Mark HibbsIran, the NAM, and Amano

Since 1985 I have spent two years and four months of my life in Vienna—not bad if you consider that I never have owned or rented a flat there. I’m right now halfway through another Vienna stay with one week down, and one week to go.

A lot of those two-plus years went by in corridors of the A and B buildings at the Vienna International Center where the IAEA has its headquarters. That was also true last week, but before we get to what happened there, I need to pay my bill here and I’ll point out that if you happen to be in the Museum Quarter or anywhere in the vicinity of the Mariahilferstrasse in the sixth district, nothing can beat a double espresso in this place, with a slice of fresh, warm plum torte and a whiff of the odd Montecristo in the air. If you arrive later, there’s a quite respectable Milano-style cocktail bar upstairs. It looks a little like a modern version of La Dolce Vita, and your waiter will remind you a little of the chauffeur in the black suit who shoots Dominique Sanda in Il Conformista, but that’s just part of the atmosphere—so no worries.

But I didn’t come to Vienna for the coffee, and so after five days of IAEA board deliberations beginning 9/13, and one more week to go at this year’s General Conference, here’s the essential thumbnail at half-time:

  • Amano’s deliberate post-election courtship with the NAM doesn’t look like it is paying off.
  • Bush and ElBaradei are both history, but as of the end of this week, NAM-Western Group atmospherics at the IAEA haven’t improved under Obama.
  • Amano’s September IAEA report on Iran was much tougher than it looked at first glance and was given credit for, as specific objections raised by Iran and the NAM clearly bore out last week.
  • The NAM and the Arab group tabled their fateful copycat resolution (from 2009) on Israel’s nuclear capabilities to the IAEA General Conference next week.
  • Board antics underscored that an IAEA special inspection request to Syria is off the table for Amano.
  • The US and Western group are between a rock (the Arabs/ NAM) and a hard place (Israel) if they want to prepare an alternative GC resolution this week to the NAM on Israel one drafted in July.  The P-5’s commitment to holding a Middle East disarmament conference in 2012 has put them there.

Prologue

Disputations between the Western Group and the NAM in quarterly IAEA board meetings and the annual General Conference have been a matter of course in recent years but this fall we have the added feature of the Final Document from the May 2010 NPT Revcon, and specifically NPT/conf.2012/L.2 and IV 7 (a-e).

That spells out that in 2012 the nuclear weapon states would convene a Middle East NWFZ conference with Israel and other states in the region. This conference would be held “on the basis or arrangements freely arrived at by the states of the region” – so if Israel doesn’t want to attend it, it doesn’t have to attend it. But in practical terms—as we saw unfolding at the IAEA last week—the Revcon Final Document implied that the US and the other P-5 states committed themselves to bring Israel to the table in 2012.

The IAEA 2010 GC began on Monday, 9/20. For the rest of this week, the P-5 commitment to hold the conference in 2012 will be at issue, because one year ago, at the 2009 GC, for the first time in a long time the Arabs and the NAM succeeded in passing a resolution at the IAEA General Conference which  urged Israel to join the NPT and put all its nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. The Israel resolution was accompanied by a separate resolution calling on the IAEA to support establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East. The US, which routinely and strongly intervenes  at IAEA GCs to head off resolutions on Israel, was not able to prevent these 2009 items from passing. That set the ball in motion toward the NAM’s goal of getting the US and other Western states at the NPT Revcon to agree to the 2012 conference.

Shortly after the NPT Revcon, the NAM quietly prepared a new resolution on Israel. The text of the resolution is more or less the same as the resolution which the GC passed in 2009, with the added point (d): “recalling…the 2010 NPT Revcon, which reaffirmed the importance of Israel’s accession to the NPT and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards for realizing the universality of the NPT in the Middle East”

Last Friday the Arabs tabled this resolution as was pointed out by Fred Dahl and Sylvia Westall this morning.  As they explained, tabling it will make it difficult to stop, since all of its sponsors would have to agree to withdraw it.  But the US and its allies in the GC will try to get the resolution stopped, replaced, or postponed.

Passion Play

This third of four annual quarterly board meetings last week was a curtain raiser to the GC (one ambassador told me it was a “passion play”) convening in Boardroom A in the M Building inside IAEA HQ on 9/13. Monday and Tuesday were spent on less-controversial items which had to be dealt with to get them onto the agenda of the GC the week thereafter. But Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday were spent on the rest of the agenda—Iran, Syria, Israel, the Middle East—and it didn’t take long for bloodletting to begin.

On Wednesday, Iran and vocal NAM states in the board launched an all-out assault on Amano’s latest IAEA report on Iran. Iran’s IAEA Ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh began the session by calling for an IAEA investigation of Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle activities—Japan’s Rokkashomura site of course being emblematic of enrichment programs of other NPT states not subject to probing by the IAEA—and pointing out the “existence of stockpiles of tons of plutonium and low and high-enriched uranium of Japan… I hereby request the Director General to report on the exact quantity and location of stockpiles of such materials having high proliferation risk, as well as the details of implementation of safeguards in Japan to the next meeting of the board of governors.”

Now, no one in the meeting concluded that Iran’s call on Amano to investigate Japan would result in the Department of Safeguards mounting an assault on Japan’s centrifuge program or scaling its plutonium mountain, but it was strong enough to provoke a stiff response during the meeting from Japan’s sanguine IAEA governor, who said that the IAEA was confident that all of Japan’s nuclear fuel cycle activities were for peaceful use, and that Japan—unlike Iran—is implementing an Additional Protocol. Iran, he said, would be well advised to instead concentrate on the application of safeguards in Iran. Wow.

That little interchange was just the beginning.

On Wednesday afternoon Soltanieh then challenged and attacked Amano on point after point in the September Iran report. Amano, and Herman Nackaerts, who shortly will be confirmed to succeed Olli Heinonen as head of IAEA safeguards, responded to each point during the standoff.

I don’t want to go into the nitty gritty gory details but suffice it to say that the following issues were raised in the board meeting by Amano’s critics in the NAM:

  • Amano’s decision to cite in the Iran report UNSCR 1929 passed this summer. NAM delegates said that previous IAEA reports did not reference UNSC resolutions, which Iran alleges are illegal.   Delegates said Amano replied that the citations from UNSCR 1929 were a useful point of reference for readers of the report.
  • Iran demanded from Amano an accounting of security measures taken by the IAEA to assure that safeguards information on Iran was not disclosed to the public and the media. We can expect some blood, sweat, and tears over this item in 2011, because there appears to be an unholy alliance brewing between Iran and the NAM—who assert that the IAEA is providing confidential details about Iran’s nuclear program to the outside world in the DG’s reports—and advanced nuclear countries, which claim that the IAEA isn’t protecting their information when the IAEA hires external consultants.
  • Iran and its allies went on the warpath over the IAEA’s objections that Iran had prevented the designation of IAEA inspectors in two recent cases. The IAEA takes the position that over the long haul Iran has a track record of barring the most experienced inspectors.
  • There was a certain amount of mudslinging in Amano’s direction concerning the unresolved issue of allegations that Iran has engaged in military nuclear activities. I could write a chapter worthy of Charles Dickens about what happened in there, but it will be enough for now to simply underline that Iran and the IAEA don’t agree that information provided by Iran puts these allegations to rest.
  • Iran and the IAEA also continue to differ over the issue of alleged pyroprocessing activities by Iran, and over efforts by Iran to compel IAEA inspectors to sign written statements before they leave the country.

On several occasions on Wednesday and Thursday, Iran objected repeatedly to the IAEA having singled out Iran and specifically for “departing from normal verification language” in the reports on Iran, referring to citation of the UNSCR and in calling on Iran to implement measures which follow from the Additional Protocol which is voluntary and, according to Iran, not a requirement for Iran.  Soltanieh: “[Amano] is expected only to report on the inspections made in Iran. Neither [is] the Agency a subordinate of the UN or UNSC, nor is Mr Amano under the Secretary General of the UN. Iran and the majority of member states do not permit the UNSC to dictate to the IAEA and [Amano] what to do, how, and when.” That kind of language—reiterated in Iran’s formal statement distributed after his remarks in the boardroom—is not routine during board conclaves.

IAEA officials on occasion of criticism in the boardroom pointed out more than once last week that the IAEA board has cited Iran over and over again for repeated breaches of its safeguards agreement, a fact which has shattered confidence that Iran’s nuclear activities are all accounted for; that Iran is out of compliance with UNSCRs;  that Iran has unilaterally suspended implementation of the Additional Protocol and, finally, that Iran has refused to even discuss the allegations of possible military nuclear activities. That was that for Wednesday, more or less.

On Thursday and into Friday, the war of words continued on Syria and Middle East issues, with Arab Group and NAM states accusing Amano and the IAEA secretariat of trying to deceive them concerning the latitude which the IAEA’s statute provides Amano in reporting to the board on Israel’s nuclear capabilities.

A polite version of comments by the NAM, distributed to the media last week, regretted that Amano had taken the position that the IAEA was “not in a position to provide” any information on nuclear installations or activities in Israel beyond those which are safeguarded an Infcirc-66 agreement between Israel and the IAEA. Inside the boardroom, however, Amano was attacked by NAM states for having failed to make any serious effort to comply with the 2009 GC resolution on Israel. Some speakers asserted that Amano’s predecessor, Mohammad ElBaradei, had done more in this regard. Iran referred to Amano’s report as “short, unpalatable, and biased” and assaulted Amano for “disregarding” the mandate provided him by the 2009 GC during Amano’s trip to Israel last month. A list of NAM states upbraided Amano for failing to report in detail on non-declared nuclear activities by Israel, and the IAEA responded by pointing out that because Israel does not have a CSA with the IAEA, the IAEA has no access to information about such activities.

After concluding the war of words on Iran, the board moved to Syria. A few pithy statements were made—in particular one by Belgium—about the lack of Syrian willingness to cooperate with the IAEA to arrive at a “managed access” solution to permit IAEA inspectors to view sites proposed by the US as possible hosting evidence of clandestine nuclear activity by Syria. The Syrian response was firm: no cooperation on managed access, on account of Syria’s objections that any access would compromise the country’s national security. That, with the exception of an impassioned plea by Sudan, on behalf of the Arab Group, to take Syria at its word, was the end of the discussion about Syria’s nuclear program.  As I had suggested on the eve of the board meeting elsewhere a request for a special inspection in Syria, or a resolution to that effect by the board, would be a non-starter, and with Sudan in there slugging it out on Syria’s behalf, it was.

During the latter half of the week, some Arab Group states reiterated urgings made in letters to Amano, that Israel’s access to IAEA technical cooperation be cut off. Toward the very end of all this, Australia intervened to voice distress at the high-pitched accusations which had punctuated the meeting since Wednesday, and they basically told aggressive parties—diplomats thereafter said that Egypt, Cuba, Venezuela, Sudan, Syria, and Iran were meant—to cool it. South Africa objected that back in 2003, on occasion of the Iraq war, the boardroom got pretty feisty, but that was a long while ago, and the conventional wisdom just last year was that Obama’s election and ElBaradei’s departure would heal things. That prediction turned out to be misinformed.

Next Moves

On to the annual GC which began yesterday, 9/20.  For many nonproliferators, this is normally a ho-hum affair.  Not this time.

