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Josh Pollack happened upon this amazing video of Safeguards Analytical Laboratory at Seibersdorf. Some briefs shots of what looks like Tuwaitha, Yongbyon (inside) and Pelindaba. Which got me thinking that the IAEA must have a spectacular video library.

It turns out the IAEA has a channel on YouTube, including a video on an inspection of imported fuel assemblies at the Kundankulam reactor in India.

Comment

Part Two of a two-part series on the 2010 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community. See Part One.

Well, it’s been a long, snowbound weekend here in the Nation’s Capital and its general vicinity. There’s not much to do while waiting for the Super Bowl commercials — assuming that your home has power this fine evening — so why don’t we take a few minutes to consider the views of the U.S. Intelligence Community on North Korea’s military capabilities?

According to the IC’s Annual Threat Assessment, the North Koreans now have three kinds of weapons: those that no longer work, those that they may or may not have built, and those that they may or may not be working on anymore.

Let’s start with the first sort.

The Conventional Arsenal, Such As It May Be

The ATA contains what must be the toughest assessment on record of the combat readiness of the Korean People’s Army (KPA):

The KPA’s capabilities are limited by an aging weapons inventory, low production of military combat systems, deteriorating physical condition of soldiers, reduced training, and increasing diversion of the military to infrastructure support. Inflexible leadership, corruption, low morale, obsolescent weapons, a weak logistical system, and problems with command and control also constrain the KPA capabilities and readiness.

It’s been said that North Korea has long had the practical equivalent of a nuclear bomb in the form of massed artillery in range of Seoul. But how much of a threat can such a decrepit force pose? Certainly, it doesn’t sound like it could put up much of a fight, which brings us to the next point:

Because the conventional military capabilities gap between North and South Korea [never mind the U.S.! —JP] has become so overwhelmingly great and prospects for reversal of this gap so remote, Pyongyang relies on its nuclear program to deter external attacks on the state and to its regime. Although there are other reasons for the North to pursue its nuclear program, redressing conventional weaknesses is a major factor and one that Kim and his likely successors will not easily dismiss.

Because, as everyone knows, you don’t bring a knife to a gunfight. The implication? That North Korea is unlikely to move too far down the path of nuclear disarmament while it perceives any serious external threat.

But just how far has North Korea moved down the path of nuclear armament?

Which Brings Us To The Nukes

Let’s start with some definition of terms. On page 14, the ATA says:

The North’s October 2006 nuclear test was consistent with our longstanding assessment that it had produced a nuclear device, although we judge the test itself to have been a partial failure based on its less-than-one-kiloton TNT equivalent yield. The North’s probable nuclear test in May 2009 supports its claim that it has been seeking to develop weapons, and with a yield of roughly a few kilotons TNT equivalent, was apparently more successful than the 2006 test. We judge North Korea has tested two nuclear devices, and while we do not know whether the North has produced nuclear weapons, we assess it has the capability to do so.

There are a couple of dichotomies worth examining here.

First, nuclear test vs. probable nuclear test. The difference is radionuclides. In October 2006, ODNI announced that they were found:

Analysis of air samples collected on October 11, 2006 detected radioactive debris which confirms that North Korea conducted an underground nuclear explosion in the vicinity of P’unggye on October 9, 2006. The explosion yield was less than a kiloton.

In June 2009, as discussed previously here and here, the ODNI press release said nothing on this point:

The U.S. Intelligence Community assesses that North Korea probably conducted an underground nuclear explosion in the vicinity of P’unggye on May 25, 2009. The explosion yield was approximately a few kilotons. Analysis of the event continues.

The association of the word “probable” or “probably” with the second test can be traced directly to the silence on radionuclides.

Second, nuclear device vs. nuclear weapon. A device can go “bang” in a test shaft, but a weapon is something built for combat, implying that it would reliably achieve the expected yield, fits within a suitable casing, has a fuze, and so forth. The ATA says that North Korea is now able to make weapons, a possibility discussed recently here. But the text does not make clear whether the IC judges that these weapons could be mated to a suitable delivery system.

Dept. of Revisions and Ambiguities

There are two nagging little spots in the discussion of North Korea’s nuclear R&D. In one place, the IC appears to have tweaked a previous assessment — not a problem in itself, certainly! — but isn’t calling attention to the change. In the other place, it’s unclear whether or not the IC is adhering to a previous judgment. These estimates have a way of shifting around on you, if you don’t watch them carefully.

The first point is the reference to the IC’s “longstanding assessment that [North Korea] had produced a nuclear device,” as opposed to a nuclear weapon. As Jonathan Pollack of the U.S. Naval War College* observed in his memorable 2003 article on the demise of the US-DPRK Agreed Framework, IC assessments during the early years of the George W. Bush administration did claim that North Korea was in possession of nuclear weapons. Previous assessments didn’t go quite so far. For the details, see pages 12 and 13 — I’ll put the excerpt in the comments.

(*Around here, we call him “Pollack the Elder.”)

