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The Mother of All Influenza Viruses. This graph indicates that all the H1N1 viruses that circulated since 1918 were mutations of the Spanish Flu. (From Taubenberger and Reid, Influenza, ed. C. W. Potter, p. 118.)

Nothing says dual-use like biology. And, seemingly, nothing worries some policymakers more than the spread (or discovery) of biological knowledge. Of course, the reasons for this are obvious if you are more worried about the misuse of knowledge than the benefits that knowledge can give to humanity. The suspects in the 2001 anthrax attacks, and their association with Fort Detrick, add a certain punch to this belief. On the other hand, making bio-agents is often the first step in making a vaccine or other beneficial medicine. I remember seeing large bags being filled with tetanus toxin produced in a developing country and then “denatured” to produce shots that obviously save a lot of lives. On the other hand, the larger fermentors used for its production could easily be used to produce botulinum toxin or other anaerobic bacteria suitable for weaponization.

We see the same tensions playing out in the nuclear field with a sizeable chunk of policymakers (most seemingly from developed countries) and across a wide range of the political spectrum saying that nationally owned enrichment centers pose a significant danger to proliferation. At the same time, important statesmen for developing countries have stated: “The assumption should not be that some nuclear technologies are safe in some hands but not others.” This debate will not be easily settled and is well worth discussing. ( I come down in favor of limiting and eventually ending nationally owned enrichment facilities, through out the world and including in the United States, in favor of multinationally owned ventures . However, the deals must be made so economically favorable, by using economically efficient centrifuges, as to induce countries to join voluntarily.)

I was struck once again by this balancing act between acquiring knowledge and banning certain types of research when it was recently announced that the H1N1 virus (aka swine flu) in the current outbreak did not have the “genetic markers” associated with really virulent 1918 “Spanish Flu.” That flu virus’s genetic code was sequenced in 1997. The dangers associated with such procedures were discussed almost immediately by a number of authors. I recommend this article in Nature for a considered discussion of how to weight the pros and cons of reconstructing the 1918 Spanish Flu virus. Of course, that was written before the current pandemic-scare. I find the fact that the genetic markers (so far, I have not been able to find out which markers they are talking about) of this current flu are different from the 1918 variety very reassuring. It should also have a significant impact on what choices public health officials make. None of that would be possible without the sequencing of the virus.