That was clear right off the bat a week ago, when White House WMD czar Gary Samore arrived on the scene at the IAEA board meeting for two and a half days of meetings including one with the Arab Group during which he urged them not to table an Israel resolution at the GC  the following week. The same message was delivered to the board and then to the press by US Ambassador Glyn Davies. Davies reiterated talking points which US officials had developed in part during bilateral discussions with Israel in recent months and which were summarized in Clinton’s terse reply to Amano’s April solicitation to member states about the Middle East NWFZ arising from the 2009 GC resolution.

Samore’s presence in Vienna last week was meant to underscore to the Arab Group that Obama is committed to making the 2012 conference happen. But it also suggested that the White House has got to be worried that, unless the US successfully negotiated with the NAM/Arab Group to either avert them from launching and passing an Israel resolution at next week’s GC, or else gets a majority of the IAEA’s 151 member states to back an alternative resolution, its game plan for the Middle East could unravel. At the GC the US will want to steer a middle course between the NAM/Arab Group, on the one hand, and Israel, on the other. In addition to warning that an Arab GC resolution would endanger the 2012 conference, Samore and Davies also made the less-cogent argument that launching an Israel resolution at the GC would damage prospects for current Middle East peace talks (That might in an abstract sense be true, but because the peace talks are already beset with the massive local issues including Israeli settlements, what happens at the GC this week will pale in significance.) While US officials have suggested in their statements that Washington’s best-case outcome would be no Arab/NAM resolution at all, the board meeting has bubbled over with some rumors that some of America’s allies were tinkering with the text for an alternative, compromise resolution which might appease NAM and some Arab states (The UAE, America’s nuclear cooperation partner of choice in the Middle East, signed the Israel resolution) and find a majority by coming Friday. Whether that flies, however, will depend on whether Israel will play along. If Israel runs to the US for cover should EU states or others launch a compromise text, bets this gambit will succeed may be off. Maybe a more likely strategy for the US will be a drive (in which the Philippines may be involved) to get the Arabs to put off the resolution for at least a year and at best, after the conference in 2012.

The US has made clear that it is committed to making the 2012 event happen and to getting Israel to attend it. Obama will still be president when the date arrives. But the US, and the rest of the P-5 have not made any commitments for anything that transpires during or after the conference.

Comments

  1. A Complete Stranger (History)

    Wow–I wish I had been there! And to think I thought the latest IAEA report on Iran wasn’t very interesting. Great write up!

    • mark (History)

      Thanks very much. I actually thought of your initial FB remark you just referred to when I was in the middle of this last week. What happened in the board meeting was absolute proof that Iran studies these reports at the microscopic level.

  2. FSB (History)

    The theatrical atmospherics could be toned down a notch or three if there was a more rational discourse in the media w/r/t Iran. If the IAEA did not blow the Iran issue out of all proprotion, there would little need for the NAM to insist on the Isreal issue.

    e.g. The latest CRS report on Iran notes:

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL32048.pdf

    “There continues to be no evidence that Iran has diverted any nuclear material for a nuclear weapons program.”

    There are small signs of hope. For the first time in the US media there has been criticism of how the politicized IAEA has been handling the Iran issue at the behest of the US and the West (note, not the “international community”, which is better represented by the NAM):

    http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/0917/Reality-check-Iran-is-not-a-nuclear-threat

  3. A Complete Stranger (History)

    Your excellent post made me go back to read the original General Conference resolution on Israel and I must admit that when I finished reading it, I had no idea what the IAEA was asked to do. A straigh forward reading of it would seem to say that the IAEA was asked to report on its activities towards getting Israel to sign the NPT (or so it would seem to me). I believe the IAEA Statue prevents the Agency from doing anything active to get a State to join, hence the IAEA Director General’s “invitation” to Israel to join the NPT.

    On an interesting tidbit from all the responses to the DG’s request for insight (I can now appreciate why he requested that!), the Arab Group asked him to include, among other things, open source information about Israel’s nuclear capability. One can certainly understand why he would decline to do so! But that rases the equally interesting question about how the IAEA reports can include allusions to “alleged studies.” One can only conclude that they have been directed by the Security Council to address such questions. I cannot, however, remember the resolutions sufficiently well to know if they did so. Im sure they asked for resolution of the unresolved issues that first caused the Agency to send the Iran file to the Council, but where there resolutions explicitly mentioning the alleged studies?

    • mark (History)

      Yes, to describe Amano’s three-line document on Israel as a “report” to the board is a bit of a stretch. In retrospect, it would be as Nietzsche said, “menschlich, allzu menschlich” for the NAM states to react they way they did to it. That being said, what could they have expected in the way of “documentation” about Israel’s undeclared nuclear activities? Any citation of “unofficial” information by Amano about these activities would have unleashed a firestorm of protests from both Israel and the US. The “alleged studies” however are another matter, since if confirmed these would represent activities suggesting a non-peaceful nuclear program in an NPT party which has made a solemn pledge not to develop nuclear arms. In the case of Israel, it has made no such commitments, so there is far less of a case which the IAEA would be able to make for getting involved in making or supporting third-party allegations that Israel is engaged in undeclared activities. Bottom line is that, as Amano told board members, the DG “is limited by the IAEA statute and its mandate.” That’s a fact that the NAM will have to live with.

  4. A Complete Stranger (History)

    Your excellent post made me go back to read the original General Conference resolution on Israel and I must admit that when I finished reading it, I had no idea what the IAEA was asked to do. A straigh forward reading of it would seem to say that the IAEA was asked to report on its activities towards getting Israel to sign the NPT (or so it would seem to me). I believe the IAEA Statue prevents the Agency from doing anything active to get a State to join, hence the IAEA Director General’s “invitation” to Israel to join the NPT.

    On an interesting tidbit from all the responses to the DG’s request for insight (I can now appreciate why he requested that!), the Arab Group asked him to include, among other things, open source information about Israel’s nuclear capability. One can certainly understand why he would decline to do so! But that rases the equally interesting question about how the IAEA reports can include allusions to “alleged studies.” One can only conclude that they have been directed by the Security Council to address such questions. I cannot, however, remember the resolutions sufficiently well to know if they did so. Im sure they asked for resolution of the unresolved issues that first caused the Agency to send the Iran file to the Council, but where there resolutions explicitly mentioning the alleged studies?

  5. FSB (History)

    And about the various curious experiments people allege Iran is doing — I suggest to them to kindly read the IAEA reports: the IAEA reports state that “it should be emphasized … that the Agency has not detected the actual use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies” (IAEA Gov/2008/15 at paragraph 28 [.pdf]). The immediately preceding board report was even more explicit: “[I]t should be noted that the Agency has not detected the actual use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies, nor does it have credible information in this regard” (IAEA Gov/2008/4 at paragraph 54 [.pdf])

    It further states: “It should be noted that the Agency currently has no information … on the actual design or manufacture by Iran of nuclear material components of a nuclear weapon or of certain other key components, such as initiators, or on related nuclear physics studies” (IAEA Gov/2008/15 at paragraph 24).

    The IAEA has seen “no indication of any [uranium metal conversion] and casting activity in Iran” (IAEA Gov/2007/58 at paragraph 25).

    That people say that “Iran refuses to answer” IAEA questions is grossly misleading. As documented in every single IAEA board report since the laptop allegations first surfaced, Iran has consistently and adamantly answered many of the allegations by describing them as baseless and fabricated. In addition, it was only in February 2008 that the U.S. even gave the IAEA permission to show any of the documents to Iran to enable it to respond (IAEA Gov/2008/4 at paragraph 37). The U.S. further manipulated the IAEA’s efforts by providing “much of this information [to the IAEA] only in electronic form” and “not authorizing the [IAEA] to provide copies to Iran” (IAEA Gov/2008/15 at paragraph 16). The U.S. even refused to give the IAEA itself copies of some material. The agency was “therefore unfortunately unable to make them available to Iran.”

    Iran’s declination to respond to allegations based on documents it has never been shown, or has only been allowed to peek at, may qualify as a “refusal” to answer, but that would not stand up in any court of law, except perhaps at Gitmo.

    For more details see:

    http://www.antiwar.com/orig/caseyp.php?articleid=13133

    Bottom line: it doesn’t matter what Iran does, or how many inspections it permits and the goalposts will be kept moving because none of this has anything to do with nuclear weapons, rather the goal of the US is to deprive Iran (and other developing nations) of their right to enrichment, in blatant violation of the NPT and international law.

    According to Article 19 of Iran’s safeguards agreement, the IAEA may refer Iran to the UN Security Council ONLY if the IAEA is “not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under this Agreement, to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” AND Art. 2 which states that the purpose of the safeguards agreement is for the “EXCLUSIVE purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” This is standard language in the all basic safeguards.

    Note further that even then, the IAEA’s model safeguards agreement (INFCIRC-153) imposes various limits on inspections, and requires that IAEA inspections avoid hampering or causing “undue inteference” with civilian nuclear programs, whilst also requiring that the IAEA collects the “minimum amount of information and data consistent with carrying out its responsibilities” and “reduce to a minimum the possible inconvenience and disturbance to the State.”

    There is an an obvious tension between what the IAEA says in its own documents: minimum inconvenience (to be judged by the state in question) and maximal responsibility for investigation.

    The fundamental point is that this natural “sweet spot” of investigating countries with minimal interference yet maximal investigative responsibility is not being handled in an even-handed way. Iran is subjected to way more scrutiny than other nations who also enrich U legally e.g. Brazil.

    Also, the US’s (and UNSC) insistence that Iran halt enrichment is plainly illegal.

    That Iran has abided by the NPT is clear:

    http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/0504/NPT-101-Is-Iran-violating-the-nuclear-treaty

    That people are exaggerating the IAEA reports is also clear:

    http://www.antiwar.com/orig/caseyp.php?articleid=13133

    And Iran is, in fact, right in the Code 3.1 kerfuffle:

    http://original.antiwar.com/sahimi/2010/03/12/politicizing-the-iaea-against-iran/

    No one is denying that the IAEA has responsibility to check on facilities and people in various CSA states — but this, according to the IAEA, must be done with minimal intrusion. And since no nuclear material has been found to be diverted INTO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, as is needed to qualify for Art 19, the UNSC referral was extra-legal at best to begin with.

    • George William Herbert (History)

      The IAEA report is important for several reasons. 1 – that no diversion is known to have occurred (no smoking gun). 2 – that not enough surety about the program exists to prove that no diversion happened (no solid disproof). 3 – that a diversion would be the last stage of weaponization, not a final stage, for reasons I will articulate below.

      With regards to “actual nuclear material” in uranium bomb development programs –

      There is no need during the development of advanced implosion uranium bombs to use fissile material at any step prior to actual construction of a live test or weapon device. The material characteristics of DU or natural U are sufficiently close to identical with HEU that you can do complete full scale implosion system firings and get an extremely detailed understanding of the system behavior.

      This is an advantage for HEU bomb makers, vs Pu bomb makers, as the inert U test articles leave only minimal (chemical) contamination afterwards. Equivalent Pu bomb tests either require subscale testing (and therefore scaling model risks), substitute materials (and therefore material behavior scaling model risks), or the use of less-fissile Pu isotopes (which are *cough* a tiny bit more radioactive than you want to be around, after they’ve been dispersed by the system).