The ATA’s discussion of North Korean uranium enrichment activity is somewhat vague. Mostly, it’s consistent with the readings of North Korea’s declarations that you could find here and here, and shrugs, “The exact intent of these announcements is unclear, and they do not speak definitively to the technical status of the uranium enrichment program.” Quite so.

So much for the open sources. Does other intelligence shed any light on whether North Korea is actually making any headway on enrichment? The ATA makes reference only to the past:

The Intelligence Community continues to assess with high confidence North Korea has pursued a uranium enrichment capability in the past, which we assess was for weapons.

It’s silent on the matter of what North Korea is up to now up to. Joe DeTrani, DNI’s mission manager for North Korea, made a bit of a stir back in March 2007, when he signalled a lack of strong consensus on whether meaningful work continued:

The intelligence in 2002… made possible a high confidence judgment about North Korea’s efforts to acquire a uranium enrichment capability. The Intelligence Community had then, and continues to have, high confidence in its assessment that North Korea has pursued that capability.

We have continued to assess efforts by North Korea since 2002. All Intelligence Community agencies have at least moderate confidence that North Korea’s past efforts to acquire a uranium enrichment capability continue today.

[Update: To avoid confusion, I’ve expanded the quote above.]

An August 2007 IC report (quoted here) put the pieces together like so:

We continue to assess with high confidence that North Korea has pursued efforts to acquire a uranium enrichment capability, which we assess is intended for nuclear weapons. All Intelligence Community agencies judge with at least moderate confidence that this past effort continues. The degree of progress towards producing enriched uranium remains unknown, however.

The February 2008 ATA contained a streamlined version of the statement above. The February 2009 ATA put a different spin on the lack of consensus:

The IC continues to assess North Korea has pursued a uranium enrichment capability in the past. Some in the Intelligence Community have increasing concerns that North Korea has an ongoing covert uranium enrichment program.

So, as you can see, the latest ATA returns to the language of the August 2007 report about the past, but leaves us hanging on the question of the present.

OK, then. You’ve read enough blogs for awhile — go back to shoveling snow, or to shoveling nachos while the Saints pound the Colts in the fleeting moments between commercials in sunny Miami.

Comment [4]

Oh, shut up already!

Some enterprising Belgian military spokesperson has decided to announce to the entire world that of the two sets of 11 hardened shelters at Kleine Brogel Airbase, the activists were in the one without nuclear weapons:

A similar stunt occurred last November, according to Ingrid Baeck, a chief spokeswoman for the Belgian Ministry of Defense, who sought to minimize the danger.

“I can assure you these people never, ever got anywhere near a sensitive area,” Baeck said in a telephone interview Friday. “They are talking nonsense.”

[snip]

But Baeck challenged the activists’ claims they went undetected for well over an hour, that guards were unarmed and that they were able to approach a hardened bunker containing sensitive materiel undeterred.

“It was an empty bunker, a shelter,” Baeck said of the building.

Way to paint a target on the loaded ones, genius.

Just take your lumps, because you can’t pretend Belgian security didn’t fail. The activist incursion is an alarming anecdotal demonstration of a systemic security problem that was well documented before the February incident.

In some important ways, Baeck is exaggerating herself — for example, we can see that the guard’s weapon is not loaded — but the real problem is that she also revealed where the activists ought to have gone. Nice way to get some kid shot on April 3, when they come back.

Yes, there are two sets of 11 shelters at Kleine Brogel, only one of which has WS3 vaults (Here is a set of Google Earth placemarks). The activists assumed that the one they accessed was the nuclear one based on their previous analysis (and the serendipity of an open gate).

The other area seems to have a more impressive fence line. That is probably, as Ms. Beack suggests, the location of the hardened shelters with WS3 vaults. (By the way, I wish I had been as careful in my post text as I tried to be in my image captions.)

If you look at the pictures of the General Tom Hobbins visiting the 701 MUNSS at Kleine Brogel in March 2006, there are two wide-angle pictures that confirm the location of the WS3 as the area I have place-marked as A. The activists were in B.

Lt. Erline Wyseur (left) and Capt. Jason Long, 701 MUNSS, meet Gen. Tom Hobbins, U.S. Air Forces in Europe commander, during his unit visit March 10.

If you open up the Google Placemarks, I am pretty sure they are standing in front of the shelter marked A3, with A4 in the background.

You can see the hardened aircraft shelter, aligned at a 45 angle to the taxiway, over Hobbins’s right shoulder.

A tree line runs along the left side of the taxiway and wraps behind the shelter, before breaking to a clear view of the horizon.

Over Long’s left shoulder, there is a small clump of trees. In the high resolution image, you can also see what looks like a ditch. The obstruction visible over Hobbin’s right shoulder appears to be related to the ditch.

On the far side of the ditch, there is a small road that crosses the taxiway and it is visible over Hobbin’s right shoulder.

There is no other bunker arrangement that even looks close. Moreover, here is another shot of Hobbins at a facility about 100 meters to the north.

Chief Master Sgt. James Fleshman, 701 MUNSS, meets Gen. Tom Hobbins, U.S. Air Forces in Europe commander, during his unit visit March 10.

