We have discussed quite a few times now the possibility of Russia’s withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, as well as a related issue of Russia’s response to proposed U.S. missile interceptors in Europe. (Feb 26, 2007, Feb 14, 2007 March 12, 2006 and March 10, 2006 Also, Pavel Podvig has more at russianforces.org)

To continue updates on this issue, I wanted to call attention to Rose Gottemoeller’s op-ed in the New York Times and IHT on May 4, discussing Putin’s annual address to parliament. Noting Putin’s omissions during the speech, Gottemoeller argues that the threat of Russia’s INF withdrawal appears to be abating:


Another issue [Mr. Putin] left unaddressed was the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Russian military spokesmen have been threatening to withdraw from this treaty, often as a response to United States missile defenses but sometimes to bring Russian missile deployments in line with those of neighboring countries.

Mr. Putin might have launched another attack on the missile treaty; he might even have announced Russia’s full withdrawal. Instead, he took a swipe at the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty but left the door open for talks to solve a long standoff with NATO, which wants Russia to withdraw its troops from Georgia and Moldova. This can be resolved without dealing a major blow to security in Europe. Not so withdrawal from the missile treaty: here Russia would begin a slide toward ruining the nuclear arms control system put in place in the closing decade of the cold war. This outcome would encourage countries eager to break out of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. It would also ensure that Russia could post no claim to leadership in the world of international law and diplomacy.

Mr. Putin had good reason to stay silent on the matter, and the backing to do so. The Russian debate on the treaty is subtly shifting, with new attention to the missiles Russia will really need. Some Russians are arguing that the newest Russian intercontinental ballistic missile, the Topol, is already in production and could easily handle intermediate-range missile tasks as a kind of “universal missile,” while retooling defense plants to produce intermediate-range missiles would be expensive and the missiles could do only limited tasks. Other experts are arguing in favor of modern supersonic cruise missiles, claiming they are cheaper to produce and perfectly capable of responding to intermediate-range threats.

Administration officials (John C. Rood and Daniel Fried) testifying last week on the missile interceptors issue noted “Russian concerns,” but in a rather limited way. Both officials pointed out that the 10 planned interceptors would be no match against Russia’s nuclear forces. Yes, and the Russians understand this. It is not what they are worried about. The concerns voiced here are broader. For example: U.S. missile bases so close to Russia’s borders may be limited now, but what about later when they may serve as a start for further, more threatening installations?

However, as Gottemoeller notes in the op-ed, the administration does seem to be making a good effort at engaging Russia. In the last month, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, as well as Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation John Rood, traveled to Moscow for discussions on missile defense. Most recently, U.S. and Russia have agreed to hold high-level talks on the missile defense plans. U.S. and Russian foreign and defense ministers are tentatively planning to meet in September.

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On a related note, I was looking into the history of the INF, and came across a great 1987 article by Strobe Talbott, The Road to Zero, in Time. It is a fascinating account of the lead up and the blow by blow of negotiations. I highly recommend taking a break from today’s news, blog surfing, and whatever it is that we do at work, to take a look back 20 years.