      One can also do all the material handling practice with completely inert DU / natural U material (conversion of hexafluoride to metal, metal purification and casting, machining, etc).

    • mark (History)

      FSB, the remarkable thing about your comprehensive commentary is that during the board meeting last week Iran in fact raised nearly ALL your objections!

    • sir_mixxalot (History)

      GWH — what you say is right. And it is one among many reasons to have a stricter NPT — kindly try negotiating that with sovereign nations.

      The NPT’s well known flaw is, indeed, that it allows a nation to effectively go up to the red line of weaponization.

      However — and this is important — it is not Iran’s fault that the NPT does not have teeth. And this cannot be compensated by illegally referring it to the UNSC.

  6. Dan Joyner (History)

    Really useful and interesting. Thanks Mark.

  7. Alan (History)

    Mark – I agree that the Sept report appeared to be much worse than people reported. I am also surprised so little is made of the laser enrichment issue raised by Ahmadinejad.

    It seems as though the IAEA under Amano and Iran are going to hit a wall quite soon, although I thought the IAEA had softened the tone significantly over the pyroprocessing claim since the May report. Doesn’t sound as though it did them much good though.

    I’m still trying to work out just how hard these rocks and hard places are that the US/P5 find themselves between vis-a-vis the 2012 summit and the Arab/NAM resolution.

    • FSB (History)

      Alan,
      do you have any reason to make a bigger deal out of the laser enrichment research?

      Just because it has “laser” in the title does not make it suspicious or evil.

      Here is a history with background:

      http://www.iranwatch.org/privateviews/First%20Watch/perspex-fwi-Laser.pdf

      The quantities are in mg’s.

      We have looked at Iran’s program in detail and there is no reason to jump to the conclusion that laser enrichment is militarily oriented.

      Here is a SILEX presentation showing why it is attractive economically:

      http://www.asx.com.au/asxpdf/20080410/pdf/318j6y3ctrzwqf.pdf

      That a bigger deal has not been made out of it is a sign of hope.

    • FSB (History)
    • Alan (History)

      FSB – Ahmadinejad is not talking about “research”, he is talking about a capability which he now says Iran has (at least he said they had it in February).

      I understood the IAEA had thought they had put this issue to bed years ago, yet Ahmadinejad seems to have felt the urge to reopen it.

    • FSB (History)

      Alan,

      Ahmadinejad also said there are no gay people in Iran.

      Could you please post what you know in technical terms about what the President of Iran said about their laser enrichment process?

      If we are just throwing words around it is not helpful nor a good basis for any kind of technical discussion.

      Even if Iran has perfected laser enrichment (I think not), it is a very useful way to make fuel, and not really useful to make weapons-grade U.

      Please tell us what you know, in technical detail, about Iran’s laser enrichment.

    • mark (History)

      “Doesn’t sound as though it did them much good though.” You can say that again.

    • MWG (History)

      I don’t have time to rebut every one of FSB’s claims in detail, but . . .

      Apparently, we should believe everything Iran says in its own self-defense (safeguards violations? what safeguards violations?) but nothing it says that might be incriminating (laser enrichment).

      More seriously, a key indicator of whether Iran is trustworthy is whether its story is consistent over time. In fact, Iran has a consistent pattern of changing its story to suit circumstances. We have declared everything we are required to declare. You found enriched uranium particles at Kalaye? Oops, we forgot to mention that, but we’re telling the truth now. The IAEA’s October 2003 report is quite damning in that regard, but the pattern continues with Iran’s decision to declare Qom/Fordow only after it became known through other means.

      On “alleged studies,” Iran has actually provided some responses (e.g. on supposed civil use of exploding bridgewire detonators) that could be checked, but Iran now refuses to respond to follow-up questions.

      Implementation of a safeguards agreement is a balance between protecting the rights of the state and ensuring that the IAEA can meet its responsibilities. Selectively quoting from articles designed to protect the state gives the mistaken impression that the state has no obligation to cooperation with the IAEA to enable it to verify that Iran’s declarations are complete – i.e. that all nuclear material required to be declared has been declared.

    • Alan (History)

      FSB:

      Ahmadinejad on laser enrichment as requested:

      http://www.president.ir/en/?ArtID=20255

      Whether or not what he says is true seems to be irrelevant, because in making these statements he appears to be deliberately inviting extra IAEA scrutiny, with an apparent intention of being able to tell them to sod off again.

    • FSB (History)

      MWG — kindly read the safeguards agreements esp. Art 22 and 19.

      What is to happen in cases where Iran and the IAEA have disagreements is for there to be arbitration — unless it is known that diversion of nuclear material went into nuclear bombs.

      It is quite simple. I do not defend Iran — I defned the document signed between Iran and the IAEA.

      I would like to see a MUCH stricter NPT, but who will sign it?

      (Ditto to Alan about laser enrichment — the IAEA does not have an issue with it, but if it did, it can invite arbitration).

    • FSB (History)

      Alan,
      There is nothing technical in what you sent.

      from your link:

      “the president stressed that since Iran was currently using the existing system of centrifuges for enriching uranium, it would not use the laser technology.”

      Laser enrichement is at the research stage even in the West, and in any case might be a smart technology for making nuclear fuel, like centrifuges are also.

      Enrichment does not equal bombs. It is permitted under the NPT.

      You want a tougher treaty than the NPT? I do too.

      Go ahead and try to get the worlds’ nations on board.

    • Alan (History)

      FSB Enrichment does not equal bombs. It is permitted under the NPT.

      Correct. Under safeguards.

      There is no laser enrichment process under safeguards in Iran.

      Ahmadinejad opening this question is indicative of the Iranian approach. It promotes distrust.

      I expect they have their reasons, but in inviting the scrutiny, they cannot simultaneously argue that no evidence of undeclared activities exist, that the IAEA is politicised and that Iran is being victimised.

    • FSB (History)

      The latest CRS report on Iran notes:

      http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL32048.pdf

      “There continues to be no evidence that Iran has diverted any nuclear material for a nuclear weapons program.”

      All safeguarded nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for. The IAEA in every single report agrees with that.

      If there is any disagreement between Iran and IAEA (over laser enrichment, which there isn’t) in the absence of known nuclear material diversion to nuclear weapons, then the CSA Art 22 calls for aribtration.

      There is a legal process here.

    • Alan (History)

      There is no “disagreement” as such, but the IAEA is currently asking Iran about laser enrichment and being ignored, despite Iran admitting to a capability.

      So it’s an issue. Another one. Created by Iran.

      Pending, shall we say.

  8. Andrew (History)

    I had a rather strong inkling that the General Conference was going to be eventful because of the 2010 NPT RevCon. Great write-up Mark!

    I think the political theatrics at the IAEA GenCon should only be expected to increase as the P5 on the one hand unilaterally asserts it can call for Iran to cease its enrichment and implement the Additional Protocol against its will on the one hand, and act completely powerless against Israel’s perceived possession of nuclear weapons on the other. Developing nations believe they can clearly see the precedent they would be setting on their own prospective programs, this is why nations such as Brazil have tried to intervene on Iran’s behalf.

    The rhetoric and divided nature of the board should only be expected to grow until a less ‘good state -versus- bad state’ and a more universal approach can be formulated and adopted.

    • FSB (History)

      I agree with Andrew — the UNSC needs to distance itself from the IAEA. The taint of political interference is becomming all to clear and can lead to the implosion of the NPT itself if the processes are seen to be unfair, which they are.

      What we are seeing now is that there is no clear “international community” that is angry with Iran.

      The NAM and (some of) the UNSC [prodded by the US (itself prodded by domestic lobbies)], are going in different directions — Brazil and Turkey are on Iran’s side on this issue — the IAEA needs to keep out of this and do its technical work.

      Alas it is all to clear it is politicized:

      http://original.antiwar.com/sahimi/2010/03/12/politicizing-the-iaea-against-iran/

      Also, insisting that Iran give up its right to make nuclear fuel (enrichment) is simply illegal — the UNSC can insist that it live up to some higher level of openness (not sure that even that should be required in the absence of the AP ratification by Iran) but not that it suspend enrichment.

      Unfortunately, there are any number of statements from SecState’s office saying Iran must stop enriching. e.g.

      http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/27/us/politics/27clinton.html

      quotes:
      Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton warned Iran’s leaders on Sunday that if they were seeking nuclear weapons, “your pursuit is futile,” and ruled out explicitly the possibility that the Obama administration would allow Iran to produce its own nuclear fuel, even under intense international inspection…….

      “You have a right to pursue the peaceful use of civil, nuclear power,” she said, as if addressing Iran directly. “You do not have a right to obtain a nuclear weapon. You do not have the right to have the full enrichment and reprocessing cycle under your control……..”

      Uh, no Ms. Clinton, they actually do. The SecState should stop pretending to be Team America. Or watch the rest of the movie.

    • Alan (History)

      Andrew – the key word there is “possession” isn’t it? What choices do you have in taking on a nuclear armed state?

      I don’t think that it’s comparing apples with apples anyway, because Israel is outside the NPT and therefore the same framework is not available for tackling them.

    • sir_mixxalot (History)

      Alan,
      Andrew’s point that no one can force Iran to ratify the AP should be pondered and appreciated.

      Just as Israel’s right to not sign the NPT should be pondered and appreciated.

      These are sovereign nations.

    • Andrew (History)

      Alan, if the international community can ask Iran to cease its enrichment and implement the Additional Protocol, why can’t it ask Israel (or any other nuclear weapon state) to accede to the NPT?

      “What choices do you have in taking on a nuclear armed state?”
      Are you suggesting that if Iran or another nation develops a nuclear weapon we should no longer be concerned with that nations possession of nuclear weapons and possible proliferation? That seems to be a pretty powerful precedent.

    • Alan (History)

      Sir Mixxalot – I don’t necessarily disagree, it’s just that the two situations are not comparable.

      The UNSC is involved in the Iran case, rightly or wrongly, because of issues over Iran’s CSA.

      Israel doesn’t have a CSA.

      Andrew – they can ask Israel, but they can expect to hear no and that is where it has to end for all practical purposes. Not a happy situation to be sure, but nothing can be done about it.

      Are you suggesting that if Iran or another nation develops a nuclear weapon we should no longer be concerned with that nations possession of nuclear weapons and possible proliferation? That seems to be a pretty powerful precedent.

      We can be concerned all we like, but we can’t do much about it. I think it *may* be different from a management perspective where you are talking about a nation with a very small number of comparatively unsophisticated devices, but it’s high stakes stuff.

    • FSB (History)

      Alan says “they can ask Israel, but they can expect to hear no ”

      Well IAEA and UNSC can ask Iran to ratify the AP but “they can expect to hear no ” also.

      Is this complicated?

    • Alan (History)

      Of course they will hear no, but the process that has lead to the asking gives much wider scope for not taking no for an answer.

    • FSB (History)

      Unfortunately, it is not just “asking” — it is insisting with a gun pointed to Iran’s head (“all options are on the table”).

      The process has been extra-legal, at best.

    • Alan (History)

      Maybe, but it is still not a process that can be invoked for Israel.