Again — this doesn’t change the fact that Belgian security turned in a woeful performance. (I am still scratching my head over the lack of guard dogs.) This was an anecdotal demonstration of something that is, as I noted before, well-documented by US officials. Moreover, it’s quite a stretch for Baeck to say that the activists “never, ever got anywhere near a sensitive area” — they were inside the wire, which is a plausible definition of “near,” and the two areas are less than two clicks from one another.

I continue to think that if the Belgian government (and other NATO governments) refuse to provide adequate security at Kleine Brogel, the weapons should be placed at US base where we will.

And a note to our Belgian friends. I was going to keep these to myself, but since Ms. Baeck decided to help out, there isn’t much point. But please don’t try to get into area A. If the Belgian security is inadequate, the SACEUR has almost certainly assigned additional US security personnel. They will most likely respond very differently than the Belgian sort you are used to.

Comment [5]

Iran’s aerospace program has been so active in the last few years it should be possible to say something about their development philosophy: the technological arc or trajectory they are following. For instance, why did they “jump” from SCUD-type missiles to the Shahab-3-type? Why didn’t they put a higher priority on clustering engines in order to achieve greater ranges before moving on to the Shahab-3? Many of my friends believe they should have. A large portion of their argument is centered on the fact that they believe Iran would have established a missile capable of hitting Israel much sooner if they had done that, perhaps as early as the mid-1990s. Of course, such arguments place an extraordinary amount of emphasis on such a military objective, especially when Iran’s nuclear program was much, much less advanced.

I’ve always thought, however, that Iran did make a strategic decision about the direction its missile development program was going in. But it was not a military-strategic decision but an industrial-strategic decision even if there were military advantages to be had further down the road. I believe Iran decided they needed to assimilate the technology for producing large engines indigenously and that this was a much higher priority for them than early production of a longer range missile. New images released at the same time as the “Kavoshgar-3” sounding rocket (with its animal passengers) was launched. Two amazingly important images were released:

A new, large, two-stage rocket with the Iranian space agency logos on it. The second stage appears to be the same stage (and nose fairing) as the Safir’s second stage.

Assuming that the smaller diameter second stage is the same as the Safir’s second stage (with a diameter of 1.25 meters), then the much larger first stage is consistent with a diameter of 1.95 meters. That is, of course, considerably smaller than twice the Shahab-3’s diameter of 2 times 1.25 (or 2.5) meters. So it is fair to ask “What can you put in there?” I think the answer is a cluster of four “Nodong engines.” And, voila, the Iranians show a new rocket power plant with a cluster of four Nodong engines at the same gathering where Pres. Ahmadinejad watched the Kavoshgar-3 launch:

An Iranian rocket scientist unveils the new cluster of four Nodong engines, known as the Phoenix (if Google translate is working properly). The yellow struts above the engines are for transmitting the thrust to the rocket’s airframe. Their presence implies that the first stage will use jet vanes for thrust vector control.

Phoenix, the name of the new power plant, is an interesting name. I’m not sure what the Iranian mythological implications are but as a Westerner, to me it means rebirth in fire. Perhaps they are implying the rebirth of this engine design in a new form. Of course, it is always dangerous to use one cultural point of view to analyze another culture’s literary allusions.

The yellow struts rising above the engine cluster (and their multiple turbopumps, perhaps four? one for each engine?) are for fastening the power plant to the rocket body and for transmitting the thrust they develop. They are angled slightly outward for increased structural strength. Pads at the top of the struts are the connections with corresponding strong points inside the first stage. But is the first stage wide enough to accommodate this cluster?

To answer that question, I have had to go through a chain of photo-interpretation; each of which undoubtedly contributes a certain amount of uncertainty or error to the final answer. First, I had to determine the diameter of the Nodong engine. (I know these are Shahab-3 engines, but I am so used to calling them Nodongs, it would be too painful to switch. Let it be known that I think these engines are indigenously produced in Iran, though Iran probably bought or licensed the production line for them from North Korea.) I get a diameter for the combustion chamber, just below the strong points for the struts, of 0.57 m.

Then, transfer this diameter to the image of the Phoenix power plant:

The top of the Phoenix power plant, showing the combustion chambers and the full diameter of the struts. Calculations by the author indicate that this cluster of four engines would certainly fit inside the large rocket body shown above.

Using this combustion chamber diameter as a reference point on length, I get a total separation between opposite pads at the top of the struts of 1.87 meters. Of course, a rather long chain of analyses was needed to estimate this length. And even the assumption that the farthest right strut pad and the farthest left strut pad represent the full diameter of the support system introduces a certain amount of uncertainty (though that is reduced by a cosine theta effect). Nevertheless, this is remarkably close to my estimate for the diameter of the new rocket’s first stage. Close enough to convince me that this is the new first stage’s power plant.

Note that there are at least superficial differences between this rocket’s first stage and the DPRK’s U’nha-2’s first stage. If nothing else, Iran has designed the airframe itself. (I am being extra cautious about this, my own feeling is that Iran has designed the entire first stage itself. But that is such a key step in my understanding of Iran’s missile development trajectory, that I am hesitant to state it as a conclusion.)

