Well, the NIE on terrorism is out.

The NIE confirms, in very broad language, that Al Qaeda would like to make the biggest boom:

We assess that al-Qa’ida will continue to try to acquire and employ chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material in attacks and would not hesitate to use them if it develops what it deems is sufficient capability.

That confirms the basic worry at the core of my terror farm article that Peter Zimmerman and I wrote for Foreign Policy (“Bomb in the Backyard,” November/December 2006): Although making a nuclear weapons wouldn’t be easy, it isn’t hard enough for me to feel safe.

I had concluded—based on Al Qaeda’s past incompetence in acquiring nuclear material and information—that radicalized professionals, after fissile material, are the hardest component for Al Qaeda to find.

The involvement of a doctor and an engineer in the recent attacks in the UK, however, make me worry that Bin Laden might “find his Oppenheimer” after all.

“It’s not that surprising for doctors and engineers to be involved in political Islamist movements—both of the violent and the more moderate sort,” one professor who studies such things told Hassan Fattah of the New York Times, “Fundamentalist-type attitudes are relatively common among people in applied science in the Muslim world. The conception has been that modern science is developed outside, and we need to bring it into our societies without it corrupting our culture.”

Frickin’ great.

3 Pages Devoted to Tradecraft

I would also note that only two of the seven pages are dedicated to the key judgments. The remainder of the document is a valuable discussion of National Intelligence Estimates—what they are, how they are produced, etc.—and how to read estimative language.

I applaud the IC for attempting to educate policymakers and other intelligence consumers about how to read the estimate critically, if they read it at all.

Sadly, I have my doubts—now that Bob Graham has moved to greener pastures—that many in the US Congress will read the two pages of key judgments, let alone the really important stuff about process. (Intelsuss has an amazing fascination with who read the NIE, when, what the lighting conditions were …)