    • FSB (History)

      Agreed. Similarly, the process of insisting/forcing/threatening that Iran ratify the AP cannot be invoked for Iran either.

  9. archjr (History)

    FSB,

    XII.C of the IAEA Statute defines important safeguards responsibilities of the Agency. I suggest you go back and read it again. The Agency has acted in all cases in conformity with these requirements, including the referral to the UNSC, which I can guarantee was not a decision taken lightly by the the staff, the DG, or the Board of Governors.

    I also suggest you read Article XIX and even VIII.A and III.V, among others, and try to explain why Iran’s behavior is consistent with these rules, with which Iran’s CSA is consistent, and within which the inspectorate has acted appropriately, circumspectly, and with more than patience would require.

    That “Iran has consistently and adamantly answered many of the allegations by describing them as baseless and fabricated,” is not dispositive of anything, as you suggest. Iran clearly understands its nominal obligations, and has failed, repeatedly, to honor them. It does have legitimate concerns related to its sovereignty, as does any Member State, which the Agency has recognized, like confidentiality of information. But the contortions of your arguments leave me with a best a mild case of vertigo.

    I still retain hope that these things can be worked out, albeit under difficult political circumstances. Try to put yourself in the Agency’s shoes. What can you do to help this dialogue? Everybody wants this to end well.

    • hass (History)

      Sorry archjr but Iran never violated Article XII.C.
      A full reading Article XII.C makes things a bit clearer about what “non-compliance” refers to by setting out three requirements for compliance:

      1- The first requirement for compliance is “accounting referred to in sub paragraph A-6 of this article”

      Paragraph A-6 of Article XII, in turn, states that inspectors are to be sent to account for fissionable materials and ensure none has been diverted for a “military purpose”.

      The IAEA did send these inspectors to Iran – many many times. El-Baradei confirmed in Paragraph 52 of his November 2003 report that “to date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a nuclear weapons programme.” And again, after extensive inspections, El-Baradei wrote Paragraph 112 of his November 2004 report that “all the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for, and therefore such material is not diverted to prohibited activities.”

      This statement by the IAEA is very significant, legally, because IT MEANS THAT IRAN DID NOT VIOLATE THE NPT.

      As Michael Spies of the Lawyer’s Committee on Nuclear Policy has written:

      “The conclusion that no diversion has occurred certifies that the state in question is in compliance with its undertaking, under its safeguards agreement and Article III of the NPT, to not divert material to non-peaceful purposes. In the case of Iran, the IAEA was able to conclude in its November 2004 report that that all declared nuclear materials had been accounted for and therefore none had been diverted to military purposes. The IAEA reached this same conclusion in September 2005.”

      2- The second requirement under Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute is “determining whether there is compliance with the undertaking referred to in sub paragraph F-4 of article XI”

      A quich check of Article XI shows that it applies to “Agency Projects” meaning the projects in which the the IAEA has provided technical assistance to a requesting country. And, subparagraph F-4 specifically requires that the assistance provided by the IAEA shall not be used for military purposes and shall be subject to safeguards.

      Last I checked, the IAEA did not provide any such assistance to Iran which has been used for military purposes

      3- The third requirement is compliance “with the measures referred to in sub-paragraph A-2 of this article”

      Subparagraph A-2 of Article XII requires observance of “health and safety” standards. Again, there hasn’t even been an allegation of any violation of this section either.

      =================
      THe authority of the IAEA is limited exclusively to nuclear material. It has no business checking into Irans missile programs etc especially when there is no evidenceo of any diversion of nuclear material.

  10. FSB (History)

    archjr — Yes, I am quite familiar with those.

    This issue was discussed previously in Andreas Presbo’s last post, but since you raise it again I highlight what I said before, updated with newer material — IAEA’s safeguards agreement (INFCIRC-153) imposes various limits on inspections, and requires that IAEA inspections avoid hampering or causing “undue inteference” with civilian nuclear programs, whilst also requiring that the IAEA collects the “minimum amount of information and data consistent with carrying out its responsibilities” and “reduce to a minimum the possible inconvenience and disturbance to the State.”

    There is an an obvious tension between what the IAEA says in its own documents: minimum inconvenience (to be judged by the state in question) and maximal *responsibility* for investigation under XII.C of the IAEA Statute.

    The fundamental point is this: (and this is why I brought up Brazil) — this natural “sweet spot” of investigating countries with minimal interference yet maximal investigative responsibility is not being handled in an even-handed way. At all. Iran is subjected to way more scrutiny than other nations who also enrich U legally.

    Also, the US’s (and UNSC) insistence that Iran halt enrichment is plainly illegal.

    No one is denying that the IAEA has responsibility to check on facilities and people in various CSA states — but this, according to the IAEA itself, must be done with minimal intrusion.

    And since no nuclear material has been found to be diverted INTO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, as is needed to qualify for Art 19 of the CSA, the UNSC referral was extra-legal at best.

    What can the IAEA do? It can follow the law, and the letter of what it signed.

    It can admit it was wrong to report Iran to the UNSC when it should have chosen Art 22 (CSA) arbitration instead. This will build some goodwill and may even get the Iranians to volunteer to adhere to the AP, as they were doing before.

    What do to after that? Enact Art 22 arbitration.

    This was the deal that Iran entered into by signing the CSA/NPT: “yes you can inspect us (within reason) to make sure we are not diverting material into nuclear bombs, and for that favor we want help with developing a nuclear energy program”. That is the NPT in a nutshell — it is not: “Watch me bend over, please send in the Gestapo.”

    You allow the Experian credit check people to have your Social Security Number to check on a legally LIMITED set of things — but if they turn up at your door at midnight you can tell them to Fuck Off. You would be right. Iran is right also.

    If reconciliation is sought, confidence building measures, such as the fuel swap which was put forward by Brazil and Turkey, should be explored.

    What does NOT help is the SecState saying that Iran can never enrich U:

    http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/27/us/politics/27clinton.html

    quote:
    Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton warned Iran’s leaders on Sunday….”You do not have the right to have the full enrichment and reprocessing cycle under your control……..”

    That is an illegal demand. The US Sec State is wrong.

    Iran is more in the right here, than the UNSC.

    Here is the latest CRS report:

    http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL32048.pdf

    “There continues to be no evidence that Iran has diverted any nuclear material for a nuclear weapons program.”

    It is so crystal clear that the UNSC is wrong that even the US press has finally picked up on it:

    http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/0917/Reality-check-Iran-is-not-a-nuclear-threat

    So please don’t bother asking what Iran can do to help the situation, ask what your governemnt can do.

    Iran has the option of withdrawing from the NPt altogether, and it is a show of goodwill that it hasn’t and agrees to be harrassed by the politicized IAEA.

    Because most of the requests to visit various Iranian sites that are stated by the IAEA in its reports are covered by the Additional Protocol, Iran has no legal obligations to grant them.

    Iran has stated that, if its nuclear dossier is returned to the IAEA – its rightful place – it will begin implementing again the provisions of the Additional Protocol on volunteer basis until Iran’s parliament ratifies the Agreement.

    At the same time, the Agency has carried out many unannounced visits to Iran’s nuclear sites. Such intrusive and unannounced visits are an important part of the Additional Protocol. Therefore, Iran is still selectively and voluntarily carrying out some provisions of the Additional Protocol. That is a positive aspect of Iran’s behavior which is overlooked.

    The IAEA also stated that Iran did not allow it to visit and inspect Iran’s under-construction research reactor in Arak. But, such visits are covered by the modified text of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1, of the Safeguards Agreement. Iran had agreed to the modified text, part of which states that Iran must allow inspection of the under-construction sites. However, because the EU3 reneged on its promises, Iran suspended the implementation of the modified text in February 2006, and went back to its original Safeguards Agreement, signed in 1974. The original Subsidiary Arrangements state that only 180 days prior to the introduction of any nuclear material into a nuclear facility does Iran have the obligation to allow visits to and inspection of the facility. Thus, once again, Iran has no legal obligations towards the Agency regarding the Arak reactor.

    Thus, overall, despite the propaganda and bogus alarms the IAEA report actually indicates positive developments in the thorny issue of Iran’s nuclear program. Iran’s legally-speaking relative openness of its uranium enrichment program should be taken for what is intended for: declaring that Iran is willing to compromise.

    Re. Code 3.1(mod) also see:
    http://jurist.org/forumy/2010/03/qom-enrichment-facility-was-iran.php

    • archjr (History)

      FSB,

      Repetition of the same old arguments without adding clarity to the issue is tautology.

      However, your statement that “Iran’s legally-speaking relative openness of its uranium enrichment program should be taken for what is intended for: declaring that Iran is willing to compromise.” is something new and made me laugh. So thanks for that.

    • FSB (History)

      archjr — yes, it would appear that my original comments were correct as is borne out by more recent posts. I am glad you find the situation amusing.

      No one can force Iran to ratify the AP. (As no one can force Israel to join the NPT)

      I’ll say it yet again — if you have a counter-argument do bring it up: Because most of the requests to visit various Iranian sites that are stated by the IAEA in its reports are covered by the Additional Protocol, Iran has no legal obligations to grant them.

      Iran has stated that, if its nuclear dossier is returned to the IAEA – its rightful place – it will begin implementing again the provisions of the Additional Protocol on volunteer basis until Iran’s parliament ratifies the Agreement.

      At the same time, the Agency has carried out many unannounced visits to Iran’s nuclear sites. Such intrusive and unannounced visits are an important part of the Additional Protocol. Therefore, Iran is still selectively and voluntarily carrying out some provisions of the Additional Protocol. That is a positive aspect of Iran’s behavior which is overlooked.

      That Iran has no obligation to follow the modified Code 3.1 has been attested to by a legal scholar:

      http://jurist.org/forumy/2010/03/qom-enrichment-facility-was-iran.php

      I think your heart is in the right place: If you wish to lessen the tensions kindly write to the President and Ms Clinton to OK the Brazil-Turkey fuel-swap deal.

      If you have actual arguments, rather than calling what I say tautological or laughing at it, do kindly let us all know. I would be more than happy to debate the substance of the issues.

  11. krepon (History)

    Mark:
    Great writing.
    MK

    • mark (History)

      Thanks, Michael. Coming from you, that matters!

  12. Ben D (History)

    Thanks for your post Mark and I second the request for, if available, further information on the Iran’s laser enrichment research.

    And BTW, is it possible for a post concerning the status of Israel’s nuclear capability and ongoing research?

  13. FSB (History)

    Interesting — how even-handed:

    http://www.democracynow.org/2010/9/14/headlines#9

    US Asks Arab States to Withdraw Israel Measure at IAEA

    September 14, 2010

    The Obama administration is asking Arab states to withdraw a measure calling on Israel to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

    The proposal would build on the non-binding measure approved at an assembly meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency last year. Israel is the only nation in the Middle East with nuclear weapons, but the country has never officially acknowledged its program. By shunning the forty-year-old Non-Proliferation Treaty, Israel has not had to reject atomic arms or allow the IAEA to probe all of its nuclear sites. On Monday, the US ambassador to the IAEA, Glyn Davies, defended Israel’s rejection of the NPT.