So what do I think has happened? First, Iran purchased a production line for Nodong engines (and the other components of the Shahab-3 missile) from North Korea. However, though the years of producing them, flight testing Shahabs, and modifying them with the design and production of the Safir and other rockets, Iran has fully assimilated this technology and they are moving on to the next stage of development—clustering large engines (they obviously gained some highly important experience with the cluster of two engines on the Safir’s second stage)— and they are probably doing this largely on their own.

Note: a future post will estimate the range of this missile using the “hypothesis” developed here.

Comment [45]

As you undoubtedly noticed, Iran launched a rocket on February 2. And released pictures of a space launch vehicle. Which may not be the same thing.

As some of you may know, Geoff Forden is going through some personal stuff right now, which is why we are missing his usual detailed commentary on Iran’s space launch. (He has something coming, but I am inclined to be patient.)

So, in honor of Geoff, I am just going to create an open thread for the Iranian space launch. Here are images from IRNA, ISNA and Mehr to get you started.

Have at it.

Comment [9]

Holy crap.

If you watch this video on YouTube it is very clear that a group of Belgian peace activists not only got inside the wire at Kleine-Brogel Airbase — where some US nuclear weapons may be stored — but they also got into the area where the hardened shelters are located (within the shelters are aircraft and WS3 storage vaults with US B61 nuclear gravity bombs.)

Between the Youtube video, a pair of stories on the Der Standard and Neusblad websites, their Facebook page and website, and Google Earth, it is pretty easy to recreate their path. (Hans K came to the same conclusion.)

Here are some images, with annotations linked to the time stamps in the video.

It looks like the activists approached Kleine-Brogel from the farms to the south of the airbase. Indeed, another group hopped the fence in November 2009. Apparently, they planned to go out on the runway and get arrested just like the previous group in November 2009. But, according to the group’s website “to their surprise, they were able to walk for over an hour on the runway.” (One of the press reports suggests it was forty minutes.)

The base is surrounded by signs indicating that the area is patrolled by guard dogs, but Milou was nowhere to be found.

Eventually, they noticed an open gate to the area where US nuclear weapons are believed to be stored. Belgian peace groups had previously identified the area based on a map handed out an airshow. (As you can see from their website, they had very good maps.)

It looks like this was a side gate — apparently it had been left open to keep from freezing shut — so the activists were able to enter the secure area and approach one of the hardened aircraft shelters from the rear. If you could get inside, it would look something like this.

Well, I suspect the vault (with the bomb) would be in the floor.

The activists defaced the shelter with stickers and then emerged onto the concrete plaza in the center of the area.

They then walked the length of the plaza — having traversed both the width of the base, and now the width of the secure area for nuclear weapons — when security force finally showed up.

The “security force” appears to comprise one moderately annoyed-looking Belgian guy with a rifle. (Which RAJ47 observes is unloaded.) The effect would only be more comedic if he had some powdered sugar on his face and maybe a little bit of waffle stuck to his uniform.

How The [REDACTED] Did This Happen?

The reality is that significant shortcomings exists in the security of European airbases where US nuclear weapons are stored. That was made absolutely clear to me on my visit to SHAPE — and it was reported in the 2008 Air Force Blue Ribbon Review. Host-nations are supposed to provide security but they often cut corners. This is basically confirmed by the Belgian commander of the base, who explained that he just doesn’t have enough security forces:

Onze luchtmachtbasis is in totaliteit 450 hectare groot. Een derde is bosgebied waarin ik me drie weken kan bevinden zonder te worden gezien. Vandaar dat we onze bewaking, gelet op onze getalsterkte, concentreren op enkele gevoelige zones.

That works out to, more or less, “Our airbase is 450 hectares in size. A third is wooded areas in which I could stay perfectly well for three weeks without being seen. That is why we concentrate our surveillance on a few sensitive zones where there are aircraft and equipment.” (The translation is by the Open Source Center.)

Mort Halperin tells a funny story about when, in the late 1990s, then-German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer called on NATO to adopt a policy of no-first use, widely seen at the time as the beginning of a discussion about withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Germany. Mort, then serving in the Clinton Administration, told a colleague that the German government had opened the door to the removal of US forward-deployed nuclear weapons. His colleague retorted: “You are not talking to the real German government.”

What Mort’s colleague meant was that there is — and has been for many years — a gap between Europe’s public, represented by elected leaders, and the so-called “real” governments — the national security bureaucracies in NATO and the European allies. So while NATO and European defense ministries make the case privately that forward-based nuclear weapons are politically and militarily essential to NATO, European political leaders have declined to make that case to their constituents for the money to modernize either aircraft or to keep up security.

What Should We Do?

As excuses go “It’s a big, wooded base and I don’t have that many troops” doesn’t cut it. In fact, when we are talking about nuclear weapons, it frankly sucks. When it comes to securing nuclear weapons, the United States Air Force has standards for both denial and recapture. If the Belgians and other NATO members won’t provide the forces and equipment necessary to meet both standards, then it is time to put the weapons on a US airbase.

