand?
Why can’t the police expand their legal authority to go into your basement at 3am to make sure you are not on some kinderporn sites? Because we limit what we allow the police to do.
We — nations — also limit the IAEA per the CSA.
The CSA also spells out how to handle disputes: and it is not the way the IAEA behaved. That is why the IAEA is currently behaning outside of the law. The UNSC referral is extra-judicial. The ch. 7 sanctions also are.
Amy’s statement: “Why can’t the police expand their legal authority to go into your basement at 3am to make sure you are not on some kinderporn sites? Because we limit what we allow the police to do.”
It’s the wrong analogy. The question is why would we not (as a civil society) have the police to search your basement if you are suspected of having 60 kg of 90% U-235 and a hemispherical explosives experiment down there. Of course the person hiding U-235 and the explosive experiment is not going to sign a contract with the government allowing the search of his/her basement. But the greater good is at risk — the risk is that this person may build a nuclear weapon in your home town and detonate it because of some personal reason.
Johnboy statement: “If Iran doesn’t agree to sign any such document then, in principle, the answer is “no”.
After all, whose country is it, Khamenei’s, or Amano’s?” What is “the principle”, that we should sit back on a legalistic interpretation of what is morally right with regard to property rights or sovereignty while someone builds a nuclear weapon in their basement. I disagree, and especially where international “law” is created by bilateral agreement to the “law”. In this case, one party can unilaterally veto an agreement forever, regardless of their “morality”.
However, I have one and only one critical decision factor to make clear in the calculus of what the P5+1, and the IAEA should be doing. Are the P5+1 and the IAEA doing all they can reasonably be expected to do to prevent a possible future nuclear attack by Iran; and to deescalate the threat of a conventional war by Israel and the United States. Strong inspections of both nuclear enrichment facilities and dual use weapons/civilian design and testing centers serves both purposes.
Occam’s razor says the behavior of Iran can be reasonably interpreted as either sovereignty for sovereignty’s sake, or instead the intention to actually complete one or more nuclear weapons. We cannot tell from the observed facts what they are doing. The Khamenei Fatwa may be a religious logical conclusion, or it may be a form of cover for continued nuclear weapons work. Note that the Fatwa (that the pursuit of nuclear weapons is in contradiction to Islam) itself was contradicted by the fact that prior to 2003 as agreed both by the now famous 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, and by the 2011 IAEA report, Iran was indeed pursuing nuclear weapons.
So, not withstanding the protests by the IRI, we cannot tell if Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons or not without further inspections. These inspections may not be previously agreed by Iran, but the fact remains, no one can be sure if weapons are being pursued without a rigorous inspection regime, and Iran is not allowing that for reasons that we cannot know from the outside.
“So, not withstanding the protests by the IRI, we cannot tell if Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons or not without further inspections. These inspections may not be previously agreed by Iran, but the fact remains, no one can be sure if weapons are being pursued without a rigorous inspection regime, and Iran is not allowing that for reasons that we cannot know from the outside.”
Yes, we cannot know, and we knew that when the IAEA signed the CSA with Iran in 1974. Yes, we cannot know and that is OK and consistent with the LAW.
If you want a stronger CSA you will have to negotiate that with the IRI.
The Additional Protocol was invented for a frickin’ reason: because the CSAs as signed are typically insufficient to TELL WHETHER OR NOT A COUNTRY is developing/researching nuclear weapons.
No one can affirm that Brazil and Argentina are not developing the capabilities for a bomb should they wish to do so in the future, just like Iran.
Yes, genius, you cannot affirm that Iran’s program is 100% peaceful and that is OK — there is nothing in the law that says you should be able to.
BTW, I like Amy’s analogy and I think it is 100% valid: we don’t allow the Police to go into your basement at 3am for a reason — we decided we did not want them there.
Iran’s frickin’ CSA OUTLINES EXACTLY how to handle the Iranian situation: ARBITRATION. If that is displeasureable to people in the West, then the IAEA can LAUNCH SPECIAL INSPECTIONS.
What is wrong with you people: you negotiated Iran’s CSA and don’t like it anymore. Too frickin’ bad. Renegotiate it.
You may like:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/sunday-review/irans-high-card-at-the-nuclear-negotiation-table.html
Looks like Bill Broad is finally interviewing the right people.