  14. Allen Thomson (History)

    Mark, since my particular hobbyhorse is the story of the alleged (and former) plutonium production reactor in Syria, what is your take on the current state of play? It looks to me as if Syria has successfully stonewalled the IAEA and that the matter will eventually be forgotten.

    Do you see any further measures the IAEA or others, like the US, could take to bring clarity to the matter?

    • sir_mixxalot (History)

      This will be difficult politically without adding clarity to Israel’s program, IMHO.

    • mark (History)

      Allen, it would appear that Syria is being successful. The statement on their behalf by Sudan threw the gauntlet down to the DG. There are good reasons why the USG people in technical meetings back home and over here have raised the issue of information continuity. There are people here in Vienna who have been here a long time who say that the problem is that the IAEA never institutionalized the special inspection provision over the last five decades. The last one called for was 16 years ago. It is seen as an exceptional event. Had the IAEA called for such inspections in member states with a certain periodicity–so this argument goes–the current IAEA administration would have more confidence. Bottom line is that Amano cannot force Syria to do it and the climate in this place since Sept 2007 when the attack was carried out does not favor doing this. There is an unusual climate of political risk avoidance. Board members know that it is not up to them to call for a special inspection but is up to the DG alone. The board can urge him to do it in a resolution, but given the current state of affairs, and especially the validation of Syrian and Iranian positions in the NAM and the unique receptivity to them by the DGO, it would be folly to bet that the situation in Syria will change without a considerable demonstration of political will in Vienna which frankly I just don’t see.

    • Andy (History)

      So special inspections are basically dead as a verification tool? If true, that’s quite unfortunate.

  15. sir_mixxalot (History)
    • Ben D (History)

      “Interesting attack on Iran — who did this?

      http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/0921/Stuxnet-malware-is-weapon-out-to-

      Thing is sir_mixxalot, I doubt very much that the SCADA system for the Bushehr nuclear plant would be interfaced with the Internet, it would most probably be a stand alone system.

    • Alan (History)

      Ben – I don’t think it requires an internet interface. Isn’t it spread by USB stick?

      Not sure why Bushehr would be a target though. Natanz maybe. Perhaps if they had a clue about Bushehr software they may deduce Natanz had something similar. Or any other plant for that matter.

    • Ben D (History)

      Hi Alan, we have no way of knowing if the said SCADA system uses internet standard USB connectors, probably not? Even so, how would the hackers get the virus to infect specific USB stick/s located at the target in Iran. No,..I remain sceptical

    • Alan (History)

      Ben – have a look at this:

      http://www.langner.com/en/

      Particularly log entry for Sept 21 regarding infiltration. It transpires the Russian contractor at Bushehr actually does have a compromised website (mentioned earlier in log – see Sept 16, Ralph’s theory).

      He freely admits his overall theory is pure speculation though, and I think you’re right to be sceptical. It will be interesting to see what else emerges in the next few days.

  16. FSB (History)

    It would appear P5+1 are coming to their senses:

    http://www.isisnucleariran.org/news/detail/p51-seeks-renewed-negotiations-fuel-swap-talks-under-its-auspices/

    September 22, 2010

    According to a statement to be released today by foreign ministers of the P5+1 (comprising the United States, France, Britain, China, Russia, and Germany), the six countries will announce their hope for reaching “an early negotiated solution” with Iran over its nuclear program, and that they are “ready to engage” on this issue as well as the stalled nuclear fuel swap deal.

  17. archjr (History)

    FSB-

    This string is getting much too long, so I will refrain from further comments, apart from these:

    1) Rightly or wrongly, the UNSC referral – of “the file,” or “the dossier,” if you like – is essentially a declaration that the IAEA cannot do its job. I do not know if the arbitration you so actively support was even tried, but I certainly suspect it was under ElBaradei. I mean, come on, the guy bent over backwards to get Iran to the table. If ElBaradei couldn’t get them to come around, who could? I worked there and attended every Board meeting from 2002-2005. So I suspect the reason for the referral was Iranian intransigence. The DG most certainly opposed this action, but he works for the member states who overwhelmingly supported the referral. It was not even close.

    2) No amount of legal interpretation, or misinterpretation for that matter, can disguise the fact in front of us: Iran has failed to convince most everybody that its intentions are strictly peaceful, no matter what NAM members say at Board meetings. The whole thing is caught up in North-South politics, but I can assure you that many NAM-member folks I have talked to are not comfortable with Iran’s inflammatory and legalistic rhetoric, the latter of which cleverly feeds back into the long-standing NAM narrative about some states being more equal than others. NAM support is based on principles with which not everybody agrees, and is a convenient stick in the eye of the West, but the logic doesn’t work. Do you really think Iran’s neighbors and friends want them to have nukes? What if Malaysia took steps as controversial as Iran’s – do you think its neighbors would hew to the NAM position? Of course, Iran’s intentions are unclear, and the way forward is for them to let the inspectorate do its job, not to ceaselessly throw up debatable legal arguments to avoid doing what everyone, even some in Iran, knows they need to do to create confidence. The politicization of the issue is more a result of Iran’s actions, which you consistently fail to acknowledge, as it is of some suspicious Western/Israeli drive to go get ’em. I mentioned this before: the old Chinese proverb: You tied the knot, now you must untie the knot.

    Iran has been a great and proud country throughout its history, much admired for its learning, arts and poetry. But right now it’s a bad actor on the international scene. You and I may differ on means to the ultimate end of getting them to remain a non-nuclear-weapons state, but at least I am somewhat comforted to surmise that you also seek the same goal.

    • FSB (History)

      Why not kindly check the facts before publicly speculating?

      1. You say: ” I do not know if the arbitration you so actively support was even tried, but I certainly suspect it was under ElBaradei.”

      No it was not. Next question.

      2. You say: “No amount of legal interpretation, or misinterpretation for that matter, can disguise the fact in front of us: Iran has failed to convince most everybody that its intentions are strictly peaceful…”

      most everybody? Patently untrue. Here is the list of NAM states — all 118 countries:

      http://www.nam.gov.za/background/members.htm

      Almost everybody on planet earth agrees UNSC/IAEA are being out of line.

      3. ” Do you really think Iran’s neighbors and friends want them to have nukes?”

      Irrelevant. You presume Iran is making nuclear weapons when everyone IAEA, CRS agree that there has been no diversion of nuclear materials. You are speculating.

      4. Iran is “a bad actor on the international scene.”

      You views do NOT reflect that of most countries.
      The following countries disagree with you:

      http://www.nam.gov.za/background/members.htm

      5. That Iran’s position is basically legitimate is being borne out by developments today:

      http://www.isisnucleariran.org/news/detail/p51-seeks-renewed-negotiations-fuel-swap-talks-under-its-auspices/

      A smart move by the P5+1 — it could have been done much earlier.

    • sir_mixxalot (History)

      ARCHJR asks:”Do you really think Iran’s neighbors and friends want them to have nukes?”

      In the case that Iran were making nukes (of which there is no evidence according to the IAEA), most of it’s neigbors are actually OK with that:

      http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/aug/6/poll-majority-of-arab-world-views-nuke-armed-iran-/

      Just saw this on FP — will our government never learn to stay out of other people’s bidness. This did not turn out so well, the last 20 or so times it was tried:

      http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/09/22/congressional_backers_look_to_exiled_iranian_group_for_regime_change

    • MWG (History)

      This is silly. Iran violated its safeguards agreement, deliberately and repeatedly, and was reported to the UN Security Council. Once that happens, arbitration is no longer relevant. The Board of Governors has adjudicated the case.

      The Board could find Iran in further violation, e.g. for violating Article 39 of its safeguards agreement by unilaterally suspending implementation of part of its Subsidiary Arrangements or for violating Article 42 of its safeguards agreement by failing to provide design information “as early as possible before nuclear material is introduced into a new facility” in the manner spelled out in its Subsidiary Arrangements. But what would be the point? The case is already before the Security Council.

      I think we can agree that ultimately the way to resolve Iran’s non-compliance is through negotiations, which Iran has yet to undertake in good faith, having walked back at least three previous agreements (two with the E3 and one with the P5+1).

    • FSB (History)

      MWG:

      You say: “Iran violated its safeguards agreement, deliberately and repeatedly, and was reported to the UN Security Council.”

      And my point is, and has been (eg. see Andreas Presbo’s post from ~ week ago), that this referral was in contravention of the CSA. Why? Because Article 22 of the specific Iranian safeguards agreement from 1974(see below for URL) explicitly establishes the proper procedure for handling any disagreements between the BoG and Iranian govt.

      http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc214.pdf

      Article 22

      “Any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement, except a dispute with regard to a finding by the Board under Article 19 or an action taken by the Board pursuant to such a finding, which is not settled by negotiation or another procedure agreed to by the Government of Iran and the Agency shall, at the request of either, be submitted to an arbitral tribunal composed as follows:

      the Government of Iran and the Agency shall each designate one arbitrator, and the two arbitrators so designated shall elect a third, who shall be the Chairman. If, within thirty days of the request for arbitration, either the Government of Iran or the Agency has not designated an arbitrator, either the Government of Iran or the Agency may request the President of the International Court of Justice to appoint an arbitrator. The same procedure shall apply if, within thirty days of the designation or appointment of the second arbitrator, the third arbitrator has not been elected. A majority of the members of the arbitral tribunal shall constitute a quorum, and all decisions shall require the concurrence of two arbitrators. The arbitral procedure shall be fixed by the tribunal. The decisions of the tribunal shall be binding on the Government of Iran and the Agency.”

      According to Article 19 of Iran’s safeguards agreement, the IAEA may refer Iran to the UN Security Council ONLY if the IAEA is “not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under this Agreement, to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” AND Art. 2 which states that the purpose of the safeguards agreement is for the “EXCLUISIVE purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” This is standard language in the all basic safeguards. Note further that even then, the IAEA’s model safeguards agreement (INFCIRC-153) imposes various limits on inspections, and requires that IAEA inspections avoid hampering or causing “undue inteference” with civilian nuclear programs, whilst also requiring that the IAEA collects the “minimum amount of information and data consistent with carrying out its responsibilities” and “reduce to a minimum the possible inconvenience and disturbance to the State.”

      Finally, note paragraph 52 of the Feb 2006 IAEA report on Iran:

      “[A]bsent some nexus to nuclear material the Agency’s legal authority to pursue the verification of possible nuclear weapons related activity is limited.”

      In short, there is nothing that authorizes the IAEA to investigate Iran’s missiles program unless there is evidence of nuclear material involved — which the IAEA has said there isn’t.

      Further, the Feb 2010 IAEA report, point 46: “While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran…” That is enough to satisfy the letter of the safeguards agreement.

    • MWG (History)

      FSB simply does not understand Iran’s safeguards agreement. Under the IAEA Statute, the Board has the authority – indeed, the obligation – to adjudicate non-compliance under Article XII.C of the Statute. Where it finds non-compliance, as it did in the case of Iran (as well as previously in Iraq, Romania, North Korea, and Libya) it must report that non-compliance to the UN Security Council.

      The safeguards agreement offers an additional basis for reporting in Article 19, in cases where the IAEA is unable to verify that nuclear material has been diverted. This does not replace the separate and independent authority under the Statute.