The most direct route to securing US nuclear weapons in Europe is to immediately — like yesterday — consolidate all remaining forward deployed nuclear weapons to just one or two US airbases in Europe. Take your pick from Aviano, Incirlik, Lakenheath and Ramstein. This would immediately improve the overall security of the weapons, while starting a dialogue about whether forward-deployed weapons are really essential to maintaining NATO’s nuclear character twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. This is a point that several of us made in a letter to the President

The actual removal of such weapons should await formal consultations within NATO and may, in part, depend on arms control negotiations with Russia. But a useful first step would be the immediate consolidation of remaining forward-deployed nuclear weapons to one or two U.S. airbases in Europe.

The classic argument for leaving US nuclear weapons on European bases has always been burden-sharing — there is a value to forcing European governments to make the public case for spending money on NATO’s nuclear mission. Of course, that assumes that the governments actually make the necessary investments, rather than skimping on security.

Given the appalling state of security at Kleine Brogel, that argument seems unpersuasive today.

Update | 6:40 pm K-Reif reminds me that I outlined precisely this scenario at the Carnegie Endowment:

[T]he dominant character … of those weapons in Europe is that we don’t talk about them. I think NATO countries have been incredibly reluctant to make the public case about why they need U.S. nuclear weapons on their soil. And as a result … you see a corresponding lack of funding for security at the sites at which the European allies provide security …

[snip]

… I worry very much about a singularity, an event. It could be a security event. Our friends from Peace Action Belgium, could get in the wire with a cell phone and take a picture of a [hardened shelter].

[snip]

I do worry that something could happen that will deny NATO its preferred option of not talking about this, and then force the participants into a very ugly public debate in which the result would be the rapid, disorganized, uncoordinated withdrawal of the weapons amidst recriminations. And to me that would be much worse than beginning the dialogue about what the optimal posture is and whether that includes weapons.

[Emphasis mine]

It’s a little weird that I called Peace Action Belgium — that is sheer coincidence.

Update | 8:34, 5 February 2010 I somehow missed that Stephen Schwartz and Noah Shachtman were first — so many social media and blog pages, so little time!

Comment [18]

The Soviet Navy viewed nuclear-tipped torpedoes as aircraft carrier killers. A Soviet Foxtrot class diesel submarine, B-59, had this ace-in-the-hole when it was being depth-charged to the surface by the U.S. Navy during the Cuban missile crisis. Did Adm. George Anderson, the Chief of Naval Operations (and the Navy’s version of Gen. Curtis LeMay) suspect that he was dealing with nuclear-armed submarines when his ships were aggressively enforcing the quarantine of Cuba? Wonks: Help me out here. There was much the U.S. intelligence community did not know during this crisis, including the presence of nuclear weapons in Cuba when the Kennedy administration was contemplating military options to take out missile sites. And no American official could possibly have known at that time that three officers on board the B-59 were conducting the most important vote in the history of the Nuclear Age, on whether to fire their nuclear-tipped torpedo or alternatively, so to speak, to go up with the ship.

We learned much later, after the Cold War was over, when Americans and Russians began to swap stories, that the Captain, Second Captain, and Deputy Political Officer on board the B-59 made a private compact over the possible use of their nuclear-tipped torpedo during the Cuban missile crisis. They were, of course, supposed to check back with Moscow before doing so, but it was hard for a diesel sub to call home while under attack. (For more on how the best laid plans for nuclear deterrence can go awry, Wonks-in-training can check out Scott Sagan’s The Limits of Safety.)

And so, on October 27, 1962, the same day that a U-2 was shot down over Cuba, the three officers voted. They promised each other that, in extremis, if they were unable to work through authorized channels, they would make their own decision about using their nuclear weapon. If all three voted in favor, they would do so. If the vote wasn’t unanimous, they would hold their fire. Two of the three officers voted to fire their torpedo. The third, Vasili Alexandrovich Arkipov, voted nay.

Arkipov should have been Time magazine’s Man of the Year, but Time’s editors, like the rest of us, were unaware of his remarkable contribution to Western civilization. Time voted for Pope John XXIII, instead. I’ve never seen a picture of Arkipov – maybe Jeffrey can find one for this post. He’s the unsung hero of the Cuban missile crisis.

Oral histories are only as reliable as the memories of story tellers. So if ACW readers have reason to believe these memories are deficient, please hold forth.

Comment [12]

The Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community is out, and it’s official: cyber is the new black.

(The version presented to the Senate is linked above. Here’s the basically identical House version.)

Judging by the many threats ably described in this report, life is short, so let’s skip to the good stuff. Pages 13-15 summarize the IC’s view of missile and nuclear developments in rogue states the Axis of Evil Iran and North Korea. Today’s topic is Iran. Tomorrow — barring the Apocalypse or unforeseen delays — we’ll consider North Korea.

[Update | Feb. 7, 2010. After a Snowpocalypse-induced delay, we have a North Korea post.]