” Are the P5+1 and the IAEA doing all they can reasonably be expected to do to prevent a possible future nuclear attack by Iran…”
Really, how will they do that without a weapons program (see DNI, IAEA, SecDef)? What a perverted mind you have.
The only nations that have attacked others recently in the middle east are: NATO (on Libya), Israel (on Syria, Lebanon, Gaza), and US (on Iraq, Af/Pak/Yemen/…).
There is good reason to believe that Iran may in the future possibly develop a deterrent against NATO, Israeli and US aggression — that would be a rational move.
Probably they should leave the NPT if they wish to do that.
See:
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docUploaded/McNair69.pdf
The U.S. National Defense University study (above URL) in 2005 (when it was thought Iran did have a nuclear-weapons program) concluded that in its view, “and nearly all experts consulted agree, that Iran would not, as a matter of state policy, give up its control of such weapons to terrorist organizations and risk direct US or Israeli retribution.”
The study also stated that the “United States has options short of war that it could employ to deter a nuclear-armed Iran and dissuade further proliferation.”
Iran, it said, may have desired nuclear weapons in the past because it felt strategically isolated and that “possession of such weapons would give the regime legitimacy, respectability, and protection.”
i.e. for deterrence, not aggression.
Click on URL above and check.
“What is “the principle”, that we should sit back on a legalistic interpretation of what is morally right with regard to property rights or sovereignty while someone builds a nuclear weapon in their basement.”
If a sovereign state decides that it wants to build a nuclear weapon in its basement then IT IS PERFECTLY ENTITLED TO DO SO.
The USA was perfectly entitled to build their bomb.
So was the USSR.
So was Britain.
So was France.
So was China.
So was India.
So was Israel.
So was Pakistan.
So was North Korea.
I know you don’t want to hear this, but sovereign states are entitled to build whatever weapon they want, and that includes nukes.
Now, if Iran is building a nuke even after signing the NPT then the “crime” that it is guilty of is “cheating the NPT” i.e. it is guilty of claiming the cooperative benefits that come with signing that treaty EVEN THOUGH it is not abiding by the terms of that treaty.
But if that’s what they are doing then the “solution” is to kick them out of the NPT, thereby denying them of the benefits that they are claiming under false pretenses.
So try and get this “principle” wrapped around your brain:
a) the “crime” of “rorting the NPT” is not exactly worth going to war over, while
b) the “crime” of “building a nuke” ISN’T ACTUALLY A CRIME AT ALL.
I hadn’t intended to do much besides pose a broad policy question, but I guess I phrased it wrong. What I was trying to do was elicit some ideas of how to improve the system as a whole. If Iran will not allow the Agency access beyond the limits of its CSA, Iran cannot make any assurances its anybody will believe. Iran knows the value of assurances backed up by inspections more intrusive than those permitted under its basic CSA, otherwise it would never have signed the AP and implemented it for a short period. Iran is now pretty much at the top of the learning curve with regard to the Agency’s limitations, as is nearly everyone bothering to read and respond to this post.
I expect that every country for which it would make any difference has thoroughly examined the AP and considered its consequences for their own programs. MOST, I said, have adopted the AP, not all. Those continuing to resist the “trend,” if one can call it that, have their individual reasons, but all are aware of the trend and are watching what happens for fear that more intrusive IAEA inspections in Iran will put them in a bad light. (As an aside, perhaps Brazil has been a bit more artful in its resistance to gentle IAEA ministrations than has Iran: Brazil hasn’t, so far as I know, shouted from the rafters of the IAEA boardroom about conspiracies or deliberately made the issue one of North-South politics. A lot of the intense attention to Iran has been produced by Iran’s own behavior.)
But those who would defend Iran’s position can’t both deride the influence of “politics” – shocking – and then use political arguments (Israel, Brazil, Japan, a neoconservative cabal in the Obama administration hell-bent on regime change, etc.) to defend Iran. Nor can they argue that Iran is a victim of politics and suggest the Agency is not serious unless and until it goes after Brazil in the same vein. I suspect the Agency is focused on outcomes first, modalities second. Those who heatedly defend Iran’s position seem more interested in scoring points about the unfairness of it all than finding ways to produce the results the IAEA seeks.