      Arbitration is not an automatic remedy. It applies only if requested and only for disputes over interpretation of the safeguards agreement – other than Article 19. It does not apply – and for obvious legal reasons could not apply – to disputes over interpretation or implementation of the IAEA Statute. And arbitration has never been invoked over a safeguards dispute. Far from being the appropriate method of dispute resolution, arbitration is in practice irrelevant.

    • hass (History)

      Sorry MWG but Iran was not “non-compliant” under Article XII.C which requires that inspectors be sent to check on nuclear material to ensure none has been diverted. That has happened, repeatedly. The IAEA has even said that it has no evidence of UNdeclared nuclear material, though it doesn’t technically verify the absence of UNdecleared nuclear material in Iran as in ANY country where the AP is not in force (and in Iran it is not in force, and quite legally so.) So Iran was never “non-compliant” under Article XII.C.

  18. joshua (History)

    Mark:

    I note with some concern that today’s IAEA Daily Press Review did not include an Opinion section. I guess nothing worthwhile has appeared on the Interwebs. Either that, or you’ve just short-circuited the Public Affairs Dept. If it’s the latter, let’s hope the condition is not serious.

  19. archjr (History)

    FSB,

    You force me to respond to each of your points.

    1)Find me the proof that arbitration was not suggested under ElBaradei. There were countless private meetings, the contents of which I do not know, nor do you. Do you suspect ElBaradei was so uninformed so as not to explore this option?

    2) You surely know that there can be disagreements between members of the NAM, and I know from personal experience that some NAM members find all this tiresome. By and large, NAM members join the IAEA for technical assistance that can help them with development, as they should and rightly do, not to argue about the finer points of Iran’s safeguards argument. They have to go along to get along, and Iran has found a convenient way, as I said, to poke a stick into the eye of the US and other Westerners.

    3) I do not presume that Iran is making nuclear weapons, but I sincerely doubt that IAEA reports, CRS reports, and your posts will provide much comfort to countries in the region. They deal with Iran on a daily basis, and they are not comfortable. Again, show me the proof.

    4) If Iran is not a bad actor, why are banks and insurance companies ending business with them? Surely they have plenty of money, but the business community, except for those who poach around the edges, does not want to deal with a nation that so clearly fails to abide by its commitments. This surely has much to do with UN and other sanctions, but you must know very well that dealing with Iran as a state, as opposed to individual businesses, requires a tolerance for risk that most people don’t have outside of Russia, China, etc. If there weren’t so much money and oil there, even these business partners would not deal with them at all. Trust me: not many people put much faith in paper that is written with Iranian agreement. Everything is constantly subject to change on a whim of the government when it suits them; they frequently refuse to adhere to rules they have agreed to. Chalk it up to culture or psychology or whatever, but they are not universally deemed a reliable partner in much of anything, despite your professions to the contrary.

    5) You consistently profess doubt as to whether any engagement group, be it the EU-3 or the P-5+1, is sincere, or that it is wrongheaded, or that Iran feels coerced. The fact is that Iran has been given every opportunity to satisfy others’ concerns, without losing face, and they have failed to seize the moment at every turn. As I mentioned before, ElBaradei (no more a stooge of the US than is Amano) bent over backwards to assuage Iran’s concerns, to no avail. He was frustrated at every juncture. Parenthetically, how is it you presume UN organizations like the IAEA are completely under the sway of the US for nefarious purposes? The US has to fight through a thicket of opposition for every position it takes; there is a clear bias against hiring Americans in the UN system; and most decisions are reached by consensus, except when the US or others decide to exercise the veto, applicable only in the UNSC, or ask for a vote. My old boss told me, “If you got the votes, talk to me. If you don’t, you’ve got more work to do.” Iran doesn’t seem to understand this rule.

    • FSB (History)

      1. No proof is needed, since arbitration would be entered into the official records — it is not a done smoking cigars around the fireside. It is a legal process of which the IAEA (and Iran) will keep miticulous records. You do not need to believe me — email any of the bloggers who run the blog to check (or they can weigh in if they feel like it).

      2. Sure the NAM is not monolithic but see, eg.:

      http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LI17Ak02.html

      “In a strongly-worded statement, representatives of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have supported Iran’s position on the contentious issue of IAEA inspectors and have also expressed concern that the most recent IAEA report on Iran has “departed from standard verification language”.

      “NAM notes with concern, the possible implications of the continued departure from standard verification language in the summary of the report of the director general [Yukio Amano],” the statement said. The statement was read during the IAEA board of governors meeting on behalf of over 100 NAM member states.”

      3. The comfort level of nations in the region is not pertinent to the legal process within the IAEA — and, btw, see post by Sir_mixxalot (great name!) above.

      http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/aug/6/poll-majority-of-arab-world-views-nuke-armed-iran-/

      4.
      “If Iran is not a bad actor, why are banks and insurance companies ending business with them?”

      This is a result of sanctions which is a result of extra-legal referral of Iran to the UNSC

      5. “how is it you presume UN organizations like the IAEA are completely under the sway of the US for nefarious purposes?”

      I never said that — that is your strawman.

      I said that the IAEA is politicized. NAM agrees — most of the world agrees with this.

      Compare the Feb 2010 report with the Nov 2009 one:

      The first difference is that, whereas the reports issued by the ElBaradei-led IAEA always tried to stay away from the Resolutions issued by the United Nations Security Council, the new reports bring the subject into the report very prominently. Another important difference is that, unlike the ElBaradei-led IAEA, the new report resorts to making unreasonable, and sometimes totally illegal, demands. After reporting in the first 4 pages of the report on the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and the one under construction in Fordow (near Qom), it states in article 25 of the report that,

      As previously indicated to the Board [of Governors], in light of Iran’s refusal to permit the Agency access to the Heavy Water Production Plant [near Arak], the Agency has had to rely on satellite imagery to monitor the status of that plant.

      But a heavy water production plant is not covered by Iran’s Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. In fact, heavy water is not even considered as nuclear material covered by any IAEA Safeguards Agreement. So, why should Iran open its plants to the IAEA when it has no such obligation?

      the IAEA Feb 2010 report insists in article 29 that,

      In accordance with Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement, agreed Subsidiary Arrangements cannot be changed unilaterally; nor is there a mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of a provision agreed to in Subsidiary Arrangements. Therefore, the modified Code 3.1, as agreed to by Iran in 2003, remains in force for Iran.

      This statement is correct only if the Majles had ratified the change covering the modified Code 3.1. But, given that it did not, Iran has no obligation toward the modified Code 3.1. No country is obligated to carry out the provisions of any international agreement that it has signed, if the country’s parliament has not ratified the treaty. The United States has signed some international agreements, such as the nuclear test ban treaty, that have not been ratified by the Senate.

      In article 31 of the report, the IAEA complains again about the modified Code 3.1: “Both in the case of the Darkhovin facility [a mid-size nuclear reactor that Iran intends to construct] and FFEP [Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant], Iran did not notify the Agency in a timely manner of the decision to construct or to authorize construction of the facilities, as required in the modified Code 3.1….” But, once again, Iran has withdrawn from modified Code 3.1, and has no obligation other than Code 3.1 [that requires only 180 days advanced notification].

      In article 40, the report once again makes a political statement against all the relevant international laws:

      Previous reports by the Director General have detailed the outstanding issues and the actions required of Iran, including, inter alia, that Iran implement the Additional Protocol…

      And again in article 50

      The Director General requests Iran to take steps towards the full implementation of its Safeguards Agreement and its other obligations, including the implementation of its Additional Protocol.

      These statements are even contrary to what the report says in article 6, where the Agency states that, “Since the Feb 2010 report, the Agency has successfully conducted 4 unannounced inspections at FEP, making a total of 35 such inspections since March 2007.” Such unannounced visits are covered only by the Additional Protocol (AP). So, while Iran is still carrying out this aspect of the AP, the IAEA still complains about it and, at the same time, it considers implementation of the AP an obligation for Iran.

      Iran has no obligation to ratify the AP.

      Re. code 3.1 — besides the fact that it has never been ratified either, there are other meta-level legal concerns with what it even means:

      http://jurist.org/forumy/2010/03/qom-enrichment-facility-was-iran.php

      ==========

      I have sympathy with your emotions that Iran may be up to no good and something needs to be done about it, but the IAEA is not the vehicle with which to express those emotions. The law has to be followed, and the CSA is very precise and narrow in scope when the AP remains un-ratified.

    • Alan (History)

      archjr – related to your point 2, NAM member votes cast over the Board Resolution against Iran in November 2009 (pursuant to the Qom/Fordow facility announcement and Iran’s effective rejection of the TRR deal), were as follows (13 NAM members on BOG):

      For: 6
      Against: 3
      Abstained: 4

    • Alan (History)

      FSB – re Arak, the agency is entitled to design verification visits under the standard CSA following receipt of design info. Design info had already been provided for Arak while Iran was adhering to the modified 3.1.

      I believe Iran has since relented and let the IAEA into Arak, although more access will be required in future.

    • FSB (History)

      Alan,
      I am glad to see Iran is cooperating with the IAEA, even though it provided the design information voluntarily whilst its parliament had not yet ratified the modified Code 3.1. And Code 3.1 enforcibility, esp. without ratification is dubious (see link above).

      Perhaps a new fuel swap deal will send Iran’s dossier back to the IAEA and head off regime change led by US congress and MEK terrorists:

      http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/09/22/congressional_backers_look_to_exiled_iranian_group_for_regime_change

      Thanks to sir_mixxalot for the link.

      This is part of the reason that the 118 NAM countries think that IAEA is being manipulated by the US. Plus the fact that there have been several incidents of intelligence operatives acting as inspectors in Iran and Iraq (pre-war).

      A case in point is David Kay, who served as the IAEA/UNSCOM (United Nations Special Commission) Chief Nuclear Weapons Inspector in Iraq. He was accused by Iraqi officials of being a spy and was quite instrumental in building the case for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. He once admitted that some inspections in Iraq went hand in hand with spying. When in 1999 he was asked by PBS’s Frontline what he thought about infiltration of the UNSCOM by intelligence agents, he answered:

      “Well, I think it was a Faustian bargain. The intelligence communities of the world had the only expertise that you could use if you were unmasking a clandestine program. . . . So, from the very beginning, you needed that expertise, but I can say for myself personally—and I’m really only comfortable talking about myself—although a number of us discussed this in the early days—I realize it was always a bargain with the Devil—spies spying. The longer it continued, the more the intelligence agencies would, often for very legitimate reasons, decide that they had to use the access they got through cooperation with UNSCOM to carry out their missions.”

      ====
      Mark: if you’d like to address archjr’s concern that Art 22 CSA arbitration has be attempted that would be good.

  20. mark (History)

    Point of clarification: Heinonen, the IAEA, and Iran at the board meeting

    Some people who have read this blog post in the official world and haven’t commented on it here have related to me indirectly that it is believed or rumored that the IAEA said during the board meeting that Olli Heinonen “apologized” to Iran for not providing the data on the weaponization allegations.

    I can assert with great confidence that this is NOT true.

    Ambassador Soltanieh asserted during one of his long interventions that Heinonen had “apologized” to Iran for this. I don’t believe, and can’t believe, that the IAEA was willing to confirm this.