Two areas are especially worth a look: the analysis of the Qom enrichment facility, and the handling of the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran, a subject of fierce public debate, probably for years to come.

Qom — What is it Good For?

After summarizing what the IAEA reports say about Natanz, we get to Qom, a.k.a. Fordow, a.k.a. FFEP. Let’s focus on a few points of interest:

Second, Iran has been constructing—in secret until last September—a second uranium enrichment plant deep under a mountain near the city of Qom. It is unclear to us whether Iran’s motivations for building this facility go beyond its publicly claimed intent to preserve enrichment know-how if attacked, but the existence of the facility and some of its design features raise our concerns. The facility is too small to produce regular fuel reloads for civilian nuclear power plants, but is large enough for weapons purposes if Iran opts configure it for highly enriched uranium production. It is worth noting that the small size of the facility and the security afforded the site by its construction under a mountain fit nicely with a strategy of keeping the option open to build a nuclear weapon at some future date, if Tehran ever decides to do so.

Deep under a mountain. This echoes the characterization of the senior administration official who spoke to the press on September 25, 2009: “a very heavily protected, very heavily disguised facility.” But as Geoff Forden pointed out shortly thereafter, the available images show a cut-and-cover facility, neither deeply buried nor heavily protected by anything but its camouflage (“very heavily disguised”) and local air defenses. Is there some misunderstanding at work here?

To preserve enrichment know-how if attacked. This is almost what the head of the AEOI, Ali Akbar Salehi, told reporters at the time, but not quite:

“This site is at the base of a mountain and was selected on purpose in a place that would be protected against aerial attack. That’s why the site was chosen adjacent to a military site,” Salehi told a news conference. “It was intended to safeguard our nuclear facilities and reduce the cost of active defense system. If we had chosen another site, we would have had to set up another aerial defense system.”

The stated point, it appears, was to keep centrifuges spinning. The potential non-military application for uranium enrichment (in a hidden location, no less) after declared nuclear facilities have been destroyed is somewhat elusive. Bureaucratic inertia, as some have argued? A desire to prevent the West from imposing a “suspension by other means,” even if it has to be kept a deep secret? Or, as the IC testimony appears to suggest, to keep personnel trained up on centrifuge operations until large-scale operations could resume?

If Iran opts configure it for highly enriched uranium production. On the morning of September 25, President Obama stated flatly that “the size and configuration of this facility is inconsistent with a peaceful program.” It appears that the IC has now walked back the part about configuration, perhaps on the basis of findings from IAEA visits. Does this mean that the President was misinformed or misspoke, or did something change at the site, perhaps in the three weeks that passed before the IAEA’s initial visit? [Update: Peter Crail of ACA points out that the language on this point in the ATA is consistent with a Q&A released last September.]

Keeping the option open. This bit tracks with the September 25 background briefing: “our information is that the Iranians began this facility with the intent that it be secret, and therefore giving them an option of producing weapons-grade uranium without the international community knowing about it.”

Reaffirming the 2007 NIE, Sorta

The ATA states,

Iran’s technical advancement, particularly in uranium enrichment, strengthens our 2007 NIE assessment that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons, making the central issue its political will to do so. These advancements lead us to reaffirm our judgment from the 2007 NIE that Iran is technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon in the next few years, if it chooses to do so.

But what about the other judgments? This passage does comment directly on the contentious questions of whether Iran A) suspended research on weaponization in late 2003, as the NIE had claimed, and B) later resumed the work, a possibility the NIE considered but did not embrace.

This question was stirred up again by the appearance of the celebrated or infamous uranium deuteride document in the Times of London last December. In early January, the New York Times reported that “top advisers” to the President had reached the conclusion that the NIE had been mistaken about the weaponization question, a view said to be shared in Britain, France, Germany, and Israel. The NYT did not mention the views of the U.S. IC, but a few days later, DIA Director Ronald Burgess told Voice of America something close to a reaffirmation of the contested point, but not quite:

“The bottom line assessments of the NIE still hold true,” he said. “We have not seen indication that the government has made the decision to move ahead with the program. But the fact still remains that we don’t know what we don’t know.”

Newsweek‘s sources claimed that the IC was settling on a view that Iran had resumed research, but not development of nuclear weapons. The Washington Times went further, stating that the IC was poised to walk back the claim that Iran had suspended work in the first place.

The closest that the new ATA comes to remarking on weaponization is this seemingly anodyne observation: “We continue to judge Iran’s nuclear decisionmaking is guided by a cost-benefit approach, which offers the international community opportunities to influence Tehran.” This language echoes the 2007 NIE Key Judgments: “Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to international pressure indicates Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs.”

Readers will have to decide what that really means. After the warm welcome received by the Iran NIE Key Judgments back in December of 2007, we should not expect to see a similar release anytime soon. For clarification, we’ll probably have to settle for the forthcoming Questions for the Record.

Comment [10]

The Administration has proposed a massive increase in funding for the nuclear weapons complex, increasing the budget for NNSA by 13.4 percent (over what the FY2010 appropriation.)