We all agree (I hope) that the Iran CSA is insufficient to allow the IAEA to produce the desired results in any country, but the IAEA has to work with what it has. My question was really: what should the IAEA do next under the circumstances, if anything, other than continuing on its present course? Maybe Iran didn’t bother to pay attention to the Agency’s work (3.1, 93+2, “strengthened safeguards,” the AP) until its clandestine program was revealed. But the Agency, post-1990’s Iraq, at the behest of its Member States, did a lot of work to try and fix what was wrong with the inspection regime. Iran’s actions, not those of the Agency, have cast its intentions in doubt and led Member States to request the Agency to do more and report its results. Post-Iraq, improving safeguards work became the basis of the IAEA’s approach to every country with a safeguards agreement: that Brazil, and Korea, and many others, have addressed anomalies quietly, and in some cases resolved these issues, can be counted as a success of this approach. Iran (and John Bolton) put the Agency in a terrible position by turning the BOG into a cave of (political) winds. So I ask those so disparaging of Amano the Stooge: what would you do? By the way, the details of inspections were rarely made public until Iran raised the political ante through the NAM and Iran’s opponents started leaking to support their political goals in the BOG.
On the BOG: there was plenty of reticence at the time among Board members and others about that UNSC referral. My view is that Iran tied the knot that made the referral inevitable. Take a look at India’s evolving position, or Russia’s, or China’s: these countries have all reached the conclusion that Iran is basically operating in bad faith, although they will not say so directly, and they are constantly confronted with information that prompts the Agency and its Member States to ask more transparency from Iran.
So maybe it’s not so naïve a question after all: should the IAEA, in principle, in any country, pursue the goals and means agreed in the Model AP? Or does Iran get a pass because of the purported existence of some international conspiracy to depose the regime?
“Let the bombs fly,” is not the solution I propose, silly contentions to the contrary, merely one possible, maybe likely, reaction if Iran continues on its present path.
Further reading recommended: http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/IAEA_final.pdf
I don’t think that India, Russia or China “have reached the conclusion that Iran is operating in bad faith”. Their “evolving” position, if it is indeed evolving, more reflects considerations of the relative influence and power of the USA vs. Iran.
As per your question, I believe that IAEA basically has to give both sides, especially the weaker side, the impression of fairness, so as to entice them to cooperate (think ElBaradei). Although I would say that it won’t necessarily be more successful as it is more constrained by the politics and power plays out of its control. But at least ElBaradei won some crucial concessions from Iran which Amano has yet to do. One could argue that those concessions may have had more to do with the politics than what IAEA was capable of, but I think that ElBaradei gave the impression to the Iranians that their voice is at least being heard, unlike Amano which looks like someone “solidly in the U.S. court”, to paraphrase that WikiLeaks cable.
Until the other side understands Iran’s concerns regarding perceived fairness and that Iran is more likely to cooperate when it doesn’t feel it’s being bullied, I don’t expect any breakthrough.
” My question was really: what should the IAEA do next under the circumstances, if anything, other than continuing on its present course? ”
They should do WHAT THEY OUGHT TO HAVE DONE, AND WAS THE LEGAL course of action: either initiate arbitration OR call for special inspections.
If you are trying to ask how to make the IAEA stronger: then depoliticizing will be the biggest aid.
I think if Palestine was to join the IAEA, then per congressional law, US would have to leave the IAEA. This would be possibly a positive move.
So, another suggestion besides the IAEA doing what it ought to have done, would be for Palestine to join the IAEA.
” Brazil hasn’t, so far as I know, shouted from the rafters of the IAEA boardroom about conspiracies or deliberately made the issue one of North-South politics. ”
Yes, it has. Read the statements of its former President and VP. Also, it has NOT HAD TO SHOUT SO HARD because Brazil is our buddy and WE NEVER COMPLAINED SO HARD ABOUT BRAZIL TO BEGIN WITH.
Sheeeesh.
“But those who would defend Iran’s position can’t both deride the influence of “politics” – shocking – and then use political arguments (Israel, Brazil, Japan, a neoconservative cabal in the Obama administration hell-bent on regime change, etc.) to defend Iran.”