    • Brandon (History)

      Of course Olli has been one of the chief protagonists within the Agency on the alleged studies and I believe was barred from working within Iran, but the rumors may be grounded in other officials as official IAEA reports (http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2008/gov2008-15.pdf, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2008/ebsp2008n007.html, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2009/gov2009-55.pdf) stated

      that “the Agency received much of this information only in electronic form and was not authorized to provide copies to Iran”

      that “nor has the Agency detected the actual use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies”

      and most specifically that “the constraints placed by some Member States on the availability of information to Iran are making it more difficult for the Agency to conduct detailed discussions with Iran on this matter” and “the Director General urges Member States which have provided documentation to the Agency to work out new modalities with the Agency so that it could share further documentation with Iran, as appropriate, since the Agency’s inability to do so is rendering it difficult for the Agency to progress further in its verification process”.

      There indeed is some doubt about the documents inside and outside the Agency. One diplomat said “I can fabricate that data” (http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/13/international/middleeast/13nukes.html?_r=3&pagewanted=print&oref=slogin&oref=slogin) and some IAEA officials have called for a clear statement by the Agency that it could not affirm the documents’ authenticity after the agency obtained hard evidence in early 2008 that a key document in the collection had been fraudulently altered. While some have suggested the documents have added credibility because they appear in multiple intelligence sources, others argue this is simply because of the way intelligence sharing works.

    • FSB (History)

      Brandon,
      agreed. And I commented on this angle earlier — from Peter Casey:

      The IAEA reports state that “it should be emphasized … that the Agency has not detected the actual use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies” (IAEA Gov/2008/15 at paragraph 28 [.pdf]). The immediately preceding board report was even more explicit: “[I]t should be noted that the Agency has not detected the actual use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies, nor does it have credible information in this regard” (IAEA Gov/2008/4 at paragraph 54 [.pdf])

      It further states: “It should be noted that the Agency currently has no information … on the actual design or manufacture by Iran of nuclear material components of a nuclear weapon or of certain other key components, such as initiators, or on related nuclear physics studies” (IAEA Gov/2008/15 at paragraph 24).

      The IAEA has seen “no indication of any [uranium metal conversion] and casting activity in Iran” (IAEA Gov/2007/58 at paragraph 25).

      That people say that “Iran refuses to answer” IAEA questions is grossly misleading. As documented in every single IAEA board report since the laptop allegations first surfaced, Iran has consistently and adamantly answered many of the allegations by describing them as baseless and fabricated. In addition, it was only in February 2008 that the U.S. even gave the IAEA permission to show any of the documents to Iran to enable it to respond (IAEA Gov/2008/4 at paragraph 37). The U.S. further manipulated the IAEA’s efforts by providing “much of this information [to the IAEA] only in electronic form” and “not authorizing the [IAEA] to provide copies to Iran” (IAEA Gov/2008/15 at paragraph 16). The U.S. even refused to give the IAEA itself copies of some material. The agency was “therefore unfortunately unable to make them available to Iran.”

      Iran’s declination to respond to allegations based on documents it has never been shown, or has only been allowed to peek at, may qualify as a “refusal” to answer, but that would not stand up in any court of law…except perhaps at Gitmo.

      More info at:

      http://www.antiwar.com/orig/caseyp.php?articleid=13133

  21. sir_mixxalot (History)

    fyi, OpEd on Iran’s nuclear program in today’s C.S. Monitor:

    http://www.csmonitor.com/layout/set/print/content/view/print/327510

    • George William Herbert (History)

      It is hard to take seriously an editorial which lends credence to the idea that it’s possible to build centrifuges which can’t be used to enrich past LEU reactor fuel levels.

      ANY full fuel cycle activity can be diverted to a HEU project. All the enrichment tools can be topped-off from LEU production to HEU. This is why the IAEA is so focused on inspecting all fuel cycles. And why everyone else’s fuel cycles are so open.

    • sir_mixxalot (History)

      I agree the writer is not up to speed technically.

      I disagree with you that everyone else’s fuel cycles are so open — Brazil kicked out its inspectors based upon flimsy arguments of proprietary technologies.

      It was not pursued becuase it is not (now) a threat to the US.

    • George William Herbert (History)

      Not everyone’s fuel cycles are transparent enough, no. All the acknowledged nuclear nations + Israel have unsafeguarded fuel cycles, which are at least moderately well disclosed in most cases as part of wider non-IAEA threat reduction talks.

      You note Brazil; it’s another exception. As I recall (I’ve been focused elsewhere in the world, so I apologize if I’m not up to date here)…

      I believe that there’s been a general consensus that, unlike previous points in the past, they aren’t at this time attempting or considering a bomb program. I think consensus is that lack of current perfect IAEA access is probably not a problem in the sense of hiding a secret weapons program. I recall hearing that they continue to report activity, and the reports were felt to be accurate and consistent, just not inspection verified. If that’s not true perhaps I should look more at Brazil than I have been. I freely admit that I have not having focused on their program much for some years.

    • sir_mixxalot (History)

      GWH —
      If you have time, it would be worth exploring what Brazil is really up to.

      Their government officials have boasted about a military nuclear program:

      “If the government agrees, we need to have the ability in the future to develop a nuclear weapon,” said Gen. Jose Benedito de Barros Moreira, one of Brazil’s few four-star generals and a former head of the country’s War College. Barros Moreira, who is presently a senior official in Brazil’s Ministry of Defense, in charge of formulating the country’s military strategy, compared the weapon to a “lock” needed to safeguard Brazil’s resources.

      Their VP has said essentially the same:

      http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/09/25/jose-alencar-brazil-vp-sa_n_300187.html

      “BRASILIA, Brazil — Brazil’s vice president says in an interview published Friday that his country should develop nuclear weapons. Other officials stressed that his comments were not government policy.

      Jose Alencar, who also served as defense minister from 2004 to 2006, said in an interview with journalists from several Brazilian news media that his country does not have a program to develop nuclear weapons, but should: “We have to advance on that.”

      “The nuclear weapon, used as an instrument of deterrence, is of great importance for a country that has 15,000 kilometers of border to the west and a territorial sea” where oil reserves have been found, Alencar said.

      Alencar aide Adriano Silva confirmed the comments published by newspapers including O Globo and O Estado de Sao Paulo. But he said they were personal opinions and not a position of the government.”

      ===

      see also —

      http://www.wmdinsights.com/I23/I23_LA1_BrazilPursuit.htm

      http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,693336,00.html

      Mark has written on the Resende Fuel Processing Complex so maybe he can tell us more.

      Some more info:

      http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article12797.htm

      Note the way David Albright (of ISIS fame, or “infame”) downplays the Brazillian issue — based on politics, not impartial technical measures. But then he goes on to say:

      But former U.N. inspector Albright said he worked with Goncalves at the Brazilian Physics Society on a project to show that the Brazilian centrifuges could be used to produce highly enriched uranium, even if that wasn’t their intended use.

      ”Centrifuges are very flexible,” he said. ”Reconfiguring the cascades or recycling the enriched uranium multiple times can allow for the production of weapons-grade uranium.”

      I wonder why there are not more press releases from ISIS re. Brazil?

      In my view, that a fuss has not been rasied about Brazil only indicates the lack of even-handedness of which the NAM countries (rightly) complain. Brazil is not percieved as a threat to the West/UNSC so there is little pressure put upon the IAEA to investigate it as zealously as the IAEA is pressured to investigate Iran. If anything, judging by the statements of their officials one ought to be more concerned with Brazil than with Iran, although in neither case do I think are the nations actually diverting nuclear material for improper uses.

    • MWG (History)

      There seems to be a misapprehension in this thread that Brazil’s enrichment program is not under effective safeguards and that the focus on Iran therefore represents a double standard. In fact, Brazil has several enrichment plants under IAEA safeguards, including the one at Resende (see http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/Anrep2009/annexinfo.pdf p. 48). Years ago there were press reports of disagreements over what safeguards measures the IAEA wanted and what Brazil would accept, but as far as I am aware these were resolved long ago.

      The IAEA designs its safeguards approaches for enrichment plants to meet three overall objectives: (1) detect diversion of declared feed or product material, (2) detect undeclared production at declared LEU enrichment levels, and (3) detect production of HEU. I presume that the IAEA believes that the agreed safeguards approach at Resende allows it to meet those objectives.

    • hass (History)

      MWG – Brazil’s enrichment plants are under safeguards and so is Iran’s. In fact, Iran’s are under far more intensive scrutiny. However, no one is saying that Brazil should be denied her right to enrich uranium, as they’re doing with Iran. despite the fact that Brazil has flatly refused to sign the AP which Iran voluntarily implemented it for 2.5 years.

  22. Mohammad (History)

    archjr,

    You said “The fact is that Iran has been given every opportunity to satisfy others’ concerns, without losing face, and they have failed to seize the moment at every turn.”

    The same can be said of the West. Iran has offered many assuring proposals to satisfy the West’s concerns, to no avail. As early as 2005, Ahmadinejad suggested multilateral uranium enrichment by an international consortium on Iran’s soil. As outlined by the last link provided by sir_mixxalot, another proposal was using centrifuges which were technically incapable of enriching Uranium at high levels. All of these proposals were ignored.

    In contrast, I think that neither of the proposals put forward by the West were ‘face-saving’ for Iran, since all of them demanded zero enrichment on Iranian soil, which is deemed a humiliation in Iranian public.

    • FSB (History)

      You said: ” I think that neither of the proposals put forward by the West were ‘face-saving’ for Iran, since all of them demanded zero enrichment on Iranian soil, which is deemed a humiliation in Iranian public.”

      Such demands from the West (really just the US, possibly UK and France) are also in contravention of the NPT, that is why the 118 nations of the NAM protested the treatment of Iran. And properly so.

  23. FSB (History)

    The US IC has repeatedly said Iran seeks to keep open the _option_ to have a weapons capability — not that it has a nuclear weapons production program.

    From the DNI —

    Annual Threat Assessment:

    http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20100202_testimony.pdf

    “We continue to assess Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that bring it closer to being able to produce such weapons, should it choose to do so. We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.”

    And the “721” report:

    http://www.dni.gov/reports/2009_721_Report.pdf

    “…we do not know whether Iran will eventually decide to produce nuclear weapons.”

    Let us re-cap: to the best of the US IC’s knowledge the Iranian government has NOT decided to make nuclear weapons.

  24. Brandon (History)

    “This is why the IAEA is so focused on inspecting all fuel cycles. And why everyone else’s fuel cycles are so open.”

    If only Iran would voluntarily implement the Additional Protocol, or agree to modalities to resolve concerns about its nuclear program, or say that it would respond to the allegations against it if it were presented with the evidence for them.

    • FSB (History)

      If only the UNSC will return Iran’s dossier to the IAEA its rightful place, maybe this will happen.

      If only the West will say that, yes, Iran does have a right to enrich U for fuel, this will happen.

      Then IAEA+Iran should undertake Art 22 arbitration, which is what should have happened to being with.

      The proper procedure for handling any disagreements between the BoG and Iranian govt. re. CSA:

      http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc214.pdf

      Article 22

      “Any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement, except a dispute with regard to a finding by the Board under Article 19 or an action taken by the Board pursuant to such a finding, which is not settled by negotiation or another procedure agreed to by the Government of Iran and the Agency shall, at the request of either, be submitted to an arbitral tribunal composed as follows:

      the Government of Iran and the Agency shall each designate one arbitrator, and the two arbitrators so designated shall elect a third, who shall be the Chairman. If, within thirty days of the request for arbitration, either the Government of Iran or the Agency has not designated an arbitrator, either the Government of Iran or the Agency may request the President of the International Court of Justice to appoint an arbitrator. The same procedure shall apply if, within thirty days of the designation or appointment of the second arbitrator, the third arbitrator has not been elected. A majority of the members of the arbitral tribunal shall constitute a quorum, and all decisions shall require the concurrence of two arbitrators. The arbitral procedure shall be fixed by the tribunal. The decisions of the tribunal shall be binding on the Government of Iran and the Agency.”

    • hass (History)

      Iran did voluntarily implement the AP for over 2 years, and has offered to permanently ratify it but the US insists that Iran be stripped of the inalienable right to enrich uranium.

    • MWG (History)

      Haas is incorrect here. The United States is not insisting on “stripping” Iran of its “inalienable right” to enrich uranium. The UN Security Council is demanding that Iran suspend enrichment-related until Iran restores confidence that its program is peaceful. That may take some time, but the word “suspend” implies that it is not permanent.

      Iran voluntarily limited its right to enrich uranium – or any other nuclear activity – when it ratified the NPT. Those nuclear activities must be undertaken in conformity with Articles I-IV of the NPT (as recognized at the 2010 NPT Review Conference). Iran violated Article III (pursuing enrichment in secret) which raised obvious questions about its commitment to Article II (not acquiring nuclear weapons). It is not unreasonable to place the burden on Iran to restore international confidence. To my feeble mind it would seem irrational not to put that burden on Iran.

  25. kme (History)

    I don’t know why the resolution on urging Israel to join the NPT is being handled in the way it is by the US and allies.

    Surely the smart option is to amend it so that it calls on all the non-states-party to join the NPT, and furthermore calls on all states that have not done so to execute an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

    Simply treat it as the paper tiger that it is.

  26. mark (History)

    FSB et. al.: Infcirc-153 Article 22: To our knowledge on the blog, this hasn’t been invoked–yet. And it would, in my view, be an exceedingly long shot should Iran take that step. You’ll soon hear why from from the guy sitting next to me here in the plenary at the IAEA GC…

    • Andreas Persbo (History)

      … That would be me. I think that Iran would feel nervous about accepting arbitration, as their case is not as clear cut as you seem to think. The cardinal rule in any legal procedure is not to engage in it unless you feel fairly certain that you’re going to win.

    • FSB (History)

      Thanks Mark — would be good to know. However note that the IAEA itself is welcome to take the step: Art 22 arbitration can be kicked off “at the request of either”.

      Since the IAEA has a dispute w/ Iran (outside of Art 19 findings) it has the option to start Art 22 arbitration, as does Iran.

      Andreas Presbo in his post ~week ago agreed he’d like to see this happen also, btw.

    • FSB (History)

      Mark, Andreas — agreed it would prob. not work out in Iran’s favour…but as I understand Art 22, IAEA can kick it off also. What is your take? Is the IAEA nervous that they may lose out also?

    • MWG (History)

      To respond to FSB’s latest query, yes, the IAEA could request arbitration under Article 22. Furthermore, this request could come from the Secretariat and, if Iran refused to follow the required procedures or accept the results, the Board could (under Article 18 of the safeguards agreement) call on Iran to take action and, failing that, find Iran in further noncompliance.

      In practice the Secretariat would be reluctant to take such an unprecedented step without the approval of the Board of Governors, and I suspect the Board would rather preserve its autonomy on safeguards implementation rather than defer to an unknown quantity. That probably explains why arbitration has never been used – neither the IAEA nor any party to a dispute with the IAEA has been willing to take that gamble.

    • Andreas Persbo (History)

      Back from Vienna. MWG is right. The IAEA serves its member states, and Iran is a member. I would be very surprised if the Secretariat suddenly requested arbitration without going through the membership (one way or the other). After all, it’s an IGO with international personality and not a sovereign state.

  27. mark (History)

    I said in this blog post that there was an unholy alliance brewing between Iran and advanced nuclear countries on the issue of confidentiality of IAEA safeguards information. Here on the IAEA GC54 plenary floor I’ve just been informed that the drafting of the safeguards resolution for this conference was in effect a merger of two propositions on confidentiality in Paragraph 22 of GC(54)/COM.5/L.9/Rev 1: US and Iran.

    • George William Herbert (History)

      I am glad we’re getting this information and insight; bits of it are reminding me of the famous sausagemaking quote, though.

  28. FSB (History)

    Re. the Iranian scientist who defected and re-defected and his insights into the Iranian nuclear weapons programme and how all this is spun and hyped by NYT and WaPo reporters —

    http://washington-report.org/component/content/article/358-2010-september-october/10106-amiri-told-cia-iran-has-no-nuclear-bomb-program-.html

  29. mark (History)

    Andreas, MWG: On arbitration under Article 18, not only would the political risks be great, as MWG says, at this particular time at the board level they would certainly be incalculable. There would be for sure no consensus on this matter between NAM states and the Western group. If we were to make the assumption (rightly or wrongly) under the current IAEA secretariat leadership, that the latter group’s concerns would be in effect suspended in favor of an overtly “neutral” arbitrator willing to bend to the NAM states, imagine the implications should the process get out of control and the outcome be that Iran is deemend in compliance with its obligations under Infcirc-214. I can’t believe the secretariat would let that happen. There are too many people in at least 3 departments there fully aware of the dangers of doing that. More likely would be an outcome in which Iran–once more–would claim, and get support from a few outspoken NAM states, that the arbitration “proved” that Iran’s grievances are legitimate. Iran’s assertions would rev up the level of polemic inside the board of governors by a few more decibels, posing yet another obstacle to any future consensus on this matter. The bottom line is that the arbitration process would not be an effective way of resolving conflict over Iran’s safeguards compliance.

    • FSB (History)

      Yes, I agree that is terribly unfortunate. It begs the question why Iran and the IAEA both signed the CSA that contained an article saying that arbitration was the proper recourse for disputes outside art 19.

      As in the case of the entire NPT, people would like to have more power and control than they actually have on signed documents.

      It is unfortunate that the IAEA does not have more power, but that is the case.

    • Ataune (History)

      Mark,

      There are news in Farsi language media indicating that after Iran and NAM vigourous complaints the Secreteriat has agreed to clearly state the articles of Iran (Syria, others ?) safeguard agreeemnt for each of the sections of its future Iran (Syria, others ?) compliance reports. Furthermore, the secretariat has once again promessed to patch all the leaks at the board level. Are these true ?

  30. mark (History)

    Ataune, you raise two points:

    1.)I don’t know about any agreement by Amano or secretariat to modify the language or format of their reports to the board on Iran. In its statement to the board meeting, Soltanieh argued that the September report did not use standard language on verification. This is denied by the IAEA, which takes the view as I understand it that there is no standard language for such reports. By analogy the IAEA might well argue there is likewise no standard format for these reports. I don’t think the secretariat wants to get onto a slippery slope with Iran about the wording or formatting of its reports.

    2.)Your second point, concerning the “leaks,” was certainly dealt with during the meeting. Iran made objections and Amano and the IAEA have told Iran they will address them. Iran has taken the view that it has the right to prevent specific IAEA inspectors from being designated for work in Iran in the future if Iran concludes that these inspectors were the ones who provided specific confidential information to the IAEA, which was subsequently leaked. The IAEA however has told Iran that no IAEA personnel has been found to be involved in leaking information.

  31. hass (History)

    The explicit text of Iran’s safeguards agreement, in both the preamble and the first article, clearly states that it is EXCLUSIVELY intended to address the diversion of nuclear material.

    It is none of the IAEA’s busines if Iran “is out of compliance with UNSCRs” because the IAEA has no authority to enforce the UNSCRs and is not even part of the UN. Nor is it any business of the iAEA if Iran decides to suspended implementation of the Additional Protocol which it has never ratified in the first place, nor that that Iran has refused to even discuss the allegations of possible military nuclear activities which as the iAEA has itself stated, do not involve any diversion of nuclear material.

    • FSB (History)

      Agreed. Even the IAEA knows this:

      note paragraph 52 of the Feb 2006 IAEA report on Iran:

      “[A]bsent some nexus to nuclear material the Agency’s legal authority to pursue the verification of possible nuclear weapons related activity is limited.”

  32. archjr (History)

    I found this very useful, and balanced, regarding compliance from someone who knows the issues inside-out: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_09/Jenkins

  33. mark (History)

    archjr: Thanks for that link. Jenkins’ report underscores, as I said in my comment above from 9/28, both the political component involved in any board finding on safeguards compliance, and the current likelihood that the NAM and Western states on the board, faced with the task of making such a finding, would not reach a consensus. As Jenkins says, the political nature of the board of governors is an asset that affords memmbers flexibility, but–as we saw two weeks ago–it is also a potential liability.

  34. Ataune (History)

    Mark,

    Here is the translation of what Salehi, the head of Iran Atomic Energy Agency, was reported saying 2 days ago by the ISNA news service (I am only giving the part which is related to the first point you mentioned). I will add that Salehi is genrally perceived as a credible and prudent technocrate not bound to political chicanery. I have personnally found that, at least since 3 years ago when he took the helm of this agency, his public declaration were accurate and to the point.

    “The annual general assembly of the IAEA in Vienna had several positive outcomes

    Another event which took place in this meeting was that Iran was able to arrange a good platform for the future cooperation with the Agency. These issues [Iran and NAM complaints] were explicitly raised with the Director General of IAEA and a Resolution were adopted regarding how to implement the Safeguard, which is an important point. It has been mentioned [in this Resolution] that from now on if the Agency is evaluating an issue about the nuclear activities of countries in their reports, it should refer to the section of the Safeguards which is implying the issue.”

  35. mark (History)

    Ataune, here is the text of the resolution GC/54/RES/11

    http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC54/GC54Resolutions/English/gc54res-11_en.pdf

    If you look at Paragraph 27, you will find that in fact Saheli is quite correct.

    • MWG (History)

      This text is identical to the previous year’s. It says the Secretariat should “continue” to provide objective reports with “appropriate” reference to safeguards provisions. This calls for continuity, not change, and implies that the current degree of reference to safeguards provisions is “appropriate.”

    • ataune (History)

      MWG,

      Could you please post the link for previous year.

  36. FSB (History)

    Of interest re. the Iran NIE:

    http://www.armscontrol.org/issuebriefs/irannie2007

    There has been no retreat from the key historical judgment that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and no advance to a conclusion that Iran had decided to develop nuclear weapons.

  37. mark (History)

    Ataune, MWG:

    This is the resolution from 2009:

    http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC53/GC53Resolutions/English/gc53res-14_en.pdf

    MWG’s point is well taken. The language in operative paragraph 27 in both resolutions is identical.

    I would have thought that Salehi would have announced to Iranians that Iran had scored points in what’s in paragraph 22 of the 2010 resolution. Compare it with the text of the 2009 resolution’s paragraph 10.