John Fleck has an excellent write-up of the announcement in the Albuquerque Journal.

The purpose of announcing the massive increases in funding for the nuclear weapons enterprise — stockpile support (25 percent increase), infrastructure (5 percent) and other categories is political — is presented as the right thing to do, which it may be, but it is also intended to find votes in the Senate for ratification of the START Follow-on Treaty and, at a later date, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The budget release follows a major op-ed by Vice President Biden in the Wall Street Journal that makes explicit the link between funding the complex and achieving the agenda laid out in Prague:

Our budget request is just one of several closely related and equally important initiatives giving life to the president’s Prague agenda. Others include completing the New START agreement with Russia, releasing the Nuclear Posture Review on March 1, holding the Nuclear Security Summit in April, and pursuing ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Some of my friends are complaining that by funding the complex first and asking for START (and CTBT) ratification second, the Administration is spending is squandering its only leverage.

I worry about that, too. But I think this is the right approach, given the structure of the Senate and the President’s temperament.

Let’s hold aside, for the moment, the argument that the complex is deteriorating and people are leaving. I suspect that lack of funding isn’t the primary challenge facing the labs nor is more money a sufficient remedy for their woes. But more money is probably a necessary element of a comprehensive strategy to fix the labs. This is, all things considered, probably the correct policy decision.

The Politics of Treaty Ratification

But is it good politics? Barack Obama said he preferred to be a great one term president, rather than a mediocre two-term President. No one believe him of course, because the two are often correlated — the ability to achieve policy successes depends in large part on the same political acumen that aids reelection.

There are basically two approaches to getting to 67 votes in the United States Senate to ratify an arms control treaty. One option is to peel off just enough Republican Senators, convincing them to break ranks with their party in exchange for specific benefits or out of fear of losing reelection. The other is to secure the support of both the Senate Majority and Minority Leaders, so that the issue does not become partisan at all.

I hate to point this out, but only one of these two strategies has ever worked for an arms control treaty (at least as far as I can tell.) Securing the support of the opposition leadership is essential to avoiding a straight party-line vote that is more about partisanship than the national interest. This is why Michael Krepon, who edited the wonderful Politics of Treaty Ratification, blogged that “ratification usually happens by comfortable majorities or not at all.” John Isaacs made this point, as well.

This is the context in which to understand Senator Jon Kyl’s opposition to the various arms control treaties: He is Minority Whip and aspires to be the leading Republican voice on security issues. Perhaps, like another aspiring whip, he imagines even greater offices are within his grasp. His strategy to achieve these things is to make votes on arms control treaties a test of Senator’s Republican bona fides.

To worry that Senator Kyl might “pocket” this concession and ask for ever more rather misses the point. Of course, he’s going to do that (and more)! He’s not an idiot, after all. But nor is Senator Kyl the proper object of a ratification strategy — or at least he shouldn’t be.

The practical reality is that the Administration has to bring a majority of the Republican caucus along to support START and CTBT — even if fewer votes are technically required. If you look at the dozen of so candidates the Administration might hope to “peel off” — such as John McCain or Richard Lugar — few of them will be eager about the prospect of crossing over on a party line vote. The key to ratification has always been Mitch McConnell — and will be as long as he is Senate Minority Leader.

Depoliticizing START and CTBT

Which brings us to the budget roll-out. I don’t have any special insight into how Vice President Biden — who is spear-heading ratification process for START and CTBT — is going about cutting a deal. But I seem to recall he is familiar with the Senate.

If the strategy is to avoid, to the greatest extent possible, politicizing either treaty, starving the nuclear weapons complex probably won’t create leverage with the Senate Minority Leader and might, in fact, backfire. If you give Republicans a choice between a well-funded nuclear weapons complex and a talking point to conflate the Prague agenda with unilateral disarmament — which is a favorite claim by Senator Kyl — most will understandably choose the latter. “Unilateral disarmament” is the “death panel” of the nuclear weapons debate. The goal, then, is to take away Kyl’s talking points, rather than to horse-trade with Senators. (That comes later.)

Frankly, this is probably the only strategy an Obama Administration would undertake. It is difficult to imagine this President taking the bare-knuckled approach that we might have gotten from, say, Lyndon Johnson. However much juice his presidency has left — and that is the popular parlor question of the moment, for people in Georgetown who can afford parlors — for better or for worse, Barack Obama has his own style.

I cannot, for example, imagine Obama, as LBJ did, holding a meeting in the buff at the White House swimming pool or dictating to poor Doris Kearns from the commode. For better, or for worse.

So, we are left with the strategy of attempting to depoliticize the treaties, recognizing that there will be some additional horse-trading at a later date. It might not always succeed, but it is probably the only strategy that will.

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Funny thing about the Bomb: you can’t eat it.

Going by what the North Korean government has said of late, they’re not exactly beating their swords into ploughshares or their spears into pruning hooks. But, we are told, national security goals have made way for economic goals, and a third nuclear test should not be expected.

Dismissive remarks about further nuclear testing have now appeared at least twice in reports about a major industrial achievement. On December 19, 2009, KCNA, the official news service, reported a visit by Kim Jong Il to the Songjin Steel Complex, a.k.a. Songgang, home to a new “Juche-based” method of iron and steel production. After inspecting the facilities, KJI was pleased:

The workers of Songgang completed the steel-making method based on Juche iron by their own efforts and with their own technology, shattering conservatism and mysticism about technology, he noted, adding that this is a historic event of special mention in the development of metallurgical industry and a victory greater than the third successful nuclear test.

On December 25, KCNA reported the visit of a delegation from the steel complex to Pyongyang, where they were greeted with “a joint congratulatory message” from the Powers That Be — the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party and the National Defense Commission of the DPRK. It concluded:

The above-said spectacular success represents a great victory of the immortal Juche idea and a great demonstration of the national power more striking than the conduct of the third nuclear test.

(Emphasis added in both quotes.)

These statements, attributed to the highest levels, are internal propaganda. That’s what KCNA is for, mostly, and outside of North Korea, who could possibly care about local developments in ferrous metallurgy? It’s hard to avoid the impression that the regime is trying to set public expectations: Don’t stay up waiting all night for more big bangs, folks.

The tougher question is, why? Not knowing won’t stop me from guessing.

A Shift in Priorities

First, we could take Pyongyang at face value.

The January 1, 2010 joint New Year editorial of three North Korean newspapers was titled, “Bring About a Radical Turn in the People’s Standard of Living by Accelerating the Development of Light Industry and Agriculture Once Again This Year That Marks the 65th Anniversary of the Founding of the Workers’ Party of Korea.” (It reads better in the original, for all I know.) The KCNA excerpt describes the past year as one of “dramatic change” and the start of “a decisive turn in the Korean revolution and the building of a thriving nation,” a time of “great revolutionary upsurge” marked by technological and industrial achievements, nay, triumphs — foremost among them the second satellite launch, the second nuclear test, the production of Juche steel, and the “attainment of the cutting edge of CNC technology." The rest of the achievements are purely economic.

The coming year, too, will be “a year of general offensive, when all-Party and nationwide efforts should be concentrated on improving the people’s standard of living on the basis of the laudable victory and achievements of the great revolutionary upsurge.”

So, based on what the government is telling its people, military achievements will take a backseat to economic ones, meaning no nuclear tests to muddy the narrative. Given the new restrictions on open-air markets and the “currency reform” that destroyed virtually all private savings in North Korea in 2009, this prospect must make the average citizen shudder with dread — there’s every reason to expect the further reconsolidation of the command economy.

[Update | Feb. 2. On reflection, the announced shift is away from both military and heavy-industrial priorities, and towards production of food and consumer goods. See the comments for further elaboration.]

Not Necessary or Not Worth It

Second, North Korea may judge its second nuclear test to have been a success, obviating the need for additional testing. They may believe that the second test shows they have a working weapon in the neighborhood of 4 kt yield — what they apparently told the Chinese they were aiming for back in October 2006, before their first test fizzled.

This scenario would fit well with a view of the first test shared by a number of close observers (see: So, Like, Why Didn’t It Work?, October 10, 2006; NORK Nuke Missile?, November 3, 2006).

Third, as Paul Kerr pointed out in these webpages around the same time, the shock value from this sort of thing starts to wear off quickly (see: More Norky Goodness, October 9, 2006). It just may not be worth it, next to how much it would piss off the Chinese, not to mention the further expenditure of limited plutonium stocks (a concern that led many experts to doubt that North Korea would test in 2009).

Not a Good Time

Fourth, let’s recall that the Norks are making nice. Foreign Ministry statements on January 11, 2010 (“DPRK Proposes to Start of Peace Talks”) and January 18 (“DPRK on Reasonable Way for Sept. 19 Joint Statement”) call for replacing the Korean War Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty — Pyongyang’s new condition for denuclearization, or returning to talks on denuclearization, depending on how you read it. A third nuclear test would complicate the charm offensive.

(Incidentally, the latter statement mentions the demolition of the Yongbyon cooling tower in 2008, which I take as an indicator that they’re unlikely to rebuild it while the nice-making persists.)

So take your pick: for some, all, or maybe none of the above reasons, North Korea is letting the man (and traffic lady) on the street know that there are no immediate plans to test again.

Bonus!

As a reward for reading this far — if you skipped down here, scroll right back up, mister! — here’s the video of Steven Bosworth’s January 19, 2010 appearance on the Colbert Report, in which the envoy to North Korea explains why the peace treaty condition isn’t going to fly. No, there’s no astounding impression of an atmospheric nuclear test, but Colbert does manage to leave Bosworth speechless at the end.

Bonus bonus!

You must have been wondering, Hey, just how often does “reasonable” appear in daily KCNA items, anyway?

The answer, according to the invaluable search engine at NK News, is 1,163 times since KCNA went online in January 1996. Which is more than I’d expected, but still two fewer times than “nuclear war,” 88 fewer than “destruction,” 650 fewer than “aggressor,” and 987 fewer than “reactionaries.” Now you know.

Comment [11]