Yes, it is possible: politics in the IAEA is not good. But politics in influencing the course of action of congress etc. is DEFINITELY AT PLAY.
You make little sense. There are a lot of other wrong-ish statements in what you posted but I am hungry and have to eat now.
Another thing that would make the IAEA stronger is if the P5 nations were sanctioned for not abiding by their disarmament obligations of the NPT. The IAEA should also look into 14,000 kg of missing US HEU abroad which is a threat to the peace.
Personally I think the IAEA should have just stuck to the “Verfied no diversion of declared nuclear materials; was not able to verify absence of undeclared nuclear materials due to lack of AP.” formulation for non-AP states, together with a call for implementation of the AP.
States making allegations about nuclear weapon design work without a nexus to special nuclear materials should simply have been told to take their concerns directly to the UNSC. The IAEA simply doesn’t have the means to adequately police all the implosion-related work in the world – it ends up being reliant on the “national technical means” of member states, which is inevitably politically coloured and I think what drags politics into the process.
BTW, Iran is under no obligation to prove to the world/P5+1/IAEA/UNSC/US/Israel etc. that its nuclear program is purely peaceful. This is red herring. Nuclear science is inherently dual-use and there is no possible way to prove such a negative.
But, incidentally, our DNI has high confidence that there is no nuclear weapons work in Iran and the IAEA said any such research work ended in 2003. El Baradei said he has not “seen a shred of evidence” that Iran ever weaponized. And SecDef Panetta said Iran is NOT making nuclear weapons.
The ONLY THING IRAN IS REQUIRED to do is to account for its declared nuclear material and show that it is not being diverted to nuclear weapons.
Suggest everyone have a look at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/sunday-review/irans-high-card-at-the-nuclear-negotiation-table.html
Looks like Broad is finally talking to the right people.
@Anon
“incidentally, our DNI has high confidence that there is no nuclear weapons work in Iran and the IAEA said any such research work ended in 2003.”
This unclassified National Intelligence Estimate excerpt has been used by the supported of the IRI freedom to operate a nuclear weapons program without IAEA verification since the 2007 classified/Feb 2008 unclassified report was released. First, as stated in the report explaining the definition of “highly likely”, this means that it could be wrong — with something like a 10 to 15% chance. Second, it is today mid 2012, and this old assessment is clearly based upon five year old intelligence data from at least before 2007. Facts change, and data gets stale. Thirdly, an articles that were published in numerous news venues (NPR, WSJ, etc…) said that the analysts writing the specially chosen words in the NIE were politically motivated to prevent another Neocon war. That’s a fair enough goal, but it brings into question whether the opinion of highly likely is accurate, and that perhaps more likely than not is a better assessment based upon a non-politically motivated look that (secret) intelligence data. Clearly the Bush Administration did not agree with the NIE, and the fact that these opinions were submitted in contradiction to their policy shows in itself the incompetence of the Bush Administration once again to coherently run the policy of the United States. In this respect, the current administration is doing much better. Fourthly, the IAEA has written, numerous times, that since the period of 2003, the IRI has been developing dual use materials and techniques that IAEA _cannot_ _rule_ _out_ an current active Iranian nuclear weapons program. And lastly, the United States intelligence community including the office of the DNI is a political place to work in both senses of office politics and national politics. This makes it difficult to admit a mistake even if new data is uncovered contradicting the earlier assessment, because admitting a major mistake results in loss of employment for those responsible all up and down the organization(s), or even loss of the next election. You may have never worked for a government agency, but I can assure you for the career staff, keeping one’s position is an essential motivation, perhaps above all else.
This brings us to the present — that verifiable inspections are needed to 1) insure and actively discourage an Iranian nuclear weapons program; and 2) to prevent the resolution of the problem by military means.
anon2: Thanks. I agree with you in almost every respect, but especially with your conclusion. Thanks again to Mark for the original post, which was, I think, about the IAEA. There have been many posts here that add to our comprehension. Others are the same as always, ONLY LOUDER – maybe try using a larger font next time, too!
Another naive question: Why hasn’t Iran requested arbitration, if that’s the clearest path to resolve the conflict?
Mark here. I am closing off this post to further comment by tne end of my day here in Beijing today. Thanks to all